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 1 
 
Abstract 
 
The thesis contends that there is a dominant strand of thinking driving the prevailing 
metanarrative of American global hegemony. This strand, constructed here as Ameritocracy, 
taps into three interconnected and fundamental principles concerning the nature of America: 
that American values are universal, terminal and providential. However, this notion of 
American universality is contradicted by a troubling parochialism, one that reveals religious, 
racial and cultural particularities generated from American identity, and from the mythic, 
providential origin story of America.    
 
The thesis expands on the theory of Ameritocracy, its historical derivation and theoretical 
antecedents, and its application within the soft power realm of Hollywood film. Ameritocracy 
finds its apotheosis in the popular blockbuster films of the unipolar era. The global aspirations 
of the blockbuster conflate with the universality of the medium, and thereby function as the 
perfect conduit for expounding the presumed universality of the American nation, promoting 
and proselytising on behalf of American primacy, using Ameritocratic arguments to 
legitimise and normalise U.S. hegemony. Analysis of blockbuster texts reveals that the 
notions of universality they embed are often partial and particular, featuring an obfuscation of 
definitions, between ideals and interests, between ends and means, and between the universal 
and the American. 
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A Note on the Production of an Audio-Visual Thesis 
 
There is considerable literature devoted to determining the core of American identity, much 
of which references notions connected to the universality of the American idea. However, 
given that the primary concern of this thesis is the role and function of audio-visual media in 
expressing this idea, it seemed logical to adopt an audio-visual approach that could engage 
directly with much of the material being analysed. Such an approach has obvious 
shortcomings.  
 
Firstly, the size of the written component placed a natural limitation on the depth of possible 
analysis, in comparison to a conventional written doctoral thesis. Consequently, parts of this 
component introduce the dynamic of Ameritocracy and ground the concept in historical 
precedents and theoretical antecedents, but stop short of a deep and full analysis; this enabled 
this thesis to cover a broader terrain than might have otherwise been possible, whilst also 
leaving much scope for further, and fuller, study in future.   
 
Secondly, and perhaps primarily, it is well recognised that audio-visual material generates a 
semiotic excess which written work can easily avoid through prolonged explication. 
However, this excess also enables the filmic part of this thesis to be more open to criticism 
and creative interpretation; Ameritocracy still has a primary narrative that attempts to link 
Hollywood film production to notions of American universality and global hegemony, but 
(through inclusion of non-hegemonic movies, and through playful juxtapositions of images, 
text, voiceover and music) allows space for negotiated and oppositional readings, and in that 
sense mimics the sort of processes audiences engage with when watching Hollywood movies. 
The written thesis advances the same argument as the audio-visual component, although its 
tone and content is more scholarly and less ‘open’ as a form; where appropriate I have made 
reference to oppositional texts and to the polysemic possibilities of Hollywood film.  
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Ameritocracy does not have a leading voiceover that guides the narrative. I initially 
experimented with such a voiceover, largely inspired by the documentary work of Adam 
Curtis (The Century of the Self (2002), The Power of Nightmares (2004) and The Trap 
(2007)), whose combinations of interview footage, archive imagery and polemical voiceover 
seemed to suit the development of an ‘academic’ audio-visual narrative. However, I found 
that the voiceover made the documentary excessively didactic and with a tendency to too 
readily slip into diatribe (criticisms which can also be levelled at Curtis’s work), whilst also 
distracting from the filmic texts themselves. Instead, elements of Curtis’s approach were 
used, with inspiration also being drawn from documentaries that dispense with narration 
entirely in the construction of their argument, including The Atomic Café (1982) and Baraka 
(1992). Consequently, the narrative thread of Ameritocracy is composed of interview footage 
with academics and individuals working in the film and culture industries (both filmed and 
sourced from other media), intercut and overlaid with extensive material from Hollywood 
movies, American television, Presidential addresses, popular music, quotations from relevant 
texts and a variety of other sources.  
 
The documentary film presented both intellectual and creative challenges, particularly in 
regard to how to express this thesis in an audio-visual format that would retain academic 
rigour without becoming a dry and boring film. How to present historical ideas – for which 
there is no documentary footage – using fictional film? How to condense a theory with 
pretensions to a relationship with something as vast, rich and diverse as American identity, in 
just one hour of documentary film? How to articulate an analytical concept in what is, 
predominantly, a creative medium? These queries, amongst others, informed much of the 
editorial decisions behind Ameritocracy and, whilst open to criticism, interpretation and 
development, hopefully form the basis of an emerging audio-visual academia. 
 
The structure of the documentary component of this thesis loosely matches the three-chapter 
structure of the written component. The first section of the film serves to explicate 
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Ameritocracy and place it within a historical context; section two moves on to analyse 
Hollywood as an industry, its relationship to processes of Americanisation and the various 
ways in which it intersects with notions of American universality; the third and final section 
of the film then thematically analyses specific blockbuster movies, and the ways in which 
they express Ameritocracy. The match between the written and audio-visual components is 
not perfect, and is not designed to be so; rather, they are two free-standing, yet complimentary 
elements of the same analysis.  
 
Wherever possible, I attempted to source all footage in high definition, and at the highest 
possible quality. However, much footage was only available on the internet (YouTube, 
Vimeo, etc) and thus the quality is less than what would be desirable, certainly for a 
documentary film made for broadcast.   
 
All references to ‘Ameritocracy’, the documentary film, are italicised in the written 
component of this thesis; any un-italicised reference to ‘Ameritocracy’ will be a reference to 
the theoretical concept.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The intellectual enquiry behind this doctoral thesis was initially stimulated by some casual 
observations inspired by watching Roland Emmerich’s 2004 disaster epic, The Day After 
Tomorrow, in which rapid climate change plunges the northern hemisphere into a new ice 
age.  In the film’s denouement, with those few Americans that had survived the apocalypse 
now in enviro-exile in Mexico, the new American President gives his first address to his 
populace in which he apologises for the previous lack of action on the issue of climate change 
and speaks hopefully of the future. Even though the address begins with the traditional ‘my 
fellow Americans’, it is clear that the audience he is speaking to is global, a fact confirmed by 
the film’s closing image of the entire world as seen from space, with the United States 
covered by a vast ice sheet. There seemed to be something contradictory at work: the 
geographic America was gone and yet the President still spoke with the authority of the 
world’s most powerful nation, speaking to, and even on behalf of, all peoples, not just 
American citizens. ‘America’ was not so much a place as a universal idea, one whose 
hegemonic position could not be challenged, not even by something as complete as national 
apocalypse. Further enquiry into other blockbuster movies (including the rest of Emmerich’s 
oeuvre) suggested that this notion was not unique, but widespread; there seemed to be 
something fundamental about American identity, and filmic representations of America, that 
sought to consistently express the universality of the American idea. But to what end? 
 
The Day After Tomorrow was produced and released in the geo-political context of the War 
on Terror and, even though the film’s ostensible theme and concern was environmental 
collapse, its universalist ideas appeared to have some resonance with the rhetoric emanating 
from the Bush administration concerning the prosecution of that war. Contentions like 
‘America will lead the world to peace’ (Dietrich, p.130) and ‘you’re either with us or with the 
terrorists’ (Steyn, p.174) spoke, albeit more aggressively, to a conviction that America could 
represent and lead all other nations, suggesting that acquiescence to American global 
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hegemony was inevitable, desirable and the result of the universal nature of American 
identity. These observations led to a series of questions that underpin this thesis: where did 
the presumed right of both factual and fictional American Presidents to speak to and on behalf 
of all peoples come from? What generates and sustains this sense of universality? How does 
Hollywood contribute to projecting and sustaining American global hegemony, and is there 
something particular about the nature of blockbuster films that lends them to the projection of 
American universality? Were Hollywood blockbusters, like Roland Emmerich’s, contributing 
to a universalisation of American values by consistently and uncritically representing those 
values as universal?  
 
The primary contention of this thesis is that American global hegemony, which manifests in a 
position of primacy and unipolarity in military, political-economic and cultural terms, is 
driven by a dominant metanarrative about America: that America is, historically has been and 
will always continue to be, more than just a nation; ‘America’ is also a universal, terminal and 
providential idea with something beneficent to offer all of mankind. This strand of thought, 
which I have termed Ameritocracy, runs far back into American history and can be found in 
the nation’s cultural content and geo-political endeavour, with the aspirational rhetoric of the 
former often undermined or contradicted by the pragmatic exigencies of the latter. American 
universality has often been in conflict with conceptions of American uniqueness and troubled 
by an underlying parochialism, yet it has proved to be a remarkably consistent element in the 
ways in which generations of Americans have been taught about American identity and 
projected that identity overseas. The purpose of thesis, in both its written and audio-visual 
components, is to outline the dynamic and potential of Ameritocracy, not necessarily to 
provide full and final answers to the multitude of questions it generates, and thus leaves much 
scope for further study. 
 
The concept of Ameritocracy is part of a long critical tradition in the discipline of American 
Studies to penetrate to the core of American identity and action, and, as such, interacts with a 
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broad range of theories and theorists across a variety of disciplines, including history, 
ideology, geo-politics, film theory and cultural analysis. In tracking the historical 
development of Ameritocracy, this thesis has been informed by Louis Hartz’s work on the 
liberal tradition and by Samuel Huntington’s more recent scholarship on American identity, 
but also attempts to move beyond both analyses by constructing a paradigm that enables the 
frequently opposed secular and sacred aspects of American identity to be drawn together. As 
a prism through which we might analyse the unipolar era of American global hegemony, 
Ameritocracy also relates directly to the work of scholars who have sought to understand the 
nature of the Pax Americana. Again, whilst drawing on the antagonistic work of scholars like 
Andrew Bacevich and Francis Fukuyama (both of whom, along with many other theorists, 
utilise notions of American global exceptionalism) Ameritocracy attempts to move beyond 
arguments revolving around the nature of American primacy or centred in the exceptionalist 
paradigm. Indeed, Ameritocracy actually functions as the primary metanarrative that 
underpins both American exceptionalism (with its constructions of American cultural 
uniqueness) and American hegemony (which concerns American cultural universality), thus 
offering potential resolution to the ‘paradox of a global USA’ (Mazlish, Chanda & 
Weisbrode, 2007).  
 
There is seemingly an obvious relationship between Ameritocracy and Joseph Nye’s 
conceptions of hard and soft power; clearly, Ameritocracy relates directly to both the 
rhetorical arguments that rationalise the application of American hard power, and to the 
persuasive, value-based assertions of American soft power. However, I have utilised Nye’s 
terms sparingly, in order to focus on more specific terms and arguments that have particular 
relevance to Hollywood film production and its interactions with American ideology, such as 
hegemony, propaganda, ‘commercial aesthetic’ (Maltby, 1983), and cultural transfer.  
This thesis focuses on how the political meanings and ideological functions of American 
economic and military primacy (with its rhetoric of universality) become abstracted into the 
medium of film, which, with its status as an allegedly universal language, has made 
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Hollywood a particularly fertile breeding ground for Ameritocratic ideas; indeed, the visual 
medium of cinema, globally dominated by Hollywood, is an extremely effective means to 
project myths of American hegemony. Moreover, the global aspirations of American 
blockbuster cinema offer an ideal conduit for the projection of American values as universal 
values, wherein abstractions of ‘America’ can combine with the industrial political economy 
of Hollywood.  The appeals of the Hollywood blockbuster speak not only to the universal 
commercial interests of the American cinema industry, but also to the broader ideological 
imperatives of the American nation. 
 
Whilst much scholarship has been undertaken concerning the commercial aspects of filmic 
universality (Maltby, Sklar, Olson and other theorists who have examined Hollywood movies 
as commercial, aesthetic and ideological objects) little work has been done in analysing how 
such universality manifests textually. Geoff King’s work on the ubiquity of frontier 
mythology in Hollywood blockbuster narratives had much relevance, as did Slotkin’s broader 
work on the frontier and it’s centrality to American national identity. Similarly, Bercovitch’s 
work on myth and the jeremiad, as a ‘universal’ rhetorical form, was equally pertinent.  
However, the frontier and the jeremiad are aspects of a broader Ameritocratic impulse in 
Hollywood cinema; they are both persistently deployed as narrative constructs (as 
constituents of a monomythic narrative lexicon) in blockbuster movies, but not necessarily as 
ends in themselves, but rather as textual and contextual means to express and renew 
American universality.  
 
The first chapter of this thesis will explicate the concept of Ameritocracy and place it within a 
historical context, whilst exploring its theoretical antecedents and conceptual companions. 
Chapter two will examine how Ameritocracy inter-relates with theories of Americanisation 
and globalisation, before exploring how Hollywood developed its commercial and industrial 
activities in such a way that made national cinema the ideal location for the projection of 
national ideology. Finally, chapter three will hone in on Roland Emmerich as a case study for 
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how Ameritocracy manifests textually, and examines his films as examples of how American 
universality is suffused in the content of Hollywood blockbusters, not just manifesting in the 
context of their political economy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Ameritocracy: The Proof and Projection of Primacy 
 
 In effect, the New Jerusalem had become the New Rome, an identity that did not 
 supplant America’s founding purpose but pointed toward its fulfillment – and the 
 fulfillment of history itself. (Bacevich 2003, p.95) 
 
Introduction 
It is widely held that as the Cold War ended, the United States of America (US) advanced her 
global position from ‘superpower’ to ‘hyperpower’, ushering in an era of unipolarity and 
American global primacy. In 1989, upon the cusp of that shift in nomenclature, Francis 
Fukuyama suggested that in fact 
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a 
particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end 
point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government. (Fukuyama, 1992) 
Fukayama’s triumphal words inaugurated what appeared to be an unprecedented global 
consensus concerning the efficacy and legitimacy of liberal democracy as a socio-political 
system, proven in the cauldron of Cold War combat. Fukuyama has since clarified his 
argument (2007), stating that ‘The End of History was never linked to a specifically American 
model of social or political organisation’ and thus the post-historical world he envisioned had 
nothing to do with ‘the Americans' continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their 
military’. Nonetheless, neo-conservative elements within the United States political 
establishment saw the theory as confirmation that the American way had triumphed, not just 
over communism, but also over all alternative forms of government, and that the world was a 
better place for it. The ‘end of history’ thesis, despite its nuances and Fukuyama’s later 
disavowal of its usage by neo-conservatives, could easily be perceived as ‘a testament to 
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idealistic beliefs in the ultimate global triumph of America’s liberal political economy… [and 
as] a celebratory universalistic articulation of the American way’ (Youngs, p.218). As 
President George HW Bush remarked in his 1991 State of the Union address, ‘the triumph of 
democratic ideas in eastern Europe and Latin America, and the continuing struggle for 
freedom elsewhere, all around the world, all confirm the wisdom of our nations founders.’ In 
short, American principles and values were good for the world. Moreover, Bush’s reference 
to the Founding Fathers suggests that the conditions of American dominance implied (if not 
explicitly denoted) by Fukuyama’s theory were not just the result of winning the Cold War, a 
particular moment of historical happenstance, but that such dominance marked the fulfilment 
of the nation’s historical and providential purpose to spread freedom and democracy to the 
world. 
 
Consequently, a preponderance of phrases and paradigms have emerged in the last two 
decades (particularly since 9/11 and the military actions of the War on Terror, which have 
brought America’s role in the world under heavy scrutiny), seeking to delineate and 
understand the phenomenon of American global dominance, which, for the purposes of this 
thesis, I will broadly collate under the umbrella term of American primacy. Many theorists 
have configured primacy via classical and biblical analogy: as Colossus (Ferguson, 2005) and 
Goliath (Mandelbaum, 2005), as a new Jerusalem or a new Rome1 (Bacevich, 2003), each 
drawing on the traditional myths of Western civilisation and implying an unparalleled sense 
of scale, reach and power. Many of these analyses also draw obvious comparisons to the 
comparatively more recent imperial escapades of the European age of empire, comparing and 
contrasting the status and styles of the empires of the old world with the “empire for/of 
liberty” of the new world. However, whilst the specific objects of comparison may vary, and 
debates around whether the American conjugation of primacy is better or fairer than previous                                                         1 Comparisons of the US to ancient Rome naturally make one think of filmic representations of the 
‘eternal city’ and its empire, and the ways in which Hollywood handles ‘history’. Ridley Scott’s epic 
Gladiator (2000) is a classic example: the actual events of history are treated very loosely, with 
‘Rome’ serving instead as the location for a ‘universal’ (although actually quite American) parable 
concerning the conflict between tyranny and democracy: "the general who became a slave, the slave 
who became a gladiator, the gladiator who defied an Emperor." 
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imperial models (and whether America technically constitutes an empire at all) continue, the 
fact of American primacy itself is uncontested2. It is obviously worth noting that, at time of 
writing (September 2011), America’s economic dominance has been severely tested by the 
financial crises of the last few years. With the BRIC economies continuing to grow and 
provide increasing amounts of competition, it seems that, economically at least, American 
dominance can no longer be assumed.  
 
Culturally, American primacy has often been articulated through the catch-all term 
‘Americanisation’, the sense that through the prolonged and continued exposure to American 
culture in all its myriad forms, all peoples are becoming more like Americans (in both 
structural paradigms and cultural values), transformed into Homo Americanus. Consequently, 
Americanisation has been used as both a synonym for globalisation, seen as the engine of 
transformation, and as an expletive to express fears of homogenisation and cultural 
imperialism, seen as the potential outcomes of transformation. We should not forget, 
however, that the original, and arguably primary, focus of the transformative powers of 
Americanisation has been domestic, referring to the processes of assimilation undergone by 
immigrant populations to the US. Each usage of the term, external and internal, has had 
positive and negative attributes; however, that such a process exists and dominates global 
cultural transfer is indisputable.  
 
In economics, primacy found specific articulation in the 1980s and 1990s through the 
Washington Consensus, a general orientation of national economies towards market 
fundamentalism and neo-liberal globalisation. Indeed, given the degree to which capitalism 
and democracy are intricately entwined in both the ideological rhetoric and the day-to-day                                                         
2 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a paucity of Hollywood films which critically engage with the scale 
and scope of American primacy, no matter how configured. Apocalypse Now (Coppola, 1979) 
attempted in part to contextualise the Vietnam War within an imperialist paradigm, although it is 
crucial to note that the most ‘anti-imperialist’ scene (in which Willard and his compatriots encounter 
former French colonialists defending their homestead) was entirely cut from the theatrical release. 
More recently, films like Syriana (Gaghan, 2005) and Lord of War (Niccol, 2005) have engaged with 
the geo-political contexts of oil and arms production respectively, and some limited critique of 
American complicity in anti-democratic processes which sustain both industries, although without 
recourse to an imperial paradigm. 
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reality of America, what is most unusual about both Fukuyama and President Bush’s 
triumphalist declarations about liberal democracy is the curious omission of capitalism as the 
economic component of that system. It seems likely that this is not an acceptance that other 
forms of economics could work as adequately with liberal democracy, but rather an 
insinuation that capitalism is so entrenched within the American conjugation of liberalism and 
democracy, so pervasive and ubiquitous, that to specify it would be redundant3. However, the 
rise of China as an economic power over recent decades suggests that liberalism, democracy 
and capitalism are not mutually inclusive; the American conjugation of these terms, projected 
as theoretically universal, is thus conceivably rather parochial. 
 
In foreign policy, the language of primacy has instead revolved around hyperpower and 
unipolarity, the nature of what some have dubbed the ‘American Imperium’ and others, in 
more benevolent terms, the ‘Pax Americana’. Irrespective of which expression is put to use, 
and whether American primacy is represented in a positive or negative light, the focus of the 
phraseology is clear: in all spheres American primacy is self-evident or, in military 
terminology, America has achieved ‘full spectrum dominance’. Clearly, the manifestations of 
American primacy are myriad and, at least within the empirical sphere of hard power, 
axiomatic.  
 
However, American primacy is also hegemonic, a term that is more applicable to the 
American model than ‘empire’ as 
 hegemony suggests more than dominance in the strictly political military or even 
 political economic senses. There is a sense of leadership. This implies there will be 
 much consensus mixed in with the usual coercion. As well as being feared for its 
 power, the hegemon is also greatly admired for its achievements. So much so that                                                         
3 Similarly to notions of American empire, there are few Hollywood films that provide a meaningful 
critique of American consumer-capitalism. Both Fight Club (Fincher, 1999) and American Beauty 
(Mendes, 1999) provide somewhat thin analyses of capitalist-materialist culture, and in both cases it 
seems that the films actually speak more to a perceived emasculation of white male Americans than to 
the inequities of the capitalist system. The Joker of Nolan’s Dark Knight (2008) can also be considered 
as an anti-capitalist in some respects, although as with Tyler Durden in Fight Club, his anarchist 
leanings are presented not as a rational critique, but as the outcome of mental derangement.  
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 others come to emulate the hegemon. In this way the hegemon comes to be widely 
 regarded as the model for the future. (Slater and Taylor 1999, p.5) 
During the Cold War, the West required a hegemon to defeat the threat of communism; 
American leadership was, predominantly, actively invited. In the absence of that threat, the 
United States has continued to argue the case for American leadership, with the emulation it 
suggests implicitly invoked. In his 1992 inaugural address, President Clinton suggested that 
‘clearly, America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make’, referring to the 
post-communist order as a ‘new world’. Similarly, President Obama, speaking at the United 
Nations in September 2009, stated that ‘every nation must know: America will live its values, 
and we will lead by example’. The importance of American global hegemony and leadership 
is central to the ways in which American Presidents have articulated American identity to 
Americans and to the world, particularly in the post Cold War era; this hegemonic viewpoint 
is not, however, conditional upon the partisan differences between Democrats and 
Republicans or the particular arrangements of geo-political factors of particular eras (although 
these contribute to the strength of specific iterations), but stems from something more 
fundamental. Andrew Bacevich (2003, p.98) notes that when, in Dec 2001, President Bush 
stated that ‘“America will lead the world to peace,” he was not simply resurrecting some 
windy Wilsonian platitude. He was affirming the nation’s fundamental strategic purpose and 
modus operandi’.  
 
American leadership, and thereby modelling (and encouragement of emulation) of her socio-
economic and political system, is deeply rooted in American national identity, and thus the 
presumptions of American leadership made by Presidents Clinton and Bush, were not 
original; they were, in fact, a re-articulation of a predominant theme in American thought 
regarding the promotion and extension of American principles and values. Matthew Fraser 
(2003, p.10), utilising Joseph Nye’s hard and soft power structure (1990), argues that  
 recognition of America as a ‘hyperpower’ is usually based on material facts – 
 specifically, the superiority of American hard power. Yet America’s global 
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 domination has been achieved largely through non-military means – in short, through 
 the extension, assertion, and influence of its soft power. If hard power, by definition, is 
 based on facts, soft power is based on values. American hard power is necessary to 
 maintain global stability. American soft power… spreads, validates and reinforces 
 common norms, values, beliefs, and lifestyles. Hard power threatens, soft power 
 seduces.  
The ‘common norms, values, beliefs, and lifestyles’ that are being spread, validated and 
reinforced are bound up with complex and sometimes contradictory notions concerning the 
idea of ‘America’; her founding myths and icons, her enduring political and social qualities, 
and her meaning for the world. It is the contention of this thesis that a dominant strand of 
thinking running through American social, political and religious thought generates and 
sustains the idea of America that is being promulgated. This strand, which I have termed 
‘Ameritocracy’, informs the ‘sense of leadership’ that infuses American hegemony and 
primacy, and is generated by a tri-fold structure of assumptions about the idea of America. 
Firstly, that American values are universal, applicable to everyone, everywhere. Secondly, 
that America is the terminal society; in Fukuyama’s terms ‘the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution’ (1989), thus making America a model, in Nye’s terms, ‘bound to lead’ 
(1990). Thirdly, that American values are also providential; the assumption, or, more 
appropriately, faith, that America is not only universal and terminal, but was chosen by God 
to be so. However, it is the contention of this thesis that the three interconnected notions of 
universality, terminality and providentiality are each problematised, if not rendered 
paradoxical, by the events of American history and the (un)realities of American self-
representation.  
 
Ameritocracy constitutes the major thrust of the prevailing metanarrative of American 
hegemony, providing the values and assumptions that underpin the gaining and sustaining of 
primacy. The focus of this thesis, therefore, is not the demonstration of primacy through 
foreign policy, and the extension of liberal democratic capitalism through the economic, 
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military and political means at America’s disposal, but how the values and assumptions of 
primacy are projected and proved in American popular culture, specifically Hollywood 
blockbusters. In this regard, world-systems theory (Wallerstein 1984, Flint and Falah, 2004) 
offers us a useful, complementary definition of hegemony and the cultural power deployed to 
sustain it: 
 A hegemonic power has its cultural power, the prime modernity. As a hegemonic 
 power, a state takes on the responsibility of defining and disseminating a particular 
 model, or vision, of civilization, known as prime modernity… The ideological basis 
 of the hegemonic power’s rule lies in its ability to maintain cultural universality. In 
 other words, hegemonic cultural power rests upon the assumption that the prime 
 modernity is desired by all, beneficial to all and attainable by all. Resistance to prime 
 modernity by any state is a chink in the armor of universality, inevitability and belief 
 in the ability and desire of all to arrange their societies along the model of the 
 hegemonic state. (Flint and Falah 2004, p.1380) 
What marks the US out as qualitatively different from previous hegemons, and their unique 
iterations of prime modernity, is threefold. Firstly, the degree of religiosity and messianism in 
the American project, particularly its sense of providential destiny is unparalleled, at least 
since the fall of the Roman Empire. Partly, this religiosity manifests in a broad Christian 
theology that suffuses much of American public and private life, but much of it is also 
transposed into an intense civil religion wherein the object of worship is the nation itself. 
Secondly, due to the development of myriad means of mass communication in the twentieth 
century, the scale and scope of America’s ability to define and disseminate prime modernity 
has no historical parallel. Finally, American universality was assumed long before hegemony 
and primacy were practically realised, qualitatively differentiating America from her 
hegemonic forebears. The Ameritocratic ideas implicit in prime modernity were fundamental 
to the project and idea of America before the inception of the United States, and thus predated 
the rise of American power and influence in the twentieth century. Hegemony, and prime 
modernity, thus merely legitimises American exceptionalism; Americans were arguing for the 
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universality of their values and their nation when hegemonic privilege resided overseas with 
the British, and before them the Dutch. Superpower and hyperpower status has merely 
delivered in practice what Americans had long believed in theory: that America is not only 
exceptional, but destined and bound to lead the world.  
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Ameritocracy in Context: 
If a single theme pervades the history of American thinking about the world, it is that 
the United States has a peculiar obligation to better the lot of humanity. Call it a Puritan 
survival, or a sport from the Lockean roots of natural-rights philosophy, or a 
manifestation of American exceptionalism; but for whatever reasons, Americans have 
commonly spoken and acted as though the salvation of the world depended on them. 
(Brands 1998, vii) 
 
Ameritocracy is part of a long critical tradition to attempt to determine the core of American 
identity.  There is a tendency for theorists of American studies to think of the origin of 
American identity in monolithic terms, often conceived of under the banners of either 
Americanism or American exceptionalism, or broadly citing either Puritanism or the 
Enlightenment as the breeding ground of a fundamental American character. Obviously, the 
intricate diversities of American culture and history mean that any such singular constructions 
tend towards reductive, all-encompassing notions of American identity, which can exclude 
the influence of particular groups and ideologies, and obscure social and political conflict in 
the United States. Moreover, the fact ‘all sides appeal to terms such as equality or democracy 
or liberty should not conceal from us the fundamentally different meanings these terms have 
in political cultures’ (Ellis 1993, p.151) within the United States. However, for external 
observers of America, this is problematic; looking at America through Hollywood film, as 
much of the world does, this internal conflict is difficult to perceive, overwhelmed by an 
outward projection of consensus and cohesion.   
 
The nuanced (and peculiarly American) meanings of equality and democracy, freedom and 
liberty, are often elided when projected abroad; they become signifiers whose signified 
content is reduced, or emptied, so that the ‘fundamentally different meanings’ of the terms are 
no longer readable. Each term becomes a mere shell, easy to deploy in myriad, sometimes 
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conflicting contexts, because their meanings are not fixed, but in flux, with a singular and 
vague reference to ‘America’ often their only content. ‘America’ too is a deeply contested 
term, one that can be filled by the liberal tradition or neo-conservatism, by military power or 
civil religion, or by any number of discordant or complementary ideas and ideals; however, 
Ameritocracy offers cohesion to ‘America’, pulling antagonistic notions together, and 
assimilating them beneath the banner of a singular, universal nation. 
 
Ironically then, whilst American culture itself is not monolithic, it can be argued that 
‘America - in its actions and effect on other people around the world - forms an immensely 
coherent whole’ (Sardar and Davies 2003, p.9). Similarly, Hollywood produces a fairly 
homogenised, standard output that confirms, supports or promotes American hegemony, 
utilizing Ameritocracy to do so. This output reinforces a notion of a monolithic, mythic 
America, extending the once de facto national motto of ‘E Pluribus Unum’ into a post-
national realm; an ‘unum’ so large that it’s ‘pluribus’ is planetary in scale (the official 
national motto, In God We Trust, is also Ameritocratic, and steeped in a providential meaning 
that conveys a sense of American mission). The exportation of American value systems are 
also attempts to establish, via the model of American nationalism, what it means to be 
developed and democratic (the prime modernity), and thereby what it means to be human. 
Indeed, it is arguable therefore, that American national identity openly invites such singular 
readings, to absorb conflicting narratives into a unitary, universal consensus.  
 
Bercovitch acknowledges the assimilatory prowess of ‘America’ in suggesting that ‘the 
special genius of the rhetoric of American consensus… is to co–opt the energies of 
radicalism; to reabsorb the very terms of the opposition into the promise of the New, that 
long-nurtured vision of Futurity that carries us forever back, through a procession of sacred 
landmarks… to the ideological premises of modern democratic liberalism’ (1986, cited in 
Bové, 1992, p.54). Similarly, Louis Hartz (1955), the pre-eminent scholar of American 
political thought of the mid twentieth century, also focused on the liberal tradition and its 
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Lockean underpinnings as the consistent element of Americanness, whilst many critics have 
more broadly discussed the American Creed as the centre of American identity, placing 
political principles at the heart of American cultural and social life. Some critics, most 
recently Samuel Huntington (2005), have sought to move beyond creedal definitions, 
focusing instead on the religious, racial and ethnic aspects of American identity, coagulated 
under ‘Anglo-protestant culture’ as a means to explain American uniqueness. David Gelertner 
(2007) has taken the religious argument even further, arguing that America is not just a 
nation, but also an explicitly religious, and specifically biblical, idea. Clearly, these 
definitions constitute extremely contested terrain, with theorists from widely varying 
viewpoints across the political spectrum arguing for ownership of the different terms. 
However, each definition draws back to and moves beyond an idea and definition of 
‘America’, not simply as the obvious starting point for an assessment of national character, 
but as a mythic touchstone, certain aspects of which are deemed unchanging; arguments may 
vary concerning the source of these aspects, but their nature is seemingly incontestable. 
Ameritocracy constitutes these fundamental, unchanging aspects of American identity; a 
profound faith in the universal, terminal and providential nature of the nation and its role in, 
and meaning for, the world. 
 
In this respect, Ameritocracy prefigures exceptionalist and Americanist ideas. It is, in 
Gramsci’s terms, the ‘common sense’ foundation upon which the ideologies of American 
exceptionalism and Americanism are built, and the means by which American hegemony is 
sustained. But hegemony, too, has different contextual meanings. In world-systems theory 
‘hegemony is the global diffusion of economic, political and cultural practices originating 
from the activities of one nation-state’ (Flint and Falah 2004, p.1381) with prime modernity 
as ‘the integrative power of hegemony, offering cultural products as guidebooks towards an 
emulation of economic, political, and cultural practices that are deemed to be universally 
beneficial and applicable.’ (Ibid., p.1383)  
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The emphasis in the world-systems construction of hegemony is on externalities; the 
projection, distribution and absorption of prime modernity, and the interactions of the 
hegemon with other nations that reify its universality. However, the Gramscian conception 
also offers us a way to focus on the internal aspects of hegemony, of how prime modernity 
will be modelled domestically: 
 By hegemony, Gramsci meant the permeation throughout society of an entire system of 
 values, attitudes, beliefs and morality that has the effect of supporting the status quo in 
 power relations. Hegemony in this sense might be defined as an 'organising principle' 
 that is diffused by the process of socialisation into every area of daily life. To the extent 
 that this prevailing consciousness is internalised by the population it becomes part of 
 what is generally called 'common sense' so that the philosophy, culture and morality of 
 the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things. (Boggs 1976, p.39)  
These complementary definitions of hegemony remind us that American hegemony is not just 
something experienced by the rest of the world; it is something firstly, and in many senses 
more intensely, experienced by the American people themselves. Cultural products are not 
just ‘guidebooks’ for emulation, but part of a system of organising principles, instruction 
manuals for national identity to be internalised by the American population. However, these 
definitions of hegemony also suggest that the complexities of ‘an entire system of values, 
attitudes, beliefs and morality’ will necessitate complex representations and projections of 
that system in cultural products. Even a cursory glance at Hollywood blockbusters, whose 
primary aim is the provision of simple pleasures, suggests otherwise; complexity is rendered 
repeatedly into simplicity and predictability in narrative form, content and outcome. 
Complexity is commercially difficult; on screen, it is simplicity that sells. 
 
In the following subsections, I will outline the relationship of Ameritocracy to two significant 
theories of American national identity: American exceptionalism and Americanism. 
Americanisation, that other great summative term used to express both the experience of 
identity in America and the experience of cultures encountering America in the world, will be 
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discussed at length in the next chapter, with specific reference to Hollywood. The remaining 
sections of this chapter will then explore how Ameritocracy consistently manifests in 
American social, political and cultural thought: its emergence with Puritanism, consolidation 
in the American Creed, expansion in ideas of the frontier and Manifest Destiny, reification in 
Wilsonian Internationalism and the onset of the ‘American Century’ (Luce, 1941), and 
culmination in the era of American primacy. 
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Ameritocracy and American Exceptionalism 
American exceptionalism is the belief that the United States is qualitatively different from all 
other nations, based on its unique origin story and socio-political mores, and orientated 
around ‘the idea of the United States as a unique and indeed superior civilization outside the 
normal historically determined path of human history” (Tyrell 2007, p.65). Many scholars are 
careful to point out that such definitions of exceptionalism need not necessarily mean 
superior, just different, and that many, if not most, nations think of themselves as in some 
way exceptional. However, what truly marks American exceptionalism as different from 
other notions of national exceptionalism is its Ameritocratic underpinnings, and the ways in 
which the conception of American universality is not merely content to model qualitative 
differences, but to share them beneficently with the world; ‘the belief (rhetorical or sincere) 
that America’s foreign affairs, unlike those of other nations, are not self-interested but based 
on a mission to offer the world a better form of society’, specifically ‘to set an example to the 
rest of the world, to export American freedom and democracy and so conduct a foreign policy 
unlike that of any other nation’ (Mauk and Oakland 2002, p.153).  
 
Naturally, there are those that refute this version of American exceptionalism, and the notion 
that Americans have a profound and popular mission to proselytise their model to the rest of 
the world. Kohut & Stokes outline (using extensive data from the 2005 Global Attitude 
Project of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press) the recent and historical 
disparities between the rhetoric of American ‘Influentials’ and the opinions of the American 
general public. ‘The American people, as opposed to some of their leaders, seek no converts 
to their ideology. To be sure, seven in ten Americans think it is a good idea to promote 
“American-style” democracy in the world, but the American public evinces no missionary 
zeal for the task’ (2006, p.73). However, the distinction between promoting American-style 
democracy and possessing missionary zeal for the task is negligible; the difference is one of 
intensity, not sentiment. Moreover, the fact that the American general public may not share 
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the zeal for universalisation possessed by their leaders is of little relevance, or consolation, to 
the rest of the world, whose encounters with America are not with the opinions of the 
American public per se. Rather, those that do encounter America out in the world do so 
through the empirical facts of American hard power and the cultural products and projections 
of American soft power, from Hollywood movies and hamburgers to popular television and 
presidential speeches. From the point of reception, the reluctance of the American public to 
evince an Ameritocratic ideology is almost invisible; the powerful images and ideals, 
products and perceptions collated under ‘America’ obscure the diverse opinions and positions 
of actual Americans. Indeed, even the notion of an “American-style” democracy that has 
universal applicability is extremely vague, its precise intentions hazy, if not completely 
hidden behind inverted commas which obscure its real meanings.  
 
There are also obvious conflicts and contradictions at work here, in the interaction between 
Ameritocracy and exceptionalism. As Tyrell (2007, p.65) suggests, it is paradoxical that 
‘though American exceptionalism separates the United States from other nations, in political 
rhetoric American ideals that are rooted in American exceptionalism, such as freedom, liberty 
and democracy, can be applied as a model for other societies’. So, is it possible for America 
to be at once unique and universal? The answer always seems to tautologically fold back in 
upon itself: America is unique because of her true universality. American terminality is 
equally troubled by paradox, for how can America be the final form of human government if 
it is still evolving, still trying to perfect the ideas of ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, 
still seeking ‘a more perfect union’? The answer is provided by the teleological nature of 
American terminality and primarily derives from two sources: the seemingly universal 
principles of Puritanism, which conveys the nation’s spiritual purpose through setting national 
ideals, and the Enlightenment, which delivers the nation’s material purpose through the 
machinery of liberal democratic capitalism. Both purposes, and the religious and secular ideas 
of universalism that generate them, feed into a diffuse notion of ‘progress’, towards an 
idealistic end, but the terminal point is never, indeed, can never, be reached. It must always be 
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deferred, so that the moral certainty in the efficacy of progress, which both generates 
American terminality and justifies its constant deferral, can be sustained. So, America thus 
becomes the terminal society precisely because of her ability to renew and evolve; each 
renewal of identity restates American universality, uniting Americans together in their faith in 
the American idea, in progress and prime modernity, contested as that idea may be.  
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Ameritocracy and Americanism 
Americanism, like exceptionalism, is a profound and steadfast faith in the idea of America. In 
this regard, we can begin to think of ‘America’ not so much as a nation state, but as a national 
state of mind, confirmed in American historian Richard Hofstadter’s statement that ‘it has 
been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one’ (cited in Huntington 1981, 
p.25). However, Americanism has a complex relationship with exceptionalism and, as 
Pieterse (2004, p.124) suggests, ‘serves a double function as a summary account of American 
historical and geographical particulars and as an ideology… As such American 
exceptionalism is a form of “Americanism” and part of what it purports to describe’. As with 
exceptionalism, Ameritocracy’s relationship to Americanism concerns universality, and the 
proselytisation of the national faith beyond the national borders; the transference of American 
specialness from a distinctive representation to a projected, embodied force, and the 
applications of what are internal, domestic constructs onto external, international realities. If, 
as Pieterse (2004, p.128) additionally comments, ‘Americanism combined with 
exceptionalism yields a fervent nationalism that is exceptional among contemporary societies, 
huddled around the Constitution, the presidency, an unusual cult of the flag, and a pop culture 
of America Number One’, Ameritocracy is concerned with how these particularities can be 
rendered universal. We will see that Hollywood has a particularly crucial role to play here, in 
establishing that the American, by its very nature, is already the universal.  
 
Kazin & McCartin extend the debate, arguing that ‘“Americanism” has two different 
meanings. It signifies what is distinctive about the United States (and the colonies and 
territories that formed it) and loyalty to that nation, rooted in a defense of its political ideals,’ 
(2006, p.1) both of which are valid definitions of the term, referencing both exceptionalism 
and the Creed, but they are primarily internally focused. Hartz spoke, more pertinently, of 
Americanism in relation to America in the world, and the problems that this internal-external 
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dichotomy inevitably raises. After more than half a century of global action, his words still 
ring remarkably true: 
On the world plane itself, however, “Americanism” has had a dual life, which has 
confused many observers. First of all… it has been characterised by a strong 
isolationist impulse: the sense that America’s very liberal joy lay in the escape from a 
decadent Old World that could only infect it with its own diseases. This was the spirit 
that pervaded most men even in the revolutionary age of American history... And yet, 
in the twentieth century, “Americanism” has also crusaded abroad in a Wilsonian way, 
projecting itself headlong into the ancient societies of Europe and Asia. The 
explanation is not hard to find. Embodying an absolute moral ethos, “Americanism”, 
once it is driven on to the world stage by events, is inspired willy-nilly to reconstruct 
the very alien things it tries to avoid. Its messianism is the polar counterpart of its 
isolationism… an absolute national morality is inspired either to withdraw from “alien” 
things or to transform them: it cannot live in comfort constantly by their side. (1955, 
p.285) 
 
The momentum of Ameritocracy, the insistent urge to actively universalise the idea and ideal 
of universalism itself, is what truly propels the doctrine of Americanism. Americanism is thus 
not so much ‘driven on to the world stage by events’, although these clearly play a part, but 
rather such events release Americanism from the inertia of isolationism, so that defensive 
withdrawal from “alien” others is surpassed by an offensive tactic of transformation. As such, 
Hartz argues, ‘Americanism is at once heightened and shattered by the crashing impact of the 
rest of the world upon it’ (Hartz 1955, p.287), a statement perhaps more pertinent now than 
when he wrote it. The development of an American Imperium or Pax Americana has placed 
the American national narrative under considerable stress, as pursuit of American interests 
has seemingly contradicted her ideals. Donald Rumsfeld’s contention that ‘the United States 
doesn’t do empire’ spoke to American principles, not necessarily to their practice.  
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This sense of duality, of a disconnect between rhetoric and reality, and of two Americas and 
the problems of resolving them into a coherent whole, is common in American culture, if not 
essential to American identity. For Walt Whitman, contradiction was fundamental to what it 
means to be American: ‘I contradict myself? Very well then, I contradict myself. I am large, I 
contain multitudes.’ For African- (and other hyphenated) Americans, this ‘two-ness’ has often 
been experienced in terms of a DuBoisian ‘double consciousness’ (1903) wherein the hyphen 
simultaneously connects and separates the old world from the new, and where the experience 
of diversity cherished by Whitman is tempered by the realities of how diversity has been 
historically realised. Similarly, when Mark Twain stated his ‘loyalty to the country always, 
loyalty to the government when it deserves it’, he was articulating a like disconnect, one 
between the concepts of America and the United States; one mythical and universal, and 
making grand promises, the other real and particular, and breaking them. The twentieth 
century, the ‘American Century’ (Luce, 1941), brought these dichotomies to the rest of the 
world as other nations wrestled with processes of Americanisation within their own borders 
and as America wrestled with the exigencies and implications of the ‘truly American 
internationalism’ (Ibid., p.260) Luce had called for.  
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Defining Ameritocracy 
In popular nomenclature (inside and outside of the nation), the United States, as in this thesis, 
is routinely referred to as ‘America’, a term which more accurately describes the entire 
hemispheric landmass that lies between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. It has not always 
been this way. ‘The American adjective was not used in the early nineteenth century as it is 
now, when Bolívar and Hidalgo called themselves Americans. But the dominant application 
of the term by the denizens of the United States to themselves and their own came to be 
accepted over time. It grew with the weight of the nation at the expense of Indians and 
Mexicans. It then reached global dimensions’ (Casanova, 1999, p.12). ‘America’, rather than 
the more prosaic construct of the US, conjures a mythic identity and immediately places the 
nation to which it routinely refers within an embryonic post-national context, as a form of 
global nation. This nature of ‘America’ as a mythic idea, one capable of transforming the 
lives of individuals and nations through the provision of a replicable set of values and a model 
of political economy, is thus not bounded by geography in the same way as other national 
identities. Even the earliest observers of America observed this fact, with Thomas Payne 
(1776) remarking that ‘the cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind.’  
 
In coupling this idea of ‘America’ with meritocracy, the government by peoples selected on 
merit, ‘Ameritocracy’ grounds this mythic idea of the nation in the political practicalities of 
its system of government, frequently represented as the creedal basis of exceptionalist 
identity. Meritocracy is already a concept embedded with core American values and has an 
obvious relationship with the nebulous construct of the ‘American Dream’ – free and fair 
competition on a level playing field, democracy of the most egalitarian form, wherein the 
hard-working prosper and succeed. Over time, this political idea has developed into a cult of 
winning in America, of always striving to be number one, even if it’s a case of first amongst 
equals. However, meritocracy pre-supposes notions of equality whilst being simultaneously 
troubled by them; in order to function effectively there must be equality of access to the 
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systems of social organisation and the machinery of government. Historically, this has proved 
easier to promise than to practically deliver. In fact, the cult of winning that meritocracy has 
unleashed in its American formation necessitates that the majority of people must ‘lose’ for 
the system to be sustained, so we should perhaps not be surprised at the recurrent centrality of 
the jeremiad, with its focus on disparity and inequality, as the most popular form of rhetorical 
protest in America.  
 
Ameritocracy is thus a suitable fusion of terms that engages with the providential mission and 
alleged universal status of America, and the method of socio-political organisation by which 
that mission might be achieved. Furthermore, I contend that Ameritocracy allows for the 
secular as well as the religious aspects of American identity to maintain coherence - at times 
the inherited ideas and ideals of Puritanism and the Enlightenment will come into conflict, but 
at others they are mutually reinforcing, generating an extremely powerful and attractive 
resonance. The idea of America, for all its internal paradoxes and contradictions, appears as a 
remarkably coherent whole once projected onto the screens of the world, bound together by 
the flag, and by vague notions of liberty and equality, freedom and democracy. Thus, 
etymologically, Ameritocracy is the chimera of a mythic and religious notion of ‘America’, 
and the empirical, political construction of the United States as a meritocracy. American 
identity, whether thought of via Americanism or American exceptionalism, is as much a 
matter of faith as of reason, and interwoven with notions of both spiritual and material 
progress, both of which have senses of mission and purpose. As we shall see, this confluence 
of, and conflict between, spirituality and materiality, between America as idea and America 
as reality, is recurrent, both in American history, and in the popular culture industries and 
texts that export America overseas.  
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Ameritocracy begins with (and in) America: the ‘city on a hill’. 
The ideas of universality and terminality at the heart of Ameritocracy are by no means new to 
American thought or identity. There is a clearly discernible train of thought from Winthrop’s 
conception of a ‘city on a hill’ and Tocqueville’s belief in America as ‘the last, best hope for 
humanity’, through to Wilsonian Internationalism, Fukuyama’s end of history thesis, and 
even President (then Senator) Obama’s more recent assertion in a television interview that  
People outside of this country are expressing disappointment because they’ve got 
high expectations for America. And they want America to lead; they want America to 
lead through our values, and through our ideals and through our example. But they 
have high expectations of us because, I think, that this country is still the last, best 
hope on earth. (Late Show with David Letterman, CBS, April 9th 2007) 
Obama’s language is particularly telling: his claim that the peoples of the world ‘want 
America to lead’ through values, ideals and by example, firmly establishes the assumption of 
American hegemony, whilst his referencing of Tocqueville as a historical touchstone 
concerning the importance of America for the world, as both the ‘last’ (terminal) and ‘best’ 
(universal) ‘hope’ (providential) conveys the essence of Ameritocracy. However, 
Tocqueville’s analysis of America in Democracy in America, whilst interested in how the 
‘habits of the mind’ (Tocqueville 2000, p.275) necessary for democracy, liberty and equality 
could be preserved, does not mark the beginning of Ameritocratic thought in the US.  
 
To discover the origins of Ameritocracy we must look back to 1630 and step aboard the 
‘Arbella’ as she makes her perilous voyage to the new world. Before disembarkation, John 
Winthrop, the first Governor of Massachusetts, gave a sermon (‘A Model of Christian 
Charity’) in which he declaimed that ‘we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people 
are upon us’, a phrase that is widely regarded as the prototypical declaration of American 
exceptionalism. Winthrop was seeking to prepare those travelling with him for the harsh 
realities that awaited them, by suggesting that they were engaged in the establishment of a 
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society that could be a model for all others. Moreover, he contended that this society was 
predicated on the providential nature of their journey; they had formed a new covenant with 
God and must live up to their side of the deal to prove themselves worthy of being chosen, for 
theirs was to be a society prepared for parousia. So, as Huntington contends, ‘the Protestant 
sense of mission has had enormous influence in structuring American perceptions of the 
world at large and in shaping the efforts both to transform the world and yet remain distinct 
from it. Many American evangelicals shared a widespread belief that the United States was 
part of a providential plan to prepare for the coming of Christ' (2005, p.70). 
 
This sense of providentiality stemmed from the Calvinist belief of Winthrop and his 
compatriots, and its basis in covenantal theology, the idea that salvation stems exclusively 
from God’s covenant of grace with his chosen people, characterised in Calvinism as the 
‘elect’. This providential identity is therefore in conflict with the meritocratic ideas that would 
develop later; you were either born as a member of the elect or you were not (‘reprobate’, in 
Calvinistic terms), and salvation was based on God’s promise, not on personal hard work. 
This notion of the elect thus houses an uneasy tension; if salvation is pre-destined, what then 
for the meritocratic aspects of American identity that coalesce under the American Dream, 
which refute predestination, in favour of placing success under the aegis of free will, 
individual responsibility and diligent labour? The famous Puritan work ethic thus becomes 
not a method to gaining ‘elect’ status, but rather a method to prove that that status had already 
been conferred, and a means to building a terminal society with eschatological ends.  
 
Calvinistic theology, in particular Calvin’s Magnus Opus, the 1540 Institutes of the Christian 
Religion, would have been extremely familiar to Winthrop and provided the basis for his 
sense of profound providentiality. Moreover, this work also contained a justification for 
rebellion to tyrants; an argument implicated over two centuries later in the American 
Revolution, demonstrating the degree to which Calvinist theology had suffused American 
identity. Nineteenth century American historian George Bancroft even went so was as to 
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proclaim Calvin ‘the father of America’, stating that ‘he who will not honor the memory and 
respect the influence of Calvin knows but little of the origin of American liberty.’ 
 
Calvinism also provided the proto-American nation with a rhetorical form of protest that 
would become key to the American project, and thus a means by which the contradictions of 
Ameritocracy could seemingly be resolved: the jeremiad. The contradictory proclamation of 
American uniqueness and universalism embodied by the city-on-a-hill paradigm introduced a 
dichotomy between rhetoric and reality, between the sacred destiny of America and how this 
might be fulfilled in a secular society grounded not in providence, but in the day-to-day 
practicalities of survival. ‘The Puritans’ concept of errand’, argues Bercovitch, ‘entailed a 
fusion of secular and sacred history. The purpose of their jeremiads was to direct an 
imperilled people of God toward the fulfilment of their destiny, to guide them individually 
toward salvation, and collectively toward the American city of God’4 (1978, p.9). So, whilst 
the modern American jeremiad is usually constructed in less explicitly religious terms, 
drawing on the sacramental texts of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution rather 
than the bible, it still functions in the same way, by calling attention to any disparity, As such, 
the jeremiad has been repeatedly mobilised by various groups in myriad contexts (religious, 
social, economic, racial, class), each seeking to hold the republic up to its founding promises.  
 
Winthrop also partially pre-dated the Founding Fathers in his outline of how his congregation 
(which would later expand itself into America, both mythic and geographical) could fulfil 
their covenant with God and not suffer his wrath: 
For this end, we must be knit together, in this work, as one man. We must entertain 
each other in brotherly affection. We must be willing to abridge ourselves of our 
superfluities, for the supply of others’ necessities. We must uphold a familiar                                                         
4 Terrence Malick’s New World (2005) begins in 1607, with the Jamestown colonists, and thus 
historically predates Winthrop. However, Captain Newport’s speech to his crew upon touching ground 
in Virginia channels the ‘city on a hill’, and touches briefly on several key elements of the 
Ameritocratic underpinnings of America’s founding mythology, particular with regard to universality 
and providentiality: ‘Look beyond these gates; Eden lies about us still. We have escaped the old world 
and its bondage. Let us make a new beginning and create a fresh example for humanity. We are the 
pioneers of the world, the advanced guard sent on through the wilderness to break a new path.’ 
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commerce together in all meekness, gentleness, patience and liberality. We must 
delight in each other; make others’ conditions our own; rejoice together, mourn 
together, labor and suffer together, always having before our eyes our commission and 
community in the work, as members of the same body. 
His language here is redolent of the same universalism that manifests in the self-evident truths 
of the Declaration of Independence, albeit with what many modern Americans might perceive 
as a disconcerting socialistic slant. His references to ‘brotherly affection’, ‘familiar 
commerce’ and the repetition of ‘together’ certainly lack the focus on individualism that 
world develop in American identity over the coming centuries, but we can readily perceive in 
his words how Enlightenment philosophy principles (particularly those of freedom and 
personal responsibility) would find particularly fertile ground in the proto-American nation. 
 
It is crucial to note that Winthrop, writing at a time long before there was a geo-political 
entity called the United States of America, was referring to the behaviour of his congregation 
and their church, not a nation. However, ‘America’, as a mythic land of abundance, a new 
world full of promise, provided by providence, was a fresh conception that seemingly offered 
an opportunity for all mankind. Winthrop’s words demonstrate one of two arguments 
concerning the nature of this opportunity; that America should serve as a model to better the 
lot of humanity by focusing on herself in order to perfect her society. Brands (1998) terms 
this argument ‘exemplarist’, and counterposes it with that of the ‘vindicators’, those who 
believe that the fulfilment of the American mission can only be achieved by carrying the light 
of liberty, the beacon lit by the ‘city on a hill’, out into the rest of the world. Ameritocracy is 
concerned with this process of vindication, in terms of the universalisation of American 
values, the extension and application of the American Way beyond the geographical borders 
of the US.  
Winthrop’s ‘city on a hill’, the beginning of the American ‘rhetoric of mission’ (Bercovitch 
1978, p.8), whilst sowing the seeds for almost four centuries of exceptionalist thought and 
providing the initial teleological thrust to American identity, also embedded tensions within 
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the nascent idea of ‘America’ which would inform its development and maturity. By 
establishing the proto-American Puritans as a chosen people, one with a mission to model 
society for all humanity, Winthrop established the Ameritocratic principles of providentiality, 
terminality and universality; simultaneously, he was also implicitly defining their new 
identity through antithesis and binarism, for to be chosen it follows axiomatically that others 
are not. How then could universality be reified? How could others follow their example, copy 
their model, if only the Puritans had a special covenant with the Lord? This particularity 
within the universalist idea is a problematic contradiction that lies at the heart of 
Ameritocracy and can be easily observed in the cultural output of American media5.  
 
The jeremiad, a frequent narrative form used in Hollywood blockbusters, reveals a similar 
conflict: ‘The economy of the jeremiad is a closed one and it’s essentially a conservative 
model of protest. You start from the principle that you’re comparing the American reality 
against the American ideal, but the American ideal is guaranteed. America is good, America 
is right, and so patriotism is your starting point for protest and in that sense it means that if all 
these social groups are participating in the same economy, there’s only so far critique can go’ 
(Hartnell, 2011: Ameritocracy). As we will see, Hollywood blockbusters frequently invite 
global audiences to participate in this ‘universal’ form of protest, but via a universality that is 
paradoxically parochial, referring back to guaranteed American ideals and the light of liberty 
that emanates from the city on a hill. 
 
Tellingly, the phrase ‘city on a hill’ has been used by various American politicians of the 
twentieth century. In 1961, when President-Elect, John F. Kennedy stated in an address to the                                                         
5 Star Trek, an American media franchise that has (to date) spawned six television series and eleven 
motion pictures over almost half a century, perfectly embodies this contradiction. As a galactic space 
series, the franchise appears to have obvious ‘universal’ connotations (the United Federation of 
Planets, central to the narrative, is seemingly an idealised version of the United Nations, extrapolated 
out to a galactic scale), but its details are particularly American in origin. Indeed, the whole origin of 
human (and other alien) life is linked directly to American mythology:  in ‘The Chase’ (Season 6, 
Episode 20 of Star Trek: The Next Generation) a plotline is explored wherein a precursor race ‘seeded’ 
the galaxy with its genetic material, explaining why most life-forms encountered by the Enterprise are 
bipedal hominids. Captain Picard, analysing an archaeological artefact (which resembles a Russian 
doll) prior to this discovery, muses on the phrase ‘from the one, many emerge’: the entire Star Trek 
universe is thus built upon the premise of E Pluribus Unum, a central tenet of Ameritocracy.  
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General Court of Massachusetts that ‘...I have been guided by the standard John Winthrop set 
before his shipmates on the flagship Arbella three hundred and thirty-one years ago, as they, 
too, faced the task of building a new government on a perilous frontier… we are setting out 
upon a voyage in 1961 no less hazardous than that undertaken by the Arbella in 1630’. 
Similarly, President Ronald Reagan, in his farewell address, referenced the phrase, referring 
to Winthrop as ‘an early freedom man’; two decades later, in 2008, Sarah Palin used the 
phrase again, via reference to Reagan. Almost four centuries on from its original enunciation, 
the ‘city on a hill’, and its Ameritocratic sentiments, still resonate profoundly in American 
national identity, and in the ways in which America presents this identity to the world.   
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Revolution and Independence: Crying Out for the Creed 
Universality and terminality alone, however, cannot tell us about the content of American 
values, rather they only provide the structural foundations. The superstructure built upon 
these values is what we commonly regard as the ‘American Creed’, ‘with its principles of 
liberty, equality, individualism, representative government, and private property’ (Huntington 
2005, p.41). So, whilst Winthrop’s words may have sown the seeds of Ameritocracy, they are 
largely unfamiliar to the world. The language of the American Creed, however, is well known 
and, for many critics, though not all, constitutes the centre of American identity, culture and 
exceptionalism. Embodied in phrases with clear universalist pretensions like  ‘Life, liberty, 
the pursuit of happiness’ and ‘All men are created equal’, and codified in the Declaration of 
Independence, Constitution and Bill of Rights, the American Creed is a powerful repository 
of precepts that generations of Americans, and arguably many peoples outside the United 
States, have benefitted from. Polls show that ‘Americans are fiercely proud of their national 
experience and overwhelmingly convinced that their Constitution, free elections, and the free 
enterprise system are major reasons for the nation’s political and economic success in the last 
century’ (Kohut and Stokes 2006, p.122). The American Creed, however, is more than just a 
political document, and more than mere ‘truth, justice and the American Way’6. Indeed, the 
Creed is more akin to a hallowed sacramental text, as handed down by the wise old prophets 
of the republic, the Founding Fathers, whose alliterative capitalisation suggests that these 
were not just mere men, but hagiographic figures. Again, the fusion of the sacred and the 
secular, which so typifies American identity, is made manifest. 
 
For Ameritocracy, the Creed is the flesh around the bones of universality and terminality; 
Ameritocracy confirms the urge to universalise, the Creed largely supplies the content of that 
                                                        
6 Emerging in the Superman comic book series, this phrase is uttered in Superman the Movie (Donner, 
1978) by the eponymous hero, only for Lois Lane (Margot Kidder) to retort that ‘you’re going to end 
up fighting every elected official in this country’. It was deployed with similar irony in Superman 
Returns (Singer, 2006), as ‘truth, justice, and all that stuff’, mocking the self-importance of the line and 
evading jingoistic interpretation.  
 39 
universalisation, enshrining as it does an array of social, political, religious and economic 
freedoms. Whether or not the Creed truly is the centre of American identity is debatable; that 
the Creed forms the primary content of how America advertises, exports, sells and seeks to 
extend itself overseas, however, is not nearly as contentious. Whether conjugated politically 
as ‘democracy promotion’, economically in terms of expansion of free market capitalism, or 
through a myriad of cultural products that represent the American Way, the tenets of the 
American Creed (often boiled down to a triumvirate of liberty, equality and democracy) are 
central to the national narrative America tells itself and the world, particularly in regard of 
universality. 
 
Huntington (2005, p.41) perceives the Creed as developing from the settlers (he is careful not 
to use the word ‘immigrant’) who founded the nation in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, with its primary elements fundamentally identical to Britain: Protestantism, a 
strong work ethic, the English language and British institutions of law and government. ‘Out 
of this culture’, Huntington argues, ‘the settlers developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the American Creed with its principles of liberty, equality, individualism, 
representative government, and private property.’ These principles arose as America broke 
from Britain, their unique civic and political character finally differentiating the new world 
from the old, in ways that the religious and racial aspects of American identity could not. 
Consequently, ‘the creedal definition allows Americans to hold that theirs is an “exceptional” 
country because unlike other nations its identity is defined by principle rather than ascription 
and, at the same time, to claim that America is a ‘universal’ nation because its principles are 
applicable to all human societies’ (Huntington 2005, p.48). Huntington suggests, therefore, 
that the alleged applicability of the tenets of the Creed to all peoples, led to claims of 
American universality, but he errs in his historical sequencing. The Creed merely made 
manifest the sense of universality God’s providence had provided; offering a construct in the 
day-to-day practicalities of the American state that would mirror the longstanding spiritual 
convictions of the American soul. 
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Huntington is rightly wary of definitions of American identity that rely solely on the Creed; 
there are ethno-cultural, racial, economic and other socio-political factors that have also 
greatly influenced that identity. However, it is the Creed that predominantly constitutes the 
values that are exported to the world as universal; the aspects of America that are to be 
universalised are to be found in Creedal definitions of American identity, and it is these 
aspects (liberty, freedom, democracy and capitalism) that the rest of the world encounters 
during processes of Americanisation. The Creed originates from a range of diverse, 
sometimes conflicting, sources - the bible, ‘settler’ culture, Enlightenment thought, and 
broader myths of progress inherited from Western civilisation generally - that have embedded 
it with the potential to have a profound impact beyond America’s shores, both in the old 
world of Europe and elsewhere. It’s founding premise, that ‘All men are created equal’, has 
obvious universal appeal and application, even if the latter was, and is, considerably harder to 
enforce than the former is to argue. Indeed, the promise of America laid down in the Creed, 
acted as an invitation to countless immigrants to take part in the American experiment and 
bask in the light of the new Colossus: ‘From her beacon-hand/Glows world-wide welcome’, 
as it says below the Statue of Liberty. In this sense, the American Creed has come to function 
not only as the pre-eminent national narrative of the US, but also as a post-national 
declamation of America as a global nation. Needless to say, this dual function is problematic.  
 
The Creed is paradoxical in its universality. If ‘All men are created equal’ is the central and 
self-evident tenet of the Creed, why has true equality proved so elusive in America, and the 
notion of ‘American’ more often exclusive than inclusive?7 If, as many have argued, the 
Creed is at the centre of American exceptionalism, how then can it truly have universal 
application, if this universality is conditioned by geographic, civic and cultural particularity?                                                         
7 Elements of American popular culture have openly mocked this paradox. The Family Guy episode 
‘Peter’s Progress’ has Griffin Peterson say the following words on arrival in America: ‘We’re going to 
build a new settlement. We’ll have a happy new life, and we’ll have equal rights for all – except blacks, 
Asians, Hispanics, Jews, gays, women, Muslims, um, everybody who’s not a white man. And I mean 
white white, so no Italians, no Polish. Just people from Ireland, England and Scotland, but only certain 
parts of Scotland and Ireland. Just full-blooded whites. No, you know what, not even whites. Nobody 
gets any rights. Ah, America!’ 
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And yet, the Creed, and Ameritocracy, also possesses an assimilatory prowess that seemingly 
resolves these paradoxes, or at least elides them within the American national narrative. In 
Ameritocracy, Neil Campbell (in reference to Paul Giles and an ‘ever-widening circle of 
‘American-ness’) discusses how ‘America has traditionally overcome these critiques of its 
own identity politics by simply ‘adding-in’… if we’ve left out the Hispanics, we add them in; 
and if we’ve left out the African-American, we add them in and we increase the circle. But 
the circle is still there, it’s still this metaphor of closed-ness.’ Like the jeremiad, the circle of 
American-ness is a closed economy; all resistance is reabsorbed into the American idea with a 
Whitmanesque shrug. In order to render ‘America’ into a coherent whole, it has been 
necessary to draw a tight boundary (which we could regard as a ‘frontier’) around the word, 
delineating what is and what is not ‘America’. The Creed has functioned in part, therefore, as 
a gatekeeper to ‘America’, conferring rights and responsibilities to those inside its boundary, 
and helping to construct the fundamentals of American identity.  
 
Clearly, there is more to American identity than the Creed. However, refutation of the 
centrality of the Creed to that identity is contradicted by its centrality to how America 
represents itself, domestically and internationally. Furthermore, such refutations 
underestimate the ability of the Enlightenment principles that underpin the Creed to 
constantly adapt, to renew its universalism, and thereby to allow ‘for diverse ethnic groups to 
share common connections as Americans, without losing their links to older allegiances and 
identities’ (Campbell and Kean 1997, p.47). The jeremiad is fundamental within this renewal 
process, and within the notion of creedal assimilatory prowess; by holding the nation up to its 
own principles, delineated by the Creed, and upon inevitably finding disparity, America can 
simultaneously renew the contract with the people and the covenant with God, the secular and 
the sacred aspects of universalism combined in an affirmation, anew, of American identity. 
The terms of ‘liberty’, ‘equality’ and ‘democracy’, therefore, are under constant negotiation 
as multifarious racial, religious and ethnic groups seek to hold the United States up to the 
word of ‘America’. By consistently declaiming America as universal, terminal and 
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providential, Ameritocracy thus reiterates the Creed in diffuse cultural forms, reinforcing 
American exceptionalism and continuing to offer the promise of America to successive 
generations of citizens, at home and abroad. America is under a constant process of renewal 
as she attempts to resolve the riddle of E Pluribus Unum, at home and abroad.  
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The Frontier and Manifest Destiny – Testing the Boundaries of the Universal 
 American social development has been continually beginning over again on the 
 frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward 
 with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, 
 furnish the forces dominating American character. (Turner, 1893) 
 
Myths and notions of the frontier have proved central to American identity, and their 
persistent recurrence in American culture is well documented (Slotkin, 1973, 1985 and 1992, 
and King, 2000). The earliest settlers existed almost exclusively in a frontier, with the old 
world and the Atlantic ocean to the East, and the vast, sprawling continent with its wilderness 
and ‘savage’ inhabitants to the West. The frontier is the point at which American identity is 
renewed and regenerated, where universality can be tested, and is thus so fundamental to 
American identities that ubiquity almost renders it invisible. In this regard, elements of 
Turner’s thesis still resonate today; ‘the perennial rebirth’ he discusses is crucial, for it 
enables the continuous processes of negotiation that Americanisation entails, sweeping away 
the corruption and distraction of the old world and beginning again in the new. Indeed, the 
very conception of the ‘new world’ embodied an idea of frontier, a terra incognita and tabula 
rasa at the extreme limit of the known. The frontier establishes a binary line between what is 
and what is not America (in both its geographic and mythic aspects), and thus functions as 
both a defensive and offensive concept, delineating where the boundary of ‘civilisation’ lies, 
whilst simultaneously urging its transgression and effacement. Consequently, the physical and 
conceptual frontier troubles notions of universality: how can America be truly universal and 
encompass all, when there is so much that lies beyond her boundaries?  
 
As more territory was added to the early states (particularly the vast area of land that 
constituted the 1803 Louisiana Purchase), the geographic frontier was pushed back as 
American civilisation advanced. But this expansion was not perceived by Americans to be 
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aggressive colonial action, in the exploitative mould of the European powers, but merely the 
mapping of a Jeffersonian ‘empire of liberty’ on to territory, according to the providential 
mission of the nation. This process of expansion was supported by both the Monroe doctrine 
(that America should protect against further imperial incursions into the American 
hemisphere by European powers, inaugurated by President Monroe in 1823) and the doctrine 
of ‘Manifest Destiny’, coined in 1845 by John L. O’Sullivan. O’Sullivan, the editor of the 
Atlantic Review, wrote that it is ‘our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by 
Providence for the free development of our yearly millions’ (cited in Pratt, 1927). The 
doctrine was broadly accepted, as many ‘sincerely believed that by enlarging the sphere of 
American sovereignty they were contributing to the betterment of the human race’ (Brands 
1998, p.11). Manifest Destiny, therefore, is an articulation of a prototypical American prime 
modernity: the testing of American universality in an increasingly broad geographical area. 
Eventually, once the United States had fully reified itself from ‘sea to shining sea’, the 
doctrine would culminate in America’s short-lived Imperial manoeuvres in the Pacific at the 
end of the nineteenth century; empire in the traditional sense of extraterritorial expansion and 
colonisation proved too contradictory, even for a nation as fraught with internal paradox as 
the United States. The lessons learned from these imperial exercises would be applied in 
Wilsonian internationalism the broad doctrine which fundamentally still guides American 
foreign policy. 
 
Manifest Destiny is a clear articulation of the Ameritocratic principles of universality and 
providentiality, and reveals similar contradictions as those expressed by the ‘city on a hill’ 
paradigm. Initially, the doctrine was deployed to justify the annexation of Texas from 
Mexico; its universal ideas, and its professed aim to improve the lot of others by extending 
the American sphere, was tempered by the racial overtones of the war that ensued. These are 
revealed in the comments of President Polk at the end of the war in 1848, who suggested that 
had the territory remained in Mexican hands it would have remained of ‘little value to her or 
to any nation, whilst as part of our Union they will be productive of vast benefits to the 
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United States, to the commercial world, and to the general interests of mankind’ (cited in 
Slater and Taylor 1999, p.21). The implication here is clear; Mexicans, like the Indians before 
them, are inferior to American Anglo-Saxons, and thus for the world to improve America 
must have a greater share of it, in both territory and influence. In this instance, as at many 
points in American history, we can see that American universality is paradoxically particular 
and exclusive. 
 
American identity, as espoused by the ‘city on a hill’ paradigm and the American Creed, 
marks America out as a global nation from her inception; America is both an aspirational and 
invitational entity in ways that no other nation has ever been and, because America exists in 
and for the world, no longer needs to be. Even before the frontier was closed and the formal, 
physical boundaries of the nation had been established, America was using hard and soft 
power to psychologically extend the boundaries of Americanness to the rest of the world, 
extending the providential tenets of Manifest Destiny and its claims to ‘a right such as that of 
the tree to the space of air and earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle and destiny 
of growth’ (O’Sullivan, 1845, cited in Pratt 1927), adding additional meanings to, and 
versions of, Americanism and Americanisation.  
 
However, though Manifest Destiny had material limitations, the concept of the frontier it 
entailed has proved to be extremely mobile, demonstrating a mythic propensity that liberated 
it from mere geography: 
  The original frontier was defined in terms of the availability of allegedly ‘free’, 
 open or ‘empty’ landscapes into which it was possible to keep moving. The closure of 
 the domestic historical frontier, officially announced in 1890, led to the creation of 
 new frontiers, both imaginary and real. (King 2000, p.6) 
The closing of the frontier also brought to a head an ongoing argument in American culture, 
which we might think of as the crisis of exceptionalism. Should America merely model its 
universal status and be content to be a global nation in example only, or should America go 
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boldly forth into the world, carrying the beacon of liberty and bringing its light to all people? 
Should the American people be ‘exemplars’ or ‘vindicators’ (Brands, 1998)? Unequivocally, 
the geo-political events of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen the argument 
settled, thus far, in the vindicators favour. Moreover, the missionary heart of Ameritocracy, 
the profound urge to proselytise, would carried the concept of the frontier beyond the 
geographical boundaries of the United States, just as the name ‘America’ always suggested. 
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Ameritocracy and Wilsonian Internationalism: All Roads Lead to the New Rome 
 If the United States counts on its military dominance to foster conditions conducive to 
 the Wilsonian project, presidents have seldom viewed military power per se as the 
 actual agent of transformation. In this regard, the second, or ideological component of 
 U.S. strategy may capture fewer headlines, but is the more important. (Bacevich 
 2002, p.78).  
 
Conceptually, Ameritocracy is also linked directly to what is commonly termed Wilsonian 
Internationalism, or the ‘Wilsonian project’. The work of Andrew Bacevich in respect of the 
Wilsonian project, and its relationship to American primacy, has proved particularly pertinent 
to this study. The ideological component to which Bacevich refers above is contingent on a 
similar set of assumptions as those postulated to exist within Ameritocracy, although more 
tempered within the realm of socio-economics. All members of the U.S. foreign policy elite, 
argues Bacevich, have stuck steadfast to four basic convictions for almost a century. The first 
two precepts are interconnected: there are ‘no practical alternatives’ to capitalism and liberal 
democracy (implicitly understood to mean their specifically American-styles). The third 
follows on from these, stating that liberal-democratic capitalism is universally applicable. The 
final precept is that American ‘security, prosperity and continued pre-eminence’ can only be 
guaranteed by ensuring ‘universal adherence to this American (or Western) model of political 
economy’ (Ibid.) 
 
Ameritocracy is clearly linked directly to these Wilsonian convictions, and can be conceived 
of as the soft power, cultural manifestation of them; through consistent advocacy, promotion 
and proselytizing of the universality of the American idea, Ameritocracy functions as the 
primary metanarrative of hegemony and as an agent of transformation that will ensure 
American ‘security, prosperity and continued pre-eminence’. Its promises of terminality and 
universality serve as the moral and ideological compass that directs other nations to the 
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beacon of America – it says ‘come, be like us’. However, it is also the contention of this 
thesis that, much like the Wilsonian project, the universality expressed by Ameritocracy is 
inherently contradictory; the admirable sentiments it embodies are tempered by and 
contrasted with American self-interest. ‘Despite the frequent allusions to liberty in… 
justifying the use of American power,’ Bacevich argues, ‘the architects of U.S. policy in the 
20th century never viewed empire as an exercise in altruism.’ Similarly, Chomsky has outlined 
how a primary tenet of the Wilsonian worldview is to produce “open societies”, which, ‘in the 
true meaning of the term are societies that are open to U.S. economic penetration and political 
control. Preferably, these “open societies” should have parliamentary democratic forms, but 
this is a distinctly secondary consideration’ (1987, p.6). Acquiescence to American hegemony 
is of far more importance than mimicry of the American model; for all its professed 
universality, Ameritocracy is ultimately self-interested and self-referential.   
 
Furthermore, in keeping with the Chomskian logic concerning the precepts of the Wilsonian 
project, ‘universal’ is often therefore merely a euphemism for ‘American’, and vice versa. ‘In 
the eyes of Wilson and his heirs, to distinguish between American ideals (assumed to be 
universal) and American interests (increasingly global in scope) was to make a distinction 
without difference’ (Bacevich 2003, p.96). This obfuscation of definitions, between ideals 
and interests, between ends and means, and between the universal and the American, is a 
frequent theme in the proselytizing Hollywood texts that this thesis will engage with, but it is 
also a common element of American identity and self-perception. ‘Americans believe,’ 
argues Jedediah Purdy, ‘somewhere below the level of articulation, that every human being is 
born as American, and that their upbringing in different cultures is an unfortunate, but 
reversible accident.’ Ameritocracy establishes a sort of equation of euphemisms, wherein 
‘universal’ equals ‘American’, and ‘American’ equals ‘human’, or at least fully, matured, 
human. Consequently, Americans ‘have always been inclined to believe that they are the 
world’s universal nation’ (Purdy 2003, p.105), an attitude that Purdy configures as ‘parochial 
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universalism’, wherein full humanity is available to all through the American model. All that 
need be done is accept American primacy. 
 
For some critics, the equivalence made between American and human is exceedingly 
disconcerting: ‘to define the idea of America as the future, everyone’s future, is an arrogant 
denial of the freedom of others, and of the potential of the present to create alternative futures 
in the complex image of the whole world and all its peoples’ (Sardar and Davies 2003, p.10). 
So, whilst the Ameritocratic notion of universality may stem, in part, from admirable 
Enlightenment principles, and possibly even flourish within the extremely diverse society of 
America, there is an obvious tension at work: ostensibly America, and the capitalist system it 
promotes and promulgates, may welcome global variety, however ‘in (the) faith that being 
American is humankind’s natural condition, (Americans) have difficulty appreciating the 
intense attachment that people may feel to a very different nationality, language, or social 
order.’ (Purdy 2003, p.110) 
 
Prior to Wilson’s Presidency, in 1898 (and therefore in the midst of America’s turn-of-the-
century imperial escapades), Senator Albert J. Beveridge famously declaimed that American 
‘institutions will follow our flag on the wings of commerce. And American law, American 
order, American civilization, and the American flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto 
bloody and benighted, but by those agencies of God henceforth to be made beautiful and 
bright.’  The messianic fervour, ‘jingoistic hyperbole’ (Iriye, p.32) and colonial paternalism in 
Beveridge’s words may seem inappropriate and anachronistic to modern ears, but the 
fundamental sentiment behind them has remained unchanged.  American foreign policy 
rhetoric may not refer explicitly to American actions and institutions as ‘agencies of God’, 
but the profound sense of mission evoked by Beveridge is still much in evidence. The wings 
of commerce still flap and flutter, and the seeds of American institutions have been sown the 
world over. Materially, this has been accomplished through the consistent and often ruthless 
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application of American hard power, but the ground has also been prepared by the 
Ameritocratic value structures of American soft power.   
 
Beveridge, on the cusp of the American Century, was at the start of the Wilsonian wave, a 
groundswell of belief in American values bulwarked by American industrial, commercial and 
social progress. At the turn of the twentieth century, ‘American liberty received further 
vindication by the United States’ emergence as the world’s richest and most powerful nation. 
American freedom was now no longer to be a passive model, but an active force to 
emancipate peoples within their own borders. Instead of the world coming to the United 
States, America now took its military and moral standing to the world’ (Foley 1991, p.13). As 
the American Century wore on, and two world wars had converted mere progress into 
superpower status, American global hegemony and primacy was finally and fully conferred 
with the end of the Cold War. The onset of the unipolar moment seemed to have brought the 
Wilsonian vision to reality, the creation of a global Pax Americana, a peace built on 
American military, economic and moral strength and leadership.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
 
Ameritocracy, Hollywood and Americanisation 
 
Introduction 
Any thesis concerned with the potential universalisation of American values is, of course, 
talking primarily about processes of Americanisation. This term, however, is historically and 
culturally loaded, with numerous interpretations and associations stretching back over a 
century. Americanisation has a historically internal function, as a set of processes of 
assimilation in which ‘all ethnic groups could be incorporated in a new American national 
identity, with specific shared beliefs and values, and that this would take preference over any 
previously held system of beliefs’ (Campbell & Kean 1997, p.47). This traditional melting-
pot conception of Americanisation has yielded to a more pluralist, multicultural conception of 
American identity, with hybridity not homogeneity at its centre, such that we should perhaps 
more properly refer to American identities in the plural. However, tensions between these two 
internal definitions of how an individual becomes American have proved persistent; how 
much of the old world should be retained upon arrival in the new? How much transformation 
is necessary? Such tensions also reveal that when Americanisation moves beyond America 
there are no singular definitions of the cultural encounters that ensue; Americanisation is 
rather a network of interconnected and polysemic possibilities. Americanisation, even for 
Americans, is a matter of constant negotiation.  
 
Building and sustaining the Pax Americana of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries has been contingent upon persuading other nations of a simple axiom: what is good 
for America is good for the world. Other nations should therefore acquiesce to American 
leadership; it is after all in their best interest. Such acquiescence is, however, more than a 
mere reluctant acceptance of American leadership; it ideally involves some acculturation of 
American values, an ‘Americanisation’ that involves the transformation, although not 
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necessarily the complete replacement, of indigenous values. This sense of a required or 
desirable change is the consistent element to any definition of Americanisation, intra-, inter- 
or extra-cultural. As such, it is possible to perceive ‘the idea of Americanisation as 
transformation: an altered state of personal consciousness of national identity; or a change in 
the character and even structure of a nation’s culture as it feels the effect of the “idea of 
America” projected abroad’ (Melling and Roper 1996, p.1). However, if, on an intra-cultural 
level, ‘Americanisation is the outcome of personal acculturation which involves the willing 
acceptance of a new national identity’ (Ibid., p.6), what happens on the extra-cultural level, 
where such acculturation is not desired, where the people are unwilling? If, internally, ‘to 
become an American involves regeneration: to become Americanised is to be utterly 
transformed’ (Ibid: 6), how can external Americanisation succeed where transformation is 
openly, even violently, resisted? How can American universality be proved? 
 
Rothkop (1997, p.5) outlines in general terms how the Pax Americana might be sustained 
through the establishment of commonalities: 
It is in the general interest of the United States to encourage the development of a 
world in which the fault lines separating nations are bridged by shared interests. And 
it is in the economic and political interests of the United States to ensure that if the 
world is moving towards common telecommunications, safety and quality standards, 
they be American; that if the world is becoming linked by television, radio and music, 
the programming be American; and that if common values are being developed, they 
be values with which Americans are comfortable. 
Rothkop’s suggestion of ‘shared interests’ and ‘common values’ in the construction of a Pax 
Americana ‘in the general interest of the United States’, hints at the universality within 
Ameritocracy. However, his argument here stops short of its logical inference: the most 
efficacious way to develop common values with which Americans are truly comfortable is to 
generate them from explicitly American values, rather than form them in communion with 
other national value systems. Ameritocracy thus has a primary role to play in making the 
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world comfortable with American values, rather than, as Rothkop suggests, making 
Americans comfortable with ‘common values’. Ameritocracy suggests ‘common values’ 
already exist, and they are American. Equally telling is the sequencing of the types of 
commonalities that can, or should, be established; starting from a broad premise of political 
economy, Rothkop first outlines a technological and structural commonality 
(telecommunications) and its usage (the somewhat nebulous notion of ‘safety and quality 
standards’) before moving onto the content that such technology can transmit (programming). 
Finally, and most crucially, come the ‘common values’ that content contains. Rothkop’s 
conflation of these processes masks the inherent Americanness that ‘common’ actually refers 
to; these commonalities then are in fact a series of Russian dolls, with American values nested 
inside larger ‘common’ or ‘universal’ structures that, seemingly deracinated from their 
national (American) specificities, are more palatable to other nations and thereby easier to 
adopt. In this way the United States can argue that what is occurring through the adoption of 
these common processes is not Americanisation, but globalisation; that America leads the 
charge of commonalities is merely historical happenstance, and a reflection of a benevolent 
Ameritocratic urge towards universalism, not the product of aggressive imperial desire. 
 
For critics like Rothkop, the negotiations that constitute Americanisation are a benevolent 
force, progressing the world towards a mutually beneficent Pax Americana; a world governed 
by international law and transnational co-operation, marked by shared values and common 
purpose. For others, Americanisation concerns the gradual merging of indigenous national 
identities into a global American monoculture in which we all consume the multifarious 
products of American popular culture – music, movies, television, fast food – and exist in a 
bland, dumbed-down and homogenised cultural environment. ‘An American monoculture 
would inflict a sad future on the world,’ Regis Debray argues, ‘one in which the planet is 
converted to a global supermarket where people have to choose between the local ayatollah 
and Coca-Cola’ (cited in Fraser 2003, p.71), and in so doing runs the risk of mistaking 
ubiquity for aggressive monocultural universalism, whilst also possibly falling into the trap of 
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cultural imperialism (even as he tries to decry it) by insinuating that recipient cultures will be 
reduced to binaristic choices. However, cultural transfer is a complex and multi-layered 
process, not simple and uni-directional; it is not a case of either/or, but curious blendings of 
both. The duality that Debray rightly observes is rather a case of simultaneous, intertwined 
cultures, with American culture functioning as a form of lingua franca, such that whilst 
‘English is the world’s second language… American culture is the other global second 
language – a shared patois’ (Purdy 2003, pp.103-104). 
 
Ameritocracy can be considered as both a specific aspect of the vast and nebulous set of 
processes that constitute Americanisation, but also as a metanarrative that drives those 
processes. So, if Americanisation is a set of processes, Ameritocracy is thus a rhetorical form 
that accompanies and infuses them, and is both the motivation for, and outcome of, 
Americanisation: absorption into the American universal. Ameritocracy is thus an ideological 
construct, the prevailing metanarrative that attempts to explain the efficacy of American 
values and legitimise their ubiquity, so that their accrual is normalised by the recipient 
individual or culture. All versions of Americanisation involve some sense of this accrual; the 
transmission of American values and their assimilation, emulation or utilisation. As we shall 
see, Hollywood blockbusters are perfect vehicles for these transmissions of American prime 
modernity; agents of Ameritocracy, blockbusters dress American stories in the rainbow robes 
of ‘universal’ narrative, projecting the desirability and inevitability of the American Way.   
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Forms of Americanisation 
There are at least two forms of ‘Americanisation’ as encountered by other nations; one 
concerns structural change, which has historically come first, and the other cultural and moral 
transformation, which is a slower, cumulative process that follows (Garnham 2000). Any 
such division is of course somewhat illusory; each component inevitably involves the other, 
in some sense and degree. Indeed, in strict Wilsonian rhetoric these two aspects should 
accompany each other ‘on the wings of commerce’ (Beveridge, 1898, cited in Iriye, 2007, 
p.32). In reality, however, the particular value structures of individual groups and nations 
have often proved to be of less concern to American corporate and political interests; for 
these agencies, the acceptance of certain market principles, and of American hegemony, is of 
far more importance than the acceptance of American values, either in particular 
manifestation or in totality.  
 
Consequently, freedom and democracy have proved to be flexible notions in regard to 
processes of Americanisation. Perhaps fittingly for a globalised capitalist-consumer 
marketplace, ‘freedom’ is not a one-size-fits-all generic concept, but rather something that 
can be tailored to suit specific manifestations. For example, the structural freedoms that 
underpin the American, now global, economic model of liberal democratic capitalism – free 
trade and free markets – do not necessarily require concomitant cultural freedoms for the 
individuals within societies seeking to integrate more fully into the globalised economy. Even 
though American leaders may pay frequent lip-service to the ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ 
aspects of liberal democratic capitalism as a general system or model, they have not been 
historically stringent in seeking their enactment through, for example, representative 
government or the application of the rule of law. Instead, American elites have remained 
more concerned with developing a world of nebulously titled ‘open societies’. However, as 
Chomsky argues, even though such societies are preferably democratic, this is not essential 
(1987, p.6). 
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Similarly, whilst American leaders have long articulated that America stands for freedom, the 
concept itself has been left rather vague, more of a cipher for other notions than a specific 
value per se, a signifier whose signified content is not fixed, but variable. Indeed, ‘as 
Americans continuously reinvent themselves and their society, they also reinvent - and in so 
doing radically transform - what they mean by freedom. They mean not just independence, or 
even democracy and the rule of law. Freedom as Americans understand it today encompasses 
at least two other broad imperatives: maximizing opportunities for the creation of wealth and 
removing whatever impediments remain to confine the sovereign self. Freedom has come to 
mean treating the market and market values as sacrosanct (the economic agenda of the Right) 
and celebrating individual autonomy (the cultural agenda of the Left)’ (Bacevich 2003, 
p.101). ‘Freedom’, as Lucas and Kennedy (2005, p.325) further explain, carries an enormous 
weight of association and expectation: ‘In the promotion of "freedom" to foreign audiences, 
public diplomacy is inextricably connected with the development and implementation of U.S. 
foreign policy, charged with the awkward task of reconciling interests and ideals. This 
reconciliation is always deferred, forever incomplete, yet it cannot be disavowed since it is 
the horizon of the imperial imaginary projected by the extension of the national security 
state.’ And yet, even though reconciliation of ideals and interests is ‘always deferred, forever 
incomplete’, the persistent application of powerful symbology (language, flag, etc) enables 
‘America’ to project a coherent, monolithic identity. Freedom and democracy are thus not 
specific altruistic objectives, fixed and sacrosanct; they are efficacious fictions for the 
achievement of other US foreign policy goals, namely the continuation of American primacy 
and hegemony. 
 
So, freedom and democracy are left deliberately ambiguous, their meanings ever in flux; they 
are easy to repeat and argue for, but their manifestation and application varies wildly. When 
President Clinton proclaimed in his 1992 Inaugural Address that ‘ambition for a better life is 
now universal’ he was seemingly speaking with specific reference to the triumph of freedom 
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and democracy over Soviet communism. Nobody noticed the inherent ambiguity of his 
statement: surely all peoples, irrespective of historical moment, geographical location or 
ideological persuasion, have had ‘ambition for a better life’? Which people do not, in some 
form, desire freedom? The ambiguousness of his assertion belies his true meaning: America’s 
victory in the Cold War proves American universality, the efficacy of American global 
leadership and the inevitability of globalised capitalism. The appeal to universals, to banal 
cultural commonalities, masks the political-economic and structural dominance that American 
hegemonic leadership actually entails. 
 
The distinction between the structural and cultural aspects of Americanisation are roughly 
analogous to Nye’s hard and soft power – the structural, which concerns the technological, 
industrial, military and economic transformations that are aspects of broader trends in 
globalisation (to be welcomed or imposed), and the cultural, which ‘entails those symbols and 
practices that make sense of the foregoing by interpreting both “what is” and “what ought to 
be” at any given time' (Demerath 2007, p.83).  However, the two processes are rarely in sync, 
with the structural changes that bring free markets and free trade often forging far ahead of 
the socio-political and cultural freedoms that liberal democracy appears to promise. 
Hollywood, in this regard, is precariously poised between representing ‘what ought to be’ 
through ideas of America and the positive processes of Americanisation they suggest, and 
being a concrete manifestation of ‘what is’ by embodying and modelling the power of 
globalisation. 
 
The highly visible nature of American popular culture means that most debate concerning 
Americanisation occurs within a broad cultural realm, resulting in a tendency to see 
Americanisation as also synonymous with popular culture. It is worth noting that ‘popular 
culture and Americanisation are neither mutually dependent nor interchangeable terms’ 
(Melling and Roper 1996, p.15) and to see them as such obscures the operations of American 
hegemony in other areas, such that ‘the focus on culture belies the significance of American 
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influence in economics, politics, and security, though it is less visible on the street’ (Pieterse 
2004, p.121). The cultural transfer and transformation suggested by ‘Americanisation’ is only 
one aspect of a nexus of American influence in all spheres of existence; simultaneously, 
Americanisation is only one of several similar networks in a global system, albeit the most 
powerful and dominant. 
 
Such dominance has led some critics to view the term in its most pejorative senses, wherein 
Americanisation becomes a malevolent, imperial force that not only floods nations with 
products, but also with the capitalist ideology that will sustain their consumption, crushing 
and colonising indigenous lifestyles and modes of thought. Jameson famously declaimed that 
‘American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new 
wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world: in this sense, as 
throughout class history, the underside of culture is blood, torture, death and terror’ (Jameson 
1991, p.5). American media dominance, in this regard, could be perceived as just one 
manifestation of a broader American imperial domination; of course, such analysis does not 
factor in those who desire to derive pleasure from American products, who wish to reap the 
benefits of American prime modernity, and who, at least in some degree, actively want to be 
Americanised8. Furthermore, the degree to which consuming American products means 
assuming American values is extremely unclear. Demerath (2007, p.82) rightly observes that 
‘it is one thing for a cultural import to touch and exploit but quite another for it to be 
embraced and absorbed'. Moreover, as Kaplan (2004, p.15) has argued, ‘the Americanisation 
of global culture is not a one way street, but a process of trans-national exchange, conflict and 
transformation.’ Similarly, it is crucial ‘not to interpret Americanization as a simple diffusion 
and imposition. Like any package of cultural attributes away from its origins, it interacted 
with existing patterns of thought and practice to create new mixtures’ (Taylor, p.10), and thus 
‘a process such as Americanization does not run uniformly and is not imposed from above. It                                                         
8 Consequently, any structuralist analysis of American media which seeks to centre universalist ideas 
as part of a totalising system must be tempered by an acknowledgement that even texts perceived as 
carrying ‘dominant’ ideologies are read multifariously; in some cases this means that the dominant 
ideology of Ameritocracy is not just agreed with or acquiesced to, but is actively invited.  
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leads to heterogeneous answers and different accentuation’ (Sznaider and Winter 2003, p.5). 
Consequently, when we begin to think about Hollywood blockbusters as bearers, in some 
form or another, of American cultural attributes we must be aware that their content (cultural, 
ideological, economic, etc) is not injected in a uniform and hypodermic fashion into recipient 
cultures, but is rather subject to processes of accentuation, concession and negotiation.   
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Americanisation and Globalisation  
Problematically, ‘Americanisation’ has become further complicated by the term 
‘globalisation’, with the two related concepts often regarded as synonymous. Consequently, it 
is worth briefly reflecting on the relationship between the two terms, given their mutual 
relationship to American popular culture generally and Hollywood specifically.  
 
Unequivocally, there are myriad ways in which the two concepts overlap and intersect. With 
regard to their historical inception, Crockatt (2003, cited in Campbell and Kean 1997, p.288) 
notes that ‘America stands for many as a symbol of globalisation’, perhaps because ‘the 
expansion of American power happened at the same time as the growth of international 
capitalism’, with the American and the global thereby seeming ancillary of each other, if not 
identical.9 However, if we ‘view globalization as a long-term historical process of growing 
worldwide interconnectedness, far more diverse in nature and far longer in duration than 
modern American influences’ (Pieterse 2004, p.122) then it is clear that globalisation predates 
Americanisation, and is qualitatively different from it, involving multiple origin points for 
transnational flows, of which Americanisation is but one.  
 
Structurally, both terms refer to the systems, organisations, institutions and industries that 
have developed to support, sustain and constitute global capitalism. The fundamental 
difference between the two processes, however, is not material but abstract. Conventional 
definitions of globalisation in economic and political paradigms centre upon the transnational 
enlargement of free market capitalism. Americanisation, on the other hand, offers a different, 
participatory path to access and engage with American hegemony, implying a shift in values, 
not just a purchase of products within a global capitalist system; a process of acculturation to 
                                                        
9 It is also worth noting that these developments were contemporaneous with the advent of cinema and 
Hollywood’s relatively swift development into a position of global industrial pre-eminence. 
Consequently, the conflation and confusion of ‘Americanisation’ with ‘globalisation’ has been further 
compounded by the role of ‘Hollywood’, a word frequently used as a cipher or metaphor for both 
terms.  
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a specifically American model that offers all the material benefits of liberal democratic 
capitalism that globalisation entails, but with the additional suggestion that such a process 
will also be socially, and even spiritually, enriching. Americanisation then, in its broadest 
sense, concerns not just the recognition of the self as citizen-consumer in a capitalist world, 
but the intimation that the transformations towards such an identification enable concomitant 
alterations to the nature of the self, and even the soul – with both positive and negative 
associations.  
 
A further differentiation between the two terms is yielded by Mazlish (2006, p.6) who states 
that ‘in studying globalization, we must always be aware that it is a process (not a thing) that 
is neither teleological nor deterministic. These are canards frequently leveled against it.' There 
are aspects of Americanisation, on the other hand, that can be regarded as both teleological 
and deterministic, a force that is above the control of the individual and driven by America’s 
conception of its own destiny, namely, to be an exceptional city-on-a-hill that will guide the 
world to peace and prosperity. Ameritocracy helps provide Americanisation with this 
teleology and determinism by characterising American values as universal, terminal and 
providential. In part, this is the hegemonic privilege of prime modernity; as hegemon, 
America can easily claim that her values are universal, as primacy appears to prove the point. 
Previous empires, from the Roman to the British, have similarly attempted to universalise 
their values and to assume that the efficacy of such values was axiomatic, given their 
hegemonic status.  
 
Iriye (2007, p.31) recognises that the interacting meanings of globalisation and 
Americanisation are also contingent on viewpoint: 
Globalization may mean for every person in the world to be able to say, “I have two 
countries: my native land and the United States of America” - except for those 
Americans who may identify with only one country, their own. There is a tension 
between those two positions. For the rest of the world, globalization involves 
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Americanization, but does not mean giving up their local identities, so the two terms 
are not interchangeable. For many Americans, on the other hand, to be globalized is 
to be Americanized, and Americanization is globalization, so it is not always clear 
how they will respond when globalization comes to entail more than 
Americanization. 
This analysis is useful in revealing the complexities at work between the two terms, but 
underplays the transformative nature of both. Globalisation suggests the structural 
transformations that all nations will undergo, which is problematic from an American 
perspective of global leadership because leaders lead, they are not led. Americanisation on the 
other hand is problematic from the perspective of everyone else, wherein transformations are 
not just structural, but cultural too; some semblance of local identity may be retained, but in 
addition to an externalised American identity. Persuading nations to accept such 
transformation is difficult if represented in terms of Americanisation, with its associations of 
aggression and dominance. Again, Ameritocracy offers a reconciliatory rhetoric that aids 
acquiescence to American leadership, suggesting that nations are not being ‘Americanised’ 
per se, but rather merely joining a broader process of universalisation. ‘America’ cannot be 
provided to non-Americans as citizenship, but as access to the immigrant experience by 
cultural proxy and thus participation within a global American cultural space. 
 
The assertion that Americans regard the two processes of Americanisation and globalisation 
as synonymous is also especially revealing; the conflation of the two terms has, at least in 
part, developed out of the idea of America promulgated by Ameritocracy: the American is 
already the global, the universal, the human. Iriye is also reiterating, therefore, the extremely 
long-standing conceptual construct of America as the world’s ‘global nation’, a concept that 
has developed in relation to America’s long history of diverse immigration. Richard Pells 
(2005, p.190) has even gone so far as to argue that   
 It is precisely these foreign influences that have made America’s culture so popular 
 for so long in so many places. American culture spread throughout the world because 
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 it had habitually drawn on foreign styles and ideas. Americans have then reassembled 
 and repackaged the cultural products they received from abroad, and retransmitted 
 them to the rest of the planet. In effect, Americans have specialized in selling the 
 fantasies and folklore of other people back to them.  
Pells’ argument suggests that ‘America’ functions only as a filter, as if the reassembly, 
repackaging and retransmission of others ‘fantasies and folklore’ is somehow neutral, and that 
these stories return to the world with their original value structures intact. However, Pells 
downplays the powerful political economy that lies behind these processes of 
Americanisation (he is careful to not even use the term), as if the popularity of American 
culture is disconnected from the ideological forces of American primacy. Whilst American 
culture unequivocally draws heavily from ‘foreign styles and ideas’, these are always 
modified, ‘Americanised’ and sent back out into the world with an agenda, which is often 
more than the mere pursuit of profit. Americanisation ultimately seeks to ensure that whatever 
else we are, we are also American, and that through the acculturation of American values we 
can unleash the ‘American within’. Americanisation in the global sense thus becomes a 
modified and external replication of the Americanisation of the immigrant experience; but 
there is no Ellis Island for us, and frequently Americanisation is not a process we have 
necessarily chosen or invited. Our encounters with America, particularly with products that 
have a potential to Americanise, occur on the streets and screens of our own cultures. 
 
This lack of choice, and sense of imposition and domination, has led many individuals, critics 
and indeed nations, to take a combative stance of anti-Americanisation, fearful of the effects 
its transformative powers will have on their cultural sovereignty, personal identities and 
national narratives. Historically, however, much of this fear has had more to do with 
economic protectionism and envy of America’s commercial and industrial success, rather 
than the potential horrors of American monoculture, certainly when articulated by Western 
nations who appear to benefit most from American hegemony. However, whatever the 
motivations – financial, cultural, moral – behind the varying degrees of anti-Americanisation 
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exhibited by different peoples, the ubiquity of American products with the potential to 
Americanise, in some form or other, is unequivocal.  
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A Brief History of Hollywood  
It is axiomatic to state that Hollywood is the world’s most successful national film industry 
because it is the most popular; its products are seen by more people, in all formats, than those 
of any other national cinema and dominate the worldwide cinema marketplace. In cultural 
zones and economic marketplaces where Hollywood does not dominate, it penetrates, 
providing models for production, distribution and consumption, and, frequently, funding too. 
Indeed, if one word were to be chosen to sum up Americanisation, in all its hope and horror, 
surely that word would be ‘Hollywood’10. Often seen as synonymous with processes of 
globalisation, the products of Hollywood are visually obvious and seemingly ubiquitous, the 
mimetic nature of the medium giving gravitas to their ability to carry the idea of America: 
 the American cultural perspective is absorbed now not from the experience of 
 immigrant struggle, but from the passive comfort of the cinema seat or a domestic 
 arm-chair. The suspicion that there is a worldwide phenomenon, “the 
 Americanisation of culture”, is in part due to the sense that through the seductive 
 images of Hollywood, the will to resist an American viewpoint is undermined.’ 
 (Melling and Roper, 3) 
However, before going on to analyse the nature of the ‘idea of America’ as it manifests in the 
most popular of all Hollywood products, the blockbuster, and what might be meant by ‘the 
Americanisation of culture’, it is first important to contextualise how Hollywood came to 
achieve its position of global primacy. As we shall see, the early decades of the American 
cinema established both the commercial templates and narrative principles (which are not 
mutually exclusive properties) that would see Hollywood go on to experience an entire 
century of success.                                                         
10 The term ‘Hollywood’ carries a weight of contradictory meanings: a geographical location in 
southern California that was once the ‘centre’ of the American film industry; standing as representative 
term for the American film industry (although ‘Hollywood’ is at once less than the entirety of 
American film production – the American independent cinema market attempts to style itself in 
opposition to ‘mainstream’ Hollywood - and more, as a symbol for worldwide processes of 
Americanisation) and as a euphemism for the dominance and ubiquity of American capitalism; and as 
transnational nexus of production techniques and values, marketing and distribution strategies, which 
whilst being nominally and financially American, are also very much global. 
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Primacy and the Political Economy of Movie-Making  
At the dawn of the twentieth century, as Fraser argues, ‘America benefitted from tremendous 
historical good luck… A combination of technological changes, shifting demographic 
realities and cataclysmic wars provided America with powerful economic, military, and 
cultural advantages vis-à-vis Europe and the rest of the world’ (2003, p.26). Technological 
developments of the nineteenth century had seen the American economy, as well as those of 
many other nations, shift from agrarian to industrial, changing the demography of the nation 
by drawing more and more people into cities. Moreover, the industrial age had brought many 
developments that had helped globalise world trade: mass transit, mass markets and mass 
production. The most pertinent development of the turn of the twentieth century for this 
thesis, however, was the advent of mass communication, in particular the medium of film, 
which would provide a means for American ideas and ideals to be transmitted far beyond her 
borders. Of course, America was not the only nation to perceive the potential of film as a 
universal language, or the capital than celluloid could conjure. Indeed, from the opening of 
Edison’s first Kinetoscope parlours in 1894 until the start of the First World War, a large 
share of the American market was dominated by French producers like Pathé and Gaumont. 
The other European Great Powers also had booming indigenous film industries whose 
products, unhindered by the linguistic barriers that the ‘talkies’ would later establish, were 
often well received in the American marketplace.  
 
The first decades of film were thus a transatlantic struggle for supremacy, fought with the 
weapons of talent and tariff, and for much of this period it was the French who could most 
plausibly lay claim to being the world’s dominant national film industry. All this was to 
change, however, with the onset of the Great War. Unequivocally, the First World War had a 
catastrophic impact on European film producers. As the European film industry ground to a 
halt, the American film industry, which had migrated to California during the conflict, was 
able to develop and grow, achieving a position of global pre-eminence and hegemony in 
intercultural communication and entertainment that it would take the nation itself the rest of 
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the century to attain. This position of pre-eminence was predominantly a product of the 
conflict in Europe, which enabled the American film industry to both dominate its domestic 
market for the first time and, as Sklar argues, to ‘replace the Europeans as principal suppliers 
to the non-belligerent areas of the world, particularly Latin America and Japan’ (1994, p.215). 
Wagnleitner further contends that ‘analogous to the loss of political, military, and economic 
power, the European (film) powers also lost a part of their sovereignty in the production and 
distribution of movies after the First World War. They thereby forfeited control over a 
decisive channel of cultural self-interpretation and self-definition’ (Wagnleitner, p.225), as 
well as the important commercial advantages that a successful film industry could bring. 
Movies functioned to generate profit in the first instance, but they could also serve as a place 
where audiences could window-shop for other products, lifestyles and systems of political 
economy – with the American examples shown by Hollywood presented as the most 
desirable, those that would (and will) provide the most pleasure. However, the opportunities 
for consolidation and expansion created by the war, and the lack of any meaningful 
competition, also exploited a confluence of factors within America, and Hollywood, itself – 
demographic, economic, institutional, and ideological, each of which had a direct effect on 
narrative content.  
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Appealing to Mass Markets 
Movie-making, particularly in its early years, was an extremely expensive business, reliant on 
expensive technology. Consequently, it was crucial for all national film industries to seek to 
recoup some costs overseas, particularly in Europe where domestic markets were relatively 
small. In America, however, filmmakers could usually rely on the American domestic box 
office to cover the expensive production costs; much profit, therefore, was to be made abroad. 
In fact, ‘since the 1920s between a third and half of Hollywood’s earnings have come from 
audiences outside the United States’ (Maltby 1995, p.12). Sklar (1994, p.216) argues that this 
quantitative demographic factor had qualitative effects such that ‘American producers held an 
unbeatable advantage over their foreign competitors. They could pour money into 
“production values”… knowing that the more spectacular and expensive their pictures looked, 
the more they appealed to overseas audiences’. Contextual demographic factors thus directly 
influenced the filmic texts themselves; niche narratives could not recoup costs in a mass 
market, either domestically or internationally. In early cinema, as now, it made commercial 
sense to produce movies that were high on spectacle and broad on narrative appeal. 
 
Moreover, and most pertinent to my analysis, ‘since America’s population was largely 
immigrant - especially in large urban centres such as New York and Chicago - Hollywood 
deliberately appealed to a lowest common denominator, with uncomplicated narratives that 
could be grasped by all audiences, whatever their nationality or level of education’ (Fraser 
2003, p.41). Again, the contextual factor of demography, the potential audience for a movie, 
had powerful narrative effects during the early years of American cinema. Wasser (1995, 
p.165) suggests that early Hollywood was ‘an industry shaped by immigrants, both as 
producers and as audience, conveying a strong assimilatory message.’ In the melting pot 
culture of early twentieth century America it was deemed important for movies to reflect 
positive images of assimilation into the American nation; in Europe, where national identities 
were longer standing and thus more stable, movies had no need to bolster identities in a 
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similar fashion. Hollywood narratives, therefore, tended towards the simplistic; or, more 
pertinently, they readily exploited Ameritocratic narratives concerning American universality 
in order to express positive notions relating to assimilation. The benefits of such a strategy 
were thus not only commercial, but also political and ideological.  
 
This analysis is also supported by Maltby, who argues that ‘Hollywood’s notion of its 
audience has always had to remain very generalized, because of the size of a movie’s market’ 
(1995, p.12), with the ‘lowest common denominator’ therefore having international as well as 
domestic implications. As such, Hollywood films were perceived as the ideal vehicle for 
spreading American tastes, products, modes of living and values all over the world. This is 
not to say that Hollywood movies were not, and are not, pitched towards specific markets – 
with different genres marketed at different demographic groups, predominantly delineated 
along lines of age and gender. However, up until the Second World War such delineation of 
the audience was deemed largely unnecessary; the prevailing logic dictated that to target your 
product specifically, rather than generally, was to immediately reduce the potential size of 
your audience and thus limit your profit margin. Consequently, ‘Audiences flooded into 
cinemas to see American movies whose simple plots and emphasis on emotion and action had 
widespread cross-cultural appeal’ (Fraser, p.49). Almost a century later, this narrative model 
is still employed by Hollywood, finding its apotheosis in the Hollywood blockbuster, ‘global’ 
movies designed for the global marketplace of the unipolar age.  
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Hollywood and the Potential for Propaganda 
The implications and applications of the film industry for the circulation of ideas was not lost 
on the American political establishment who, even prior to America’s entry into the First 
World War, had focused in on the medium’s potential for promotion and propaganda. The 
National Association of the Motion Picture Industry, a regulatory body founded by the 
Hollywood studios in 1916 to address issues of censorship, sent a memo to the White House 
that stated that “the motion picture can be the most wonderful system for spreading national 
propaganda at little or no cost” (cited in Fraser 2003, p.40). Bulwarked by such 
pronouncements, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the creation of a congressional 
Committee on Public Information (CPI) in April 1917, tasked with persuading the American 
public of the necessity of American involvement in the First World War. The Committee, 
headed by George Creel, had a broad sweeping mandate that covered all conceivable media, 
but it was cinema that held a particular power. On the formation of the Division of Films 
within the CPI, swiftly dubbed the ‘Creel Committee’, Wilson remarked that ‘The film has 
come to rank as the very highest medium for the dissemination of public intelligence…it 
speaks a universal language, it lends itself importantly to the presentation of America’s plans 
and purposes’ (cited in Debauche 1997, p.109). Creel himself perceived the function of the 
CPI to be propaganda, but not ‘as the Germans defined it, but propaganda in the true sense of 
the word, meaning the 'propagation of faith' (Creel 2008, p.158). 
 
In the words of Creel and Wilson it is easy to perceive the workings of Ameritocracy. Film, 
as a ‘universal language’ could speak to diverse populations in diverse lands, spreading, in 
Creel’s terms, the ‘Gospel of Americanism’ (Creel 2008) with its implicit and explicit 
references to the religiosity of the American idea and the requirement of proselytisation and, 
thereby, the universalisation of American values. Crucially, the power of Creel and the CPI 
also extended into the export conditions on Hollywood movies, insisting upon the inclusion of 
‘20 percent of “educational material” – namely, propaganda footage’ (Fraser, p.41), 
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dramatically increasing the propaganda power of any given film. If producers wanted to 
access the profit possibilities of foreign markets then they had little choice but to acquiesce to 
these conditions. Similarly, the CPI also sought to curtail the German film industry’s efforts 
to spread its own propaganda by threatening to withhold all American movies from foreign 
exhibitors who screened German movies, whilst also threatening ‘similar sanctions against 
those [domestic] theatres reluctant to show CPI newsreels’ (Trumpbour 2002, p.63).  
 
The CPI was exceptionally short-lived, and was abolished in 1919 having fulfilled its wartime 
function. Indeed, the explicit codification of the American cinema industry as a propaganda 
machine operating on behalf of the American state has only ever occurred during the two 
world wars, and even then the relationship between Hollywood and Washington was not 
always a happy one. During the Second World War, when Hollywood focused itself on 
helping the war effort by producing propaganda films that expressed the evils of the enemy 
and the virtues of America and her allies, it was suggested ‘by Senator Ralph O. Brewster of 
the Truman Committee that “recent citizens” were not appropriate filmmakers for the war 
effort… that the moviemakers were insufficiently American in origin, intellect and character’ 
(Sklar 1994, p.249). Ironically, the immigrant-heavy nature of Hollywood (that had produced 
such strong assimilatory, Americanising messages in the early years of the industry and 
helped solidify Hollywood’s global domination of the market) was now inverted, and deemed 
a potential threat. Nonetheless, the requirement for propaganda during wartime was obvious: 
to direct and bolster public opinion on the home front, and to attempt to influence public 
opinion overseas. Hollywood was well placed to provide such functions and, as Elmer Davis, 
Director of the Office of War Information in World War Two stated, ‘the easiest way to inject 
a propaganda idea into most people's minds is to let it go through the medium of an 
entertainment picture when they do not realize that they are being propagandized’ (1942, 
cited in Koopes and Black 1977, p.88).  
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In the years immediately following the Second World War, Hollywood found itself under 
attack ideologically, industrially and economically: the House Un-American Activities 
Committee sought to eradicate ‘Communist’ infiltration of the industry, television rapidly 
encroached on film’s domestic dominance of entertainment and the Paramount Anti-Trust 
case of 1948 effectively brought an end to the vertically integrated studio system. Indeed, 
Hollywood has often been a convenient domestic villain for the American political elite; a 
high-profile target accused of moral laxity, ideological subversion and un-American activity. 
However, negative perceptions of Hollywood at home have always been balanced against its 
importance on the international stage, particularly the commercial possibilities that a 
hegemonic cultural industry could offer. In 1990, Gore Vidal suggested that, 
 As we entered the world stage in the First World War, simultaneously we entered 
 the world as conquerors through silent movies, something no one could have 
 calculated or had ever happened before… It was a lucky coincidence that as we 
 became number one in the world militarily, the movies were there for us to use, to 
 make propaganda with, to express ourselves, to sell the world a lot of bills of goods. 
 We're still doing it. (cited in Wagnleitner 1994, p.31) 
Consequently, I contend that the CPI established a template for the relationship between the 
American state and American cinema, at least in its overseas operations: the marriage of 
financial muscle, ideological imperative and American value proselytisation. This union 
cemented Hollywood dominance of the international movie market in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War, and established the general terms by which Hollywood 
production would operate from then until now. However, it must be noted that in the decades 
between the two world wars it was still plausible for America to retreat from internationalism 
and thus projections of ‘America’ overseas were evolving throughout this period. Newfound 
military dominance did not translate into the usage of cinema as a directly propagandistic 
medium on behalf of the American state, with Hollywood instead ‘advertising’ America in 
broader contexts. The explicit usage of Hollywood as a wartime propaganda machine has thus 
been limited, however its potential to propagate faith in the idea of America in more general 
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terms has been much farther reaching, particularly in regards to the American system of 
capitalist political economy. Hollywood could help sell the idea of ‘America’ to the world, by 
providing a shop window for American products and American modes of living. In 1947, 
Mayer articulated this potential: 
 The modern American motion picture, almost beyond any possible comparison with 
 other items of export, combines considerations of economic, cultural and political 
 significance… No one has ever attempted to calculate - and it would probably be an 
 impossible task - the indirect effect of American motion pictures on the sale of 
 American products, not only on display, as it were, but in actual demonstrated use. 
 Scenes laid in American kitchens, for example, have probably done as much to 
 acquaint the people of foreign lands with American electric refrigerators, electric 
 washing machines, eggbeaters, window screens, and so on, as any other  medium… 
 There has never been a more effective salesman for American products in foreign 
 countries than the American motion picture. 
Even as the Cold War was about to embrace the globe it was clear that Hollywood would not 
just be engaged in strictly propagandist pursuits of establishing and fighting the common 
enemy of communism. Its movies would not just carry combative ideological messages, but 
transformative power, aimed at establishing broader commercial commonalities. As early as 
1925, it was suggested that ‘trade follows the film’ (cited in Fraser 2003, p.43), and other 
nations were already aware of what this implied: ‘The film is to America what the flag was 
once to Britain. By its means Uncle Sam may hope one day, if he be not checked in time, to 
Americanize the world’ (cited in Fraser 2003, p.44). Indeed, concerns about the potential for 
Americanisation afforded by Hollywood were a concern in the highest echelons of the British 
government. Lord Newton, in a House of Lords debate in May 1925 stated that Americans 
had ‘realised almost instantaneously that the cinema was a heaven-sent method of advertising 
themselves, their country, their wares, their ideas and even their language, and they had 
seized on it as a method of persuading the whole world that America was really the only 
country that counted.’ (cited in Jarvie 1992, p.111) Such responses perhaps spoke more to 
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British concerns about declining imperial power and America’s seemingly inexorable rise to 
supplant their position, than to a specific fear of Hollywood. Hollywood, then as now, was 
merely the most obvious expression of the coming shift in geo-political domination. Such 
concerns, however, were not limited to Britain. The French, perhaps still reeling from the loss 
of power and pride that the Great War had entailed (including the crushing effect the war had 
had on their previously dominant film industry) were equally troubled: “Americans are trying 
to subject Europe to their ideas and they think, correctly, that motion picture propaganda -
which enables putting American propaganda before the eyes of every public - is the best and 
least costly way of spreading their influence’ (Le Matin, 1929, cited in Fraser 2003, p.47) 
Paranoid, perhaps, but prophetic nonetheless. 
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National Cinema and National Identity: Selling ‘America’ 
The ubiquity of American cultural products has made it easy for critics to see Hollywood as 
the bastion of an aggressive American cultural imperialism; we must remember, however, 
that Hollywood, whatever else it may be, is also the American national cinema. The stories of 
America that we encounter internationally are, first and foremost, stories Americans tell to 
themselves and, perhaps unsurprisingly, such stories tend towards positive affirmations of 
national values. As President Reagan, in his 1989 Farewell Address, nicely surmised (and in 
surmising, explicitly linked the mission and meaning of America to the ability of the film 
industry to spread that message): 
 An informed patriotism is what we want, and are we doing a good enough job 
 teaching our children what America is and what she represents in the long history of 
 the world? Those of us who are over 35 or so years of age grew up in a different 
 America. We were taught very directly what it was to be an American, and we 
 absorbed almost in the air a love of country and an appreciation of its institutions. If 
 you didn’t get these things from your family, you got them from the neighbourhood. 
 From the father down the street who fought in Korea, or the family who lost someone 
 at Anzio. Or you could get a sense of patriotism from school. And if all else failed 
 you could get a sense of patriotism from the popular culture. The movies celebrated 
 democratic values and implicitly reinforced the idea that America was special. TV 
 was like that too. (President Reagan, Farewell Address: January 11, 1989) 
Reagan’s vision of an undivided America where good patriotic thoughts wafted about on the 
breeze is clearly somewhat nostalgic and unrealistic, but his conviction that patriotism meant 
a wholesome faith in the American idea in all its uniqueness (‘the idea that America was 
special’) and universality (‘what America is and what she represents in the long history of the 
world’) is consistent with Ameritocracy. In this sense, we can even begin to think of 
American cinema (domestically and internationally), and blockbusters in particular, as 
Althusserian Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), one of a whole panoply of patriotic 
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influences that help to reproduce the appropriate conditions for the social formation of 
‘America’ to exist (reproduction of the ‘existing relations of production’), by helping to teach 
successive generation of Americans how to be American. Cinema though, unlike other ISAs 
such as the family and the school, which operate within national boundaries, also operates 
across them, taking American values, not just patriotism, to cultures far and wide. The 
function of ISAs to attain ‘a reproduction of submission to the ruling order, i.e. a reproduction 
of submission to the ruling ideology’ (Althusser 1971, p.132) thus has international 
implications, with ‘the ruling order’ therefore referring not just to a capitalist ideology within 
America, but also to American global hegemony externally. As a soft power cultural medium 
cinema uses pleasure and persuasion to achieve such submission, which in the first instance 
(internally and externally) is to guarantee the continued consumption of its products; in 
broader international contexts, ‘submission’ concerns itself instead with the generation of 
notions about American benevolence, uniqueness and universality that sustain the mythos of 
American global hegemony.  
 
Moreover, whilst cultural products are axiomatically constructed from the national narratives 
of their country of origin, the types of stories told by Hollywood owe more to bottom-line 
economic considerations than to national culture per se11; the ideological conversions that 
‘Americanisation’ suggests, both domestically and internationally, are the by-products of 
what Maltby (1983, 1995) refers to as Hollywood’s ‘commercial aesthetic’, they are not 
necessarily an objective in themselves.  
 ‘Filmmakers, production companies, distributors and so on, they certainly don’t have 
 agendas to go and spread this kind of meaning or that kind of meaning. I think they 
 would say it’s something they do probably subconsciously. So, you’re thinking 
 you’re going to make a big film that’s going to have a huge audience – it’s no great 
 mystery that you’re going to, in doing that, draw on some kind of resonance that’s 
                                                        
11 Of course, it could be argued that in the American formation, economic interests are so interwoven 
into national culture as to be indistinguishable. Unfortunately, there is neither space nor scope for such 
an analysis here.   
 77 
 around in the culture in a particular place, in a particular time, to do that. I think that’s 
 a good way around any kind of conspiratorial view of filmmakers as being part of an 
 ideological system in a more deliberate, intentional kind of way’ (Geoff King, 
 interview for Ameritocracy: 2011). 
The vast majority of Hollywood movies, therefore, are not produced with propaganda in 
mind, certainly not in an official sense. They do not seek to directly push specific ideologies, 
although they may interact within ideological agendas that exist in the real world; a degree of 
verisimilitude, a relationship to the real, is a necessary component of narrative, even in the 
most escapist of entertainments. So, ‘the producer… expresses ideology in a different way, 
not as a personal preference or artistic vision, but as mediated by mainstream institutions like 
banks and studios, which transmit ideology in the guise of market decisions… Hollywood is a 
business, and movies avoid antagonizing significant blocs of viewers; they have no incentive 
to be politically clear’ (Biskind, 1983, cited in Maltby 1995, p.361).  
 
In Hollywood, the commercial aesthetic is unequivocally the primary motivating factor in 
movie production; ideological posturing is a secondary consideration. That said, it is worth 
pointing out that the commercial aesthetic itself is also inevitably ideological; its placing of a 
profit motive over all other considerations of what a film could or should be perpetuates a 
capitalist ideology, and one grounded in an American model, which thus also includes the 
brands of liberalism and democracy with which American capitalism is infused. As such, it 
should not be surprising that ‘the Hollywood film - with its emphasis on individualism, 
competition, the cleansing forces of the market, the freedom of choice, and especially the 
melting pot - became the most influential iconographic inventory of the capitalist ethos and 
U.S. democracy in the twentieth century’ (Wagnleitner 1994, p.225).  
 
Indeed, Hollywood has historically been able to pull off a remarkable Wilsonian legerdemain: 
fusing its commercial interests with particularly American ideals, leading to ‘claims by 
Hollywood marketers and apologists that its films maintain global appeal through universal 
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narratives and the expression of American populist values’ (Herbert 2006, p.30). One of the 
leading directors of early Hollywood, D. W. Griffith (himself a personal correspondent of 
President Wilson), expressed the potential for the union of American ideals with the 
‘universal language’ of film in deliberately Wilsonian terms: 
 ‘Are we not making the world safe for democracy, American democracy, through 
 motion pictures? The increase of knowledge, the shattering of old superstitions, the 
 sense of beauty have all gone forward with the progress of the screen. Our heroes are 
 always democratic. The ordinary virtues of American life triumph. No Toryism. No 
 Socialism’ (cited in May 1980, p.61). 
Griffith’s statement is poignantly Ameritocratic; democracy is American democracy and vice 
versa. Of course, we should remember that the sense of universal brotherhood invoked by 
Griffith did not manifest itself in his treatment of race relations in Birth of a Nation (1915), 
further revealing the particularity and partiality of American notions of universality. Even 
though ‘democracy’ was held up by Griffith and Wilson as an ideal form of government, the 
application of the term, even in America, did not necessarily equate to ideals of equality, 
fairness and freedom. What is clear, however, is that even in its earliest incarnations, there 
was a perception that Hollywood had the potential to have a profoundly positive effect on 
those who viewed its products; that beyond the financial benefits of movie production lay a 
value-based, soft power function that could take the idea of America and transplant it 
overseas, to the benefit of those who encountered it. Movies were seen not just as entertaining 
cultural objects, but also as shop windows for American goods, lifestyles and values; tools 
which could be subtly deployed to reinforce patriotism at home and encourage acquiescence 
abroad.  
 
Will Hays, President of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) 
from 1922 to 1945, also believed that movies were more than mere entertainment, and that 
Hollywood sold more than pleasure: ‘We are going to sell America to the world with 
American motion pictures’ (1923, cited in Jarvie, 1988: 215). Most likely Hays was referring 
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to the capacity of movies to help sell American products, but it is easy to see how foreign 
governments could also perceive that what was additionally being sold was an idea of 
America itself. In a 1938 speech, Hays went on to elucidate what he perceived as the special 
relationship between America and movie-making: 
 There is a special reason why America should have given birth and prosperous 
 nurture to the motion picture and its worldwide entertainment. America in the very 
 literal sense is truly the world-state. All races, all creeds, all men are to be found here 
 – working, sharing, and developing, side by side in more friendship among greater 
 diversities of tribes and men than all the previous history of the world discloses. Our 
 country represents the greatest single unity of races, people, and culture. Is it not 
 possible that very quality enabled America to express itself by the creation and 
 development of the motion picture? (cited in Jarvie 1988, 216) 
The historical inaccuracy of Hays’ claims for America as the birthplace of the motion picture 
notwithstanding (although Americans, notably Edison, can probably be credited with 
converting the technology from scientific curio to a medium for commercial use), we can 
clearly see the link between Ameritocratic ideas of American universality (‘all races, all 
creeds, all men’) and film as universal language. Indeed, for Hays, the latter inevitably sprang 
from the former, and by the time he wrote his memoirs he conceived of cinema with a 
Winthropian glow: ‘At the end of fifty years’ journeying the American Motion Picture 
Industry stood on a mountaintop from which the beacon of its silver screen was sending rays 
of light and colour and joy into every corner of the earth’ (Hays 1955, p.508). So, ‘beyond 
bottom-line considerations, Hollywood conveys an enduring commitment to a core set of 
values and beliefs: individualism, capitalism, liberalism and democracy’ (Fraser, p.111), and 
it has often been argued that Hollywood’s position of global cultural hegemony represents a 
universal endorsement of these values. For example, Jack Valenti, President of the Motion 
Picture Association of America (MPAA) from 1966 to 2004, triumphantly stated that 
 It is a fact, blessedly confirmed, that the American movie is affectionately received 
 by audiences of all races, cultures and creeds on all continents amid turmoil and 
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 stress as well as hope and promise. This isn’t happenstance. It’s the confluent of 
 creative reach, storytelling skill, decision making by top studio executives and the 
 interlocking exertions of distribution and marketing artisans. (cited in Miller et al, 
 2001, p.4) 
Valenti’s argument seemingly confuses the empirical fact of Hollywood’s global market 
dominance with universally affectionate reception. Of course, we cannot discount the fact that 
American values, embedded in the ‘universal’ narratives of Hollywood film, may have a 
broad appeal for audiences all over the world. That there is something extremely attractive in 
the idea of America is testified to by the nation’s long history of mass immigration. Indeed, 
Richard Pells (2005, p.190) has argued that ‘the United States has been a recipient as much as 
an exporter of global culture’ and thus ‘the conception of a harmonious and distinctively 
American culture – encircling the globe, implanting its values on foreign minds – has always 
been a myth’. Certainly, such a conception is overly simplistic, but myths must at least have 
elements of truth, or else they would not also have durability. American values may not be 
‘implanted’ but they are presented and projected; America may well be internally diverse and 
disharmonious, but this does not preclude an international perception of America as 
monolithic. The intricate fabric of the stars and stripes appears worldwide as just one flag. 
 
So, just as we cannot presuppose that Hollywood and its products are unwelcome, we 
similarly cannot account for the success of American movies based purely on Hollywood’s 
overwhelming financial superiority; surely there must be something appealing in the movies 
themselves, beyond their ubiquity? After all, foreign governments ‘would not have to regulate 
to limit their import unless there was sufficient domestic demand to warrant doing so’ (Olson 
2004, p.115). However, as Wasser (1995, p.376) argues, ‘the point is not whether 
international viewers are actually seduced by such images but that film producers set for 
themselves the task of portraying an “America” that is a dreamscape for “universal” desires 
rather than a historic reality’. Again, such a universal dreamscape is a peculiar Wilsonian 
fusion of ideals and interests; commercial interests are satisfied in products that offer ‘a 
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multiplicity of icons and viewpoints that have different meanings for different audiences at 
different times in different countries’ (Straubhaar and Duarte 2005, p.220), often within 
singular texts. Simultaneously, national ideals are assuaged in the consistent projection that 
America, and only America, can offer the space from which such divergent meanings can be 
yielded, and in which such differences can be embraced and harmonised. The universality 
encouraged by Hollywood’s commercial aesthetic is not merely the operation of that 
particular economic imperative, but also an embodiment of the Ameritocratic aspects of 
American national identity.        
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Universality, Polysemy and Narrative Transparency 
Clearly, we must be wary of fearful pronouncements concerning the ability of Hollywood 
movies to produce a negative Americanisation in their audiences as if spectators were mere 
imbibers of ideology, but simultaneously aware that as the world’s dominant cultural entity 
Hollywood does seek to have effects on its audiences and to tell particular stories concerning 
America. Wagnleitner’s blanket contention, therefore, that ‘seeing is believing… reel facts 
become real facts’ (1994, p.226) is certainly contestable, as is the school of cultivation theory 
from which it springs. Indeed, ‘in its most common manifestation, cultivation analysis 
assumes, and therefore discovers, that American media will render the world American, even 
when the evidence for that transformation is merely small effects.’ (Olson 2004, p.116) The 
‘small effects’ however, may well be cumulative, taking time before they can be identified in 
behaviour and attitude. Certainly, such ‘Americanised’ effects are but one of many in a 
globalised world of transnational flows and their effects should not be over-estimated; 
however, that they are the most powerful and dominant forces within the realm of 
transnational cultural exchange can also not be disputed.  
 
Olson (2004, p.126) argues that  
 there is an effect to the American media, but it is not to project American values; 
 quite to the contrary, American media are now cleverly designed so as to reinforce 
 existing values. This results in interstitial readings and polyglot cultures, but not 
 monoculture. They no longer need to create a market for American products, because 
 they can design products that act as though they are indigenous. Polysemy is built in. 
 All that is ultimately necessary is selling the product and that is better accomplished 
 without having the burden of transforming the culture first. “The Other” has become 
 just another commodity to sell. 
Olson conceives of the polysemic qualities of American media products as ‘narrative 
transparency’, ‘defined as any textual apparatus that allows audiences to project indigenous 
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values, beliefs, rites, and rituals into imported media’, thus enabling Hollywood narratives ‘to 
become stealthy, to be foreign myths that surreptitiously act like indigenous ones, Greek gifts 
to Troy, but with Trojan citizens inside the horse’ (2004, p.114). Olson’s contention that 
something like transparency must exist is convincing - it is, after all, the ultimate expression 
of a commercial aesthetic. Moreover, his assessment that interstitial readings and polyglot 
cultures will emerge as a result of encounters with American media seems valid; evidence 
that audiences use American texts in surprising ways, decoding multiple and oppositional 
meanings, is plentiful. Indeed, the idea of narrative transparency is certainly useful in 
analysing Hollywood texts, particularly with regard to their utilisation of myth, and I shall 
return to Olson’s theory in my discussion of blockbuster narratives in the next chapter. 
However, his contention that American values are not projected stretches the theory of 
narrative transparency too far; such values may be interpreted and used in different ways, but 
to suggest they are not present at all is not born out by textual analysis.  
 
Furthermore, the additional suggestion that the interstitial effects of transparency do not result 
in some form of ‘Americanisation’ does not ring true; the polyglot cultures that emerge do not 
replace global American monoculture, but co-exist with it; Olson has seemingly mistaken the 
extensive use of mythic structures, and Ameritocratic rhetorical expressions of universality in 
American media, for transparency. Iriye’s notion that global citizens can increasingly state 
that they have ‘two countries’ suggests that they can also have two cultures, one which is 
local (their own national culture) and one which is global (American, universal culture). 
Americanisation therefore becomes not an issue of cultural replacement, but of cultural 
simultaneity; American media clearly have a crucial role to play in establishing and 
continuing the notion of a global American culture that can co-exist with, and feed off and 
into, local cultures.   
In his 1947 study Mayer noted that ‘the motion picture is one product which is never 
completely consumed for the very good reason that it is never entirely forgotten by those who 
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see it. It leaves behind a residue, or deposit of imagery and association, and this fact makes it 
a product unique in our tremendous list of export items’ (p.227). The impact of this ‘deposit 
of imagery and association’ on the sale of goods is difficult to quantify. However, if it did not 
exist at all then companies would not be as eager as they clearly are to associate themselves 
with Hollywood narratives through product placement, merchandising and other 
epiphenomena. What is considerably more intangible is the degree to which Hollywood 
products also leave behind a ‘value residue’, and, if so, to what uses this might be put. 
Notions of transparency suggest that the culture leaves a residue in the text, not vice versa, 
but, as Geoff King suggests (Ameritocracy, 2011) ‘it’s a reasonable hypothesis to say that it’d 
be pretty extraordinary if they [movies] had no influence, frankly’. 
 
It is the contention of this thesis that Hollywood movies, particularly those from the 
blockbuster era of the last 30 years or so, do have an ‘Americanising’ (or universalising) 
effect; on a superficial, material level this manifests in the display of American products and 
lifestyles, which many audiences may find seductive. However, I contend that there is also a 
broader, cumulative effect that Hollywood has on other national narratives; by following the 
models and genres of Hollywood film, indigenous film industries become inevitably 
Americanised. On the commercial level, they take on generic (Americanised) narrative forms 
so that they might compete in the international movie marketplace. However, Hollywood’s 
global dominance also means that the indigenous film industries of many nations find 
themselves greatly outnumbered and out-muscled in their domestic marketplaces. 
Consequently, Hollywood’s cultural hegemony has led to an Americanisation of audience 
expectation, particularly in European markets. German filmmaker Wim Wenders explains 
that despite the relatively healthy position of European cinema in recent decades, ‘it’s losing 
touch with young audiences. They have a taste of a different kind of cinema and a lot of them 
don’t know anymore that there is any other cinema than the blockbuster cinema’12 
                                                        
12 This statement, and its inclusion in Ameritocracy, must be balanced against the fact that Wenders is a 
filmmaker who has frequently worked in Hollywood, and has made several films which explore 
‘American’ themes, from road movies to literary adaptations.  
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(Ameritocracy  2011). British film director Mike Leigh is considerably more emphatic: ‘The 
audience is brainwashed into this notion that films… that films means American films, 
Hollywood films’ (Ibid.). Hollywood’s global cultural hegemony thus means that ‘when we 
go to the cinema we kind of almost expect that it’s going to be an American film, and 
therefore those underpinning values, those mythic values, are going to be American values’ 
(Neil Campbell, Ameritocracy 2011).  
 
The projections and uses of American values are multivalent, so much so that we can argue 
that there is not one uniform Americanisation, but many. However, the continued and 
consistent exposure to American narratives (and the values they contain), whether overtly 
jingoistic or covertly dressed in the rainbow robes of universalism, will inevitably have an 
Americanising effect on indigenous film narratives. If audiences increasingly associate the 
very notion of film itself with American film, then this powerful cultural medium will 
become increasingly hard for indigenous narratives to penetrate into the marketplace of their 
own cultures without assuming the narrative techniques, commercial imperatives and value 
structures of Hollywood.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
 A Brief History of the Blockbuster 
This chapter will make a number of claims for the Hollywood blockbuster, and will 
particularly attempt to establish that the Hollywood blockbuster functions as a chiasmic 
intersection of commercial and ideological notions of universality, wherein ‘universal’ stories 
are sold to ‘universal’ audiences, reinforcing the efficacy of American global hegemony (via 
cultural universality) and the legitimacy of American values to represent all peoples. 
Consequently, it is important at this point to provide a more specific definition of the term 
‘blockbuster’, which already comes loaded with a range of shifting and overlapping 
associations and interpretations, depending on whether it is being deployed by producers, 
critics, academics or audiences. In its simplest and earliest incarnation we can think of a 
blockbuster as any film that achieves vast commercial success, and in this regard we should 
note that the blockbuster is not a phenomenon unique to Hollywood, nor one that can be 
explicitly pigeonholed to a specific historical era. The blockbuster is primarily understood 
with regard to size or scale: out-sized spectacular cinematic experiences, expensively 
produced and marketed ‘event’ movies advertised through superlative language which assures 
the would-be viewer that they will be thrilled and entertained. Blockbusters frequently 
suggest that they will offer the audience something they have never seen before, and establish 
themselves as ‘must see’ movies whose appeals are universal, excluding no-one. In this 
regard, Hollywood has always produced blockbusters, expensively-produced “prestige” 
pictures designed to appeal to mass audiences and garner maximum profits, such as Birth of a 
Nation (Griffith, 1915), Gone With the Wind (Fleming, 1939), and The Ten Commandments 
(DeMille, 1956), amongst myriad others.  
 
However, such productions were nonetheless exceptional for much of the twentieth century, 
in which Hollywood moved through several distinct, but overlapping phases: the ‘classical’ 
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era, which established certain narrative conventions and was structured around the vertically-
integrated studio model, and which loosely ran from the first nickelodeons up to World War 
Two; the post-war period, in which the narrative techniques of ‘classical’ Hollywood 
remained largely the same, but the political-economic organisation of the industry changed as 
the studio system was dismantled and cinema was forced into a competitive market with 
television; and the short-lived ‘New Hollywood’13 era of the 1960s and early 1970s, in which 
younger directors experimented with new techniques of filmmaking and funding in the 
absence of a dominant studio system. As Sklar argues, ‘Hollywood’s collapse in the late 
1960s was real, but not permanent. It marked the nadir of a long transformation, one that 
stretched from the demise of the old studio system in the 1950s to the advent of effective new 
distribution strategies in the mid-1970s’ (1994, p.321). These strategies – utilising expensive 
production values, extensive advertising and marketing, and commercial synergy - meant that 
 1975 witnessed the phasing out of the New Hollywood in favor of the blockbuster 
 era, a politically conservative, neoclassical style of filmmaking. Of course, 
 blockbusters constituted an integral part of classical Hollywood, but as exceptional 
 productions that ran counter to the regular output of routine movies. From 1975, 
 blockbusters increasingly became Hollywood’s standard or dominant practice of 
 filmmaking. (Buckland 2006, p.11)14 
The blockbuster era, therefore, did not invent the blockbuster, but rather systematised the 
calculated production, marketing and distribution of ‘must-see’ event spectacles on a global 
level. Stringer (2003, p.3) suggests that ‘as a loose, evolving system of claims and 
counterclaims – or an influential and multifaceted idea – the blockbuster circulates diverse 
kinds of knowledge concerning titles deemed to be social events. Such discursive activity                                                         
13 The phrase ‘New Hollywood’ is also disputed, with different theorists using the term to refer to 
different periods of Hollywood history. Schatz (1993, p.9), for example, argues that ‘post-1975 era best 
warrants the term “the New Hollywood”’ for its utilisation of new production, marketing and 
distribution techniques. I have referred to the same period here as the ‘blockbuster era’, and instead 
follow the critical line of Jacobs (1977) and Buckland (2006) that aligns the term ‘New Hollywood’ 
with the ‘Hollywood Renaissance’ (Jacobs, 1977) which marked the late 1960s and early 1970s of 
Hollywood production.  
14 Schatz (1993, pp.10-11) provides a similar analysis in his contention that whilst ‘In terms of budgets, 
production values, and market strategy, Hollywood has been increasingly hit-driven since the early 
1950s’, the ‘blockbuster syndrome went into high gear in the mid-1970s… the first period of sustained 
economic vitality and industrial stability since the classical era’. 
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takes place on both textual and extra-textual levels…[and thus the blockbuster can be placed 
within] a wide variety of interpretative frames’, making it extremely difficult to ascribe any 
essential characteristics. However, above all other considerations, the blockbuster prioritises a 
commercial aesthetic, a ‘bums-on-seats’ imperative that equates notions of universality with 
profitability.  
 
Indeed, in the globalised, transnational world of late capitalism, Hollywood’s urge towards 
universality is nowhere more prevalent than in the blockbuster movie; global films for global 
audiences, which, with massive production and advertising budgets to recoup and redouble, 
must appeal ‘universally’. This appeal is as old as the American cinema itself, and relates 
both to the specifics of demographic diversity in early twentieth century America and to ideas 
of film as a universal language and mass medium more generally. As such, the notions of 
universality (which we can think of as a fusion of American notions of universality and 
notions of American universality) that Hollywood now embodies in the blockbuster continue 
to perform both commercial and cultural functions; in the era of unipolarity that has followed 
the end of the Cold War, this means that Hollywood (and the blockbuster), has a crucial role 
to play in extending and exemplifying American cultural universality (prime modernity), not 
as an official function (propaganda or otherwise) of America as a nation state, but as part of a 
national state of mind that is both internalised and projected – the belief in the universality of 
an ‘America’ that is ‘desired by all, beneficial to all and attainable by all’. (Flint & Falah 
2004, p. 1380).  
 
For more than three decades the blockbuster has formed the core of Hollywood’s global 
business, the ‘tent-pole picture’ that costs more and reaches further than any other cultural 
object and is Hollywood’s primary, although not predominant, product. Furthermore, because 
blockbusters have a putative global reach, they are also the focal point for additional 
commercial activities that exist beyond the profits yielded by cinematic distribution (which is, 
of course, in itself an enormously profitable endeavour). Naturally, these include an 
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increasingly diverse variety of distribution channels, including television, DVD and online 
viewing, but which also extend into a panoply of synergetic activities: product placement 
within films, computer games, toys, foodstuffs, theme park rides, novelisations, board games, 
etc. In this way, our encounters with blockbusters are not singular viewings, but multifarious 
interactions that occur both within and beyond the multiplex. Without delving too far into the 
murky waters of ‘postmodernism’, we can see that the blockbuster is but one of myriad means 
to encounter diffuse notions of ‘America’ out in the world. As the dominant cultural product 
of the world’s dominant nation, blockbusters are therefore natural objects of study for anyone 
seeking to understand American global hegemony in the era of unipolarity or the operation of 
global market relations in Late Capitalism. Ameritocracy forms part of the rationale for the 
former of these spheres of concern and is implicated in the American leadership of the latter. 
 
The soft power persuasions of American cinema offer a means to access the American 
universal, seemingly away from the harsh realities and structural limitations of geo-politics 
and economic globalisation, which Nye would define as the actions of American hard power. 
Of course, we cannot watch blockbuster movies without, in some way or another, paying for 
the entertainment we are about to receive and thus engaging with the commercial and 
structural political economy of Hollywood. However, encountering ‘America’ on screen 
(whether in the cinema or through other media) is a hyper-real experience, an engagement 
with a superstructural simulacrum of an ‘America’ that does not really exist, but which is 
nonetheless ubiquitous and potentially transformative. However, unlike the structural factors 
of American primacy, in which engagement with ‘America’ is enforced and whose 
transformative effects are measured in more quantifiable terms, American cinema is 
persuasive; with its promise of pleasure, the blockbuster demonstrates domination not by 
arms, but by desire. Indeed, whilst accusations of cultural imperialism may sometimes holds 
true in particular periods, policies and movies, we cannot rely entirely on the theory to 
sufficiently explain the global domination of American cinema.  
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Ultimately, ‘Hollywood sells pleasure to people, of one type or another’ (Geoff King: 
Ameritocracy 2011), and so suggestions that audiences are simply buying a myth of America 
(‘false consciousness’) fail to account for the fact that Hollywood must be selling something 
that audiences want. Superficially, this is the experience of pleasure that derives from 
spectacle, the suspension of disbelief and narrative resolution (happy endings). However, as 
an expression of, and agent for, American prime modernity, the blockbuster is also exporting 
ideas concerning American hegemony and its globally beneficial effects. Indeed, because the 
‘need to export economic practice, political ideology and cultural ideals across the whole of 
the globe rests upon a visible assumption that these models are universally desired’ (Flint and 
Falah 2004, p.1380) the Hollywood blockbuster serves an important function in maintaining 
American hegemony by both embodying (commercial dominance) and expressing (mythic 
narrative content) American universality. The political economy of the medium isn’t the 
message per se, but ideas of universality are implicit to both and are thus intertwined and 
mutually fortifying, further reinforcing the universality of American prime modernity and 
fulfilling the nation’s providential destiny. 
 
Examining late twentieth and early twenty-first century blockbusters reveals that even as they 
express seemingly universal themes, ethics and values, they are also implicated in expounding 
parochial ideas concerning American identity. As such, Hollywood blockbusters are 
exemplars of Ameritocratic ideas of universality, which manifests in their political economy, 
mythic narrative structures, and ideological intentions. The ‘commercial aesthetic’ of 
Hollywood production suggests that films and filmmakers do not have explicit ideologies that 
they wish to promote, certainly not beyond the primary objective of perpetuating their profits 
and the capitalist system that generates them. It is not in the commercial interests of film 
producers to alienate sections of their potential audience with excessively political or 
ideological films. However, as we can observe in the oeuvre of Roland Emmerich, 
Hollywood blockbusters nonetheless do demonstrate an almost uniform commitment to 
certain principles that are implicitly connected to American conceptions of global destiny: 
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that America is a benevolent force in the world, that the individual is the primary agent of 
history, that liberal democratic capitalism is the best form of social organisation and political 
economy, and that America’s unique historical development, value structures and global 
position allow her to speak and act on behalf of all peoples as natural universal hegemon.   
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Ameritocracy on Screen 
In the era of unipolarity, the Hollywood blockbuster has become the ultimate exemplar of 
Ameritocracy; the global scope and scale of its political economy enables the blockbuster to 
function as the primary channel through which the mythos of American universality is 
projected and exemplified to the world. Hollywood itself is, of course, but one medium 
through which the phenomenon of American primacy is made manifest (and through which 
Ameritocracy can be expressed), and thus its global success and dominance is sometimes 
cited as evidence of the efficacy of American hegemony and as proof of America’s universal 
status. However, despite global reach and universal pretensions, the version of universality 
presented in the Hollywood blockbuster is often troublingly parochial, speaking more to 
specific American concerns and historical influences than to genuinely universal values. 
Indeed, the Ameritocratic processes of universalisation and Americanisation in which 
Hollywood is implicated are inherently contradictory, embodying what we might refer to as 
the ‘crisis of exceptionalism’: the simultaneous, yet paradoxical, claims that America is both 
unique and universal. Such a paradox inevitably generates a range of challenging and long-
standing questions. Can one nation function as model for all nations? How can the individual 
ideals and values of liberty, freedom and democracy – so fundamental to American 
conceptions of their exceptional national character – be applicable to all peoples, particularly 
when their meanings are seemingly not fixed (universally standard, but uniquely occurring in 
America) but flexible (unique in application and thus universally adaptable)? The riddle of 
American uniqueness and universality inherent to Ameritocracy naturally yields a riddling 
answer: America’s true uniqueness lies in her universality, the two ideas part of the same 
Ameritocratic continuum, an ideological ouroborus that feeds on itself in an unending 
conceptual loop.  
 
Ameritocracy, the profound belief in American universality, terminality and providentiality, 
has led successive generations of American leaders to ‘vindicate’  (Brands, 1998) the 
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American idea abroad; reifying the universality of American values, and thereby proving 
America’s providential mission to improve humanity’s lot. The twentieth century produced 
the conditions through which the American mission might be brought to fruition; rather than 
just modelling her unique universality, America now had the industrial, economic and 
military might to make changes to the structure of global governance that could prove it. With 
the advent of cinema, and Hollywood’s relatively swift global domination of the medium, 
America also had access to a powerful cultural tool that could present American values 
(alongside or within American products, modes of living, political culture, etc) as the 
transformative cultural force to accompany (and even inspire) the structural changes of 
American-led globalisation.  The message of America’s special mission could now be spread 
throughout the world, with the universality of the medium seen as the perfect conduit for 
expounding the universality of the nation. Consequently, from its earliest years, universality 
was a central concern for Hollywood: 
 ‘That the cinema was a universal medium was a specially handy counter-argument 
 against those wishing either to use film to represent national/local interests or to erect 
 import barriers. And it also served to naturalize Hollywood’s own nationality by 
 equating Hollywood cinema’s undeniable American ‘accent’ with a universal 
 language. Given Hollywood’s worldwide prominence and the rhetoric of universality, 
 the style and practice of film-making developed by Hollywood in the late 1910s and 
 1920s became international norms: studio-based production, expensive production 
 values, rapid cutting, shot variety, continuity editing.’ (López, 2000, p.423) 
The Hollywood blockbuster, often too readily dismissed as harmless entertainment, is the 
apotheosis of the ‘rhetoric of universality’ established by Hollywood in its earliest years, 
expressing both the commercial prerogative of the American national film industry and the 
ideological and hegemonic imperatives of the nation itself. The filmmaking techniques 
developed in the classical era, as suggested above, produced an Americanising effect on other 
national cinemas, which has persisted into the present day. The blockbuster continues to 
establish international norms for filmmaking, so much so that for some international 
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audiences, ‘films means American films, Hollywood films’ (Mike Leigh, Ameritocracy: 
2011), with the shift in definition of ‘film’ itself a perfect example of Ameritocracy: an 
American iteration transformed into a universal model.  
 
What will we find when we look at the filmic texts themselves? Can we observe a genuine, if 
mythic, universalism that can speak to all peoples and thus transcend national specificities? 
The answer to this question is an unsatisfactory ‘partly’, insofar as the commercial aesthetics 
of filmmaking, particularly those of the Hollywood blockbuster, dictate the application of a 
broad narrative that might have universal appeal. Consequently, It has been convincingly 
argued (Ang 1985, Kaplan 2004, Olson 2004, Demerath 2007) that American media texts are 
deliberately polysemic: audiences (domestic and foreign) are offered a space into which they 
can project their own myths and ideals, and are encouraged to negotiate the meaning of a text 
from a range of possible interpretive positions. However, Hollywood’s focus on polysemy 
actually (and ironically) generates homogeny, such that we can observe ‘a standardisation, a 
blandness, in a lot of Hollywood films, that would allow them to lend themselves to 
everybody’ (Neil Campbell, Ameritocracy: 2011). This leads us in turn to an obvious question 
– if the universality of Hollywood films makes them bland, why watch them at all? Surely we 
must come to the counter-intuitive conclusion that the ‘blandness’ of generic spectacle, 
universal themes and predictable outcomes provides pleasure?  
 
Notions of universality have often been limited to the commercial imperatives of the 
American cinema, with critics variously mobilising notions of transparency, deracination and 
polysemy to explain Hollywood’s global cultural dominance. Each of these terms also 
resonates in some degree with notions of universality, usually with regard to a rationalisation 
of why Hollywood narratives have tended, in recent decades, towards homogenised 
blockbuster products: the summation of such analyses has been, in short, that universality 
equals maximum profitability. What then of universality as represented within, not by, the 
blockbuster? When Hollywood blockbusters refer to ‘universal’ values such as freedom and 
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democracy they do so in Ameritocratic terms; what is being referred to is not a genuinely 
universal value, but its American iteration. However, the specific (American) historical and 
cultural references to which these terms speak are unreadable; the signified content of the 
concepts are left deliberately vague and variable, heightening their ‘universal’ nature.  Over 
half a century ago, as America assumed her leading role on the world stage, Louis Hartz 
(cited in Paul Roazen introduction to Hartz 1990, p.21) sounded a warning against the 
conflation of unique aspects of America with universal applications:  
 What we have to do is disentangle our faith in the norm of freedom from the 
 particular historical experience in which it has been cast in the United States. We 
 have to be able to distinguish the universality of an ethic from the peculiar framework 
 in which we have received it. 
Hollywood blockbusters have consistently failed to heed this warning, unable or unwilling to 
disentangle American uniqueness from American universality, obfuscating the boundary 
between the American and the global, and thus projecting the ‘peculiar framework’ of 
America as a global inheritance. The assumption, espoused by American Presidents of both 
the filmic and factual worlds, that all peoples desire freedom and independence may well be 
true, but the universality of these ethics is rarely presented in a paradigm that does not 
reference America as the ultimate expression of them. Nonetheless, it may also be true that 
audiences do see something universal in Hollywood movies, and that representations of 
freedom and democracy, trite as they may be, can offer inspiration and hope: ‘probably a lot 
of people who suffer from all sorts of oppression can project into that situation of the 
embattled central figure who fights against oppression and wins through’ (Geoff King, 
Ameritocracy: 2011).  
 
Through analysis of Roland Emmerich’s blockbuster movies, I will expand upon and draw 
together ideas concerning the universalisation of American values that have already been 
developed and explored, focusing on the ways in which they integrate and employ 
Ameritocracy. It is not within the scope of this thesis to quantify, qualify or analyse what 
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effects, if any, Ameritocracy might have through these texts. Rather, my analysis is upon 
identifying Ameritocracy within the text as desirable outcome, preferred subject position and 
dominant metanarrative in terms of the conflation of American values and universal values. 
Indeed, it may be philosophically contentious to even argue whether such things as 
‘universal’ values do or can exist, and although mono-myths and mythotypes will be 
discussed in reference to specific texts, it is not my purpose here to digress excessively into 
such deep waters. However, it should suffice to say that generations of Americans have been 
educated to believe that such universal values do exist, and that they are American. Partly 
because of the worldwide dominance of Hollywood, we too have received the same lessons.   
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Case Study: The Universality of Roland Emmerich 
 The whole Western world is obsessed with entertainment. I don't know about the 
 third world really; maybe they are too. It's like everybody is obsessed with 
 Hollywood movies worldwide. And even though everybody hates the Americans, 
 they're still watching American movies. So, in that way, entertainment can do much 
 more than, probably, a book or article. (Gilchrist, 2004). 
  
The dominance of the blockbuster in global markets is based around a political economy that 
seeks to promptly and profitably return investments. With blockbuster budgets usually in 
excess of one hundred million dollars, it is unsurprising therefore that Hollywood studios tend 
to utilise a limited range of low-risk strategies in the production of a blockbuster, designed to 
maximise their ‘universal’ appeal. Blockbusters usually come from a handful of loose genres 
(science fiction, fantasy, action, cartoon), frequently derive from ‘pre-sold’ intellectual 
properties (comic books, novels, etc) and have reasonably predictable narrative outcomes. 
Additionally, part of a blockbuster’s unique selling point is that it has a star director to match 
the star cast; consequently, there are only ever a handful of directors at any given time that 
can be considered as ‘blockbuster’ directors, and therefore only a limited number of 
‘bankable’ directors who studios will trust with the gargantuan sums at their disposal. For the 
purposes of this case study I have honed in on the work of one such director, Roland 
Emmerich. Whilst there are several other blockbuster directors whose films could similarly be 
used to interrogate Ameritocracy, there are several reasons that make Emmerich’s oeuvre 
particularly pertinent. 
 
Emmerich’s Hollywood theatrical releases, beginning with Universal Soldier (1992) through 
to 2012 (2010) neatly span the post-Cold War era of American unipolarity and hegemony 
with which this thesis has been largely concerned. During this era, without the easily 
identifiable ‘Other’ of Soviet communism against which America could define itself, 
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Hollywood has constructed a range of enemies for its heroes that have scattered and 
unspecific origins and motivations. However, much like the universal aspirations of the 
Soviet Union, these diffuse enemies are also perceived to hold the potential for universal 
threat; in attacking America, these enemies attack us all. Emmerich’s movies are full of such 
universal threats and the ‘universal’ (American-led) responses that can resolve them, and, 
similarly, can be said to belong to a broad apocalypse genre, which, with its themes of global 
crisis, destruction and rebirth, lends itself particularly well to Ameritocratic themes and 
content.  
 
In selecting sources for his blockbusters, Emmerich has largely strayed away from the pre-
sold properties (including sequels) that dominate the blockbuster marketplace (Godzilla, 
1998, being the sole exception to date) preferring free-standing texts that only connect 
indirectly to other cultural products or mythologies (with which they may share commercial 
synergy or branding). Consequently, as one-off event movies, we can analyse and interrogate 
Ameritocratic themes in Emmerich’s films without excessive recourse to additional meanings 
generated by the brand or property being utilised. Of course, Emmerich’s movies still come 
with pre-existing mythological baggage, but they draw instead from other sources which are 
less obviously commercial (novel, comic books, television shows, etc) such as Ancient Egypt 
(Stargate, 10, 000 BC), American history (The Patriot), or catastrophic Climate Change (The 
Day After Tomorrow, 2012), and are thus more self-contained as objects of study. Similarly, 
Emmerich’s use of historical setting and narrative scenario is particularly fantastic. For 
example, Emmerich does not make ‘history’ films in the way that, for example, Spielberg has 
(Schindler’s List, Saving Private Ryan, Munich), but rather merely references history as part 
of plot content, not to explore the meanings of the narrative within a broader historical 
context. Even The Patriot, Emmerich’s sole ‘history’ film, takes the facts of the War of 
American Independence very loosely: the film is not a film ‘about’ the war as such, but rather 
uses the structure of the war as a backdrop for the more universal themes of freedom, 
democracy and individual heroism. So, whether the narrative crisis is pre-historic, parochial 
 99 
or planetary, Emmerich consistently returns to Ameritocratic ideas, and positions positive 
notions of ‘America’ as just and right, as unique and universal, and as a true hegemon. Any 
critique of America in Emmerich’s films only occurs by means of the closed economy of the 
jeremiad, which, as the most patriotic form of protest, only circles back in to the same 
positive notions of American universality.  
 
By any standards, Emmerich’s films perfectly fit the ‘blockbuster’ mould. High on budget, 
spectacle and production values, his films are visually impressive products capable of 
generating vast profits. However, unlike some of his colleagues such as Steven Spielberg or 
Christopher Nolan, Emmerich is not regarded as a director of ‘serious’, ‘artistic’ or 
‘challenging’ films but rather as a proclaimed director of ‘popcorn’ movies - films which do 
not have pretensions to wider social significance or the development of ideas, but focus solely 
on the provision of pleasure through escapist entertainment. The ‘popcorn’ moniker is 
suggestive of a ‘pure’ entertainment, and of an emphasis on visual spectacle over character 
development, plot structure or general profundity, which means that Emmerich’s films are 
rarely analysed for ideological motivation; however, they are at the cutting edge of the 
commercial aesthetic – vast, ‘global’ stories, seemingly transparent and un-antagonistic, and 
maximising universal appeal – and as such are particularly pertinent to the analysis of 
Ameritocracy. Moreover, Emmerich’s admittance in the epigraph to this section that ‘even 
though everybody hates the Americans,  they're still watching American movies. So, in that 
way, entertainment can do much more than, probably, a book or article’ demonstrates an 
awareness that Hollywood films, even ‘popcorn’ ones, have a transformative potential, even 
if we accept that the nature of that transformation is polyvalent and unpredictable. 
 
In the following sections I will analyse the Ameritocratic content and intent of Emmerich’s 
films thematically, analysing how his usage of certain shots, expositionary strategies, filmic 
techniques, genres, and monomythic narrative content all contribute to an Ameritocratic 
message, which, whilst seemingly concerned with universal aspirations and values, often 
 100 
extols particular virtues and parochial concerns through a persistent conflation of the 
American with the universal. Emmerich’s blockbusters, like those of other big budget 
directors, may appear to demonstrate global concerns in their appeals to audiences beyond the 
domestic market of the United States, but analysis of his films shows that these ‘tent-pole 
pictures’ are not really deracinated – they still speak to specifically American ideals and 
interests, and root themselves in Ameritocratic notions of universality15.  
 
My analysis of Emmerich’s films will take a broadly structuralist approach, seeing his 
blockbuster narratives as pleasure-producing and meaning-making mechanisms that seek, in 
some small degree, to make sense of the world; his movies project universal mythic structures 
(conveying meaning through the use of particular monomythic story tropes, character types 
and narrative arcs), which endorse the dominant ideology of American universality and 
hegemony through the projection of Ameritocracy as part of a totalising and underlying 
universal system. Emmerich is not so much an ‘auteur’ with an instantly recognisable visual 
style or a self-conscious agenda, nor a director engaged in the projection of ideological 
messages in a conspiratorial or propagandist sense, but rather a filmmaker whose practice 
utilises and assembles an array of cinematic codes and conventions which are particularly 
well suited to the commercial success required by the blockbuster marketplace.  As Maltby 
(1995, p.436) suggests, the ‘cinematic author may now be understood, in theory, as the name 
of a sign, a matrix of textual devices, or “merely a term in the process of reading and 
spectating;”’ in this sense, ‘Emmerich’ refers not just to the director and his creative 
idiosyncrasies, but to a particular mode for the assemblage of what Lévi-Strauss referred to as 
‘bundles of relations’ (1963, p.211), the constituents of mythic narratives.   
Indeed, as Olson (2004, p.125) suggests, 
                                                        
15 Of course, not all blockbuster films are as explicitly Ameritocratic as I will suggest Roland 
Emmerich’s are. However, by their very nature, all blockbusters must make some appeals to 
universality – commercial success hinges upon it – and thus they tend therefore to return to familiar 
themes, genres, and re-constitutions of monomythic elements with proven ‘universal’ status.  
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 Although authorial intention does not define the nature of a literary act, it is clear that 
 some of the leading Hollywood media producers believe they distill, displace, and 
 display mythic archetypes. Steven Spielberg and George Lucas are perhaps the best 
 examples. Their use of mythic displacement ranges narrowly from the overtly 
 manifest to the slightly less manifest, particularly in their work together, which 
 explicitly mine Western mythology. 
We could easily add Roland Emmerich to a long list of blockbuster directors who ‘believe 
they distill, displace, and display mythic archetypes’, frequently utilising elements of 
Campbell’s ‘monomyth’16 of the ‘hero’s journey’ (1968), which, through its tale of tests and 
thresholds, endeavours and enemies, rewards and resurrection, makes claims for its universal 
applicability. It is not within the scope of this thesis to address whether the world shares a 
single myth system (or a set of universal values), or to extensively test the academic validity 
and usability of Campbell’s ideas17; however, we can acknowledge, as Olson does above, that 
many Hollywood filmmakers (particularly blockbuster directors) extensively utilise 
monomythic forms and archetypes (on both conscious and unconscious levels) as part of a 
creative and commercial strategy. In arguing that such forms and archetypes constitute a 
‘narrative transparency’ onto which non-American cultures can superimpose their own 
mythic meanings, Olson even goes so far as to argue that the  
 global intercultural success [of American media] can best be attributed to their 
 ability to reduce myth to its prior elements, elements that like those on the periodic 
 table are recombinant and universal. Their success does not lie in regenerating a 
 particular myth, but in transgenerating a new, elemental one. This can best be called a 
 mythotype because it transcends any particular myth. (2004, p.126) 
                                                        
16I use the terms ‘monomyth’ and ‘monomythic’ here in their most generic senses, without a slavish 
devotion to Campbell’s work, and the stages of the ‘hero’s journey’ (1968), or to other monomyths. 
However, Jewett and Shelton’s constructions of The American Monomyth (1977) and The Myth of The 
American Superhero (2002) are both pertinent to my analysis (although I do not analyse Emmerich 
through the specifics of their arguments), because of the ways in which they concentrate on American 
iterations of universality and on an exceptionalist desire to lead humanity to salvation.  
17 Campbell’s conception of the monomyth has been criticised for excessive abstraction and Western 
ethnocentrism (Crespi, 1990), for male bias (Weigle, 1998), and for operating in terms which are too 
general to be of academic credibility in the study of mythology. 
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Olson’s transparency theory implies universality, which feeds back into an idea of America as 
the ‘universal nation’: it attributes universal status to American media production (via its 
usage of archetypes and common myth structures), one so complete that even monomyths are 
preceded by ‘mythotypes’. Olson is suggesting that audiences desire Hollywood texts because 
they know, from experience, that they will offer them transparency, thus generating an 
association between ‘America’ and mythotypical forms. Hollywood therefore functions as a 
supplier of transgenerational templates, spaces that say ‘Your Myth Here’. Yet those spaces, 
the framework onto which the projection of indigenous values can occur, are nonetheless 
unequivocally American – referring to them as transparent simply obscures the Americanness 
of the process. In constructing such mythotypes or monomyths, Hollywood directors do not 
simply select morsels at random from the mythotypical smorgasbord, they regularly return to 
elements that speak directly to values and behaviours valourised in American culture. The 
‘hero’s journey’, for example, endorses the endeavours of male individualism as the driving 
force of history, truth and justice. Similarly, the monomythic elements utilised by Emmerich 
relate not to global myths (although they are frequently presented as such) but to elements of 
American mythology: the tabula rasa, the frontier, the jeremiad, the happy ending, renewal, 
and a sense of moral mission and providential purpose. Such monomythic recombinations in 
blockbuster movies may seem neutral, and, as ‘popcorn’ products, fundamentally irrelevant 
and ideologically insignificant; however, as Mackay (1999, p.65) states in reference to Star 
Wars (1977), ‘we are instructed that these films have cultural capital; they are relevant to a 
“timeless” audience because of their mythological themes.’ 
 
Naturally, readings of blockbuster texts are not uniform, as the broad nature of monomythic 
elements generate an interpretive variance. Where appropriate I will signal possible counter-
hegemonic interpretations in footnotes, but it has not been possible here to engage in a fully 
open poststructuralist analysis in which  ‘criticism should not only critique dominant 
ideologies but should also specify any utopian, oppositional, counter-ideological, subversive, 
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and even, if possible, emancipatory moments which are then turned against existing forms of 
domination’ (Kellner, p.80). The assumptions of a poststructuralist analysis, ‘that no text 
takes a position that it does not at the same time undermine, the idea that all texts are 
constitutively contradictory’ (Stam, p.182), are certainly applicable to Emmerich’s oeuvre 
and to blockbuster cinema more generally.  The blockbuster’s urge towards commercial 
universality opens each text up to polysemic possibilities, to the potential for negotiated and 
oppositional readings to those that support the dominant and hegemonic ideology. However, 
just because the now normative poststructuralist mode of criticism tends to reach ‘the familiar 
conclusion that the “text” under analysis is full of contradictory tensions, requires active 
readers and produces a variety of pleasures’ (Willemen, p.227) we should not ignore the fact 
that dominant codes, conventions and ideologies can still be located in individual texts, and 
across Hollywood blockbuster cinema generally.  That said, it should also be noted that it is 
generally easier to locate mythic or ideological elements in films than to work out what this 
means, to what ends they might be deployed, how they get there and what we ‘do’ with them 
in our viewing. Furthermore, simply because the dominant code is the most obvious, this does 
not necessarily make it the most influential; as Stringer argues (2003, p.3) ‘the social stature 
of movie blockbusters is never guaranteed’, so we cannot easily equate the size, scale and 
success of the blockbuster with lasting cultural significance. Consequently, ‘we cannot read 
directly from the hit status of texts to argue that they plug directly into contemporary cultural 
concerns’ (King, p.7); however, to suggest no connection between success and wider cultural 
and ideological currents would be, at best, implausible.  
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Conveying Universality: Symbolic Signposting 
One of Roland Emmerich’s preferred techniques for expressing the global nature of a 
particular narrative is exceedingly simple, involving little more than the appearance of an on-
screen graphic displaying the place and date of the following scene. Ostensibly, the purpose 
of these graphics is obvious. They function as simple geographic and temporal signposts, 
enabling the audience to immediately understand where and when the ensuing ‘action’ is to 
occur. In helping to establish a ‘world’ for the narrative that is ground in the familiar, such 
signposting is an element of a standard exposition that  ‘introduces the characters, shows 
some of their interrelationships, and places them within a believable time and place’ (Boggs, 
40). Expositionary graphics are used at least once in the introductory scenes of every 
Emmerich directed theatrical release apart from 10,000 BC, which uses its title to achieve the 
same ends. In The Patriot, these graphics are limited to specific locations in America during 
the revolutionary era, which itself is referenced in the first graphic ‘West Virginia, 1776’. 
Universal Soldier, Stargate and 2012 foreground their narratives with scenes set in earlier 
historical periods that contain important plot information about the past, informing the present 
day narrative that constitutes the body of the film: ‘Vietnam, 1969’ (Universal Soldier), 
‘North African Desert, 8,000 BC’ and ‘Giza, Egypt, 1926’ (Stargate) and a series of graphics 
that lead us from 2009 to the titular date of 2012 via a series of locations around the world 
(2012). Exposition of this sort is, of course, certainly not limited to Roland Emmerich or to 
blockbuster filmmaking, however its deployment by Emmerich suggests that as well as 
providing temporal and geographic orientation, such graphics also function as part of a 
broader symbolic signposting that relates to Ameritocracy. Emmerich is able to convey a 
sense of universality to the narrative using this form of expositionary signposting (the 
universality of the commercial aesthetic), implicating all peoples, not just Americans, in the 
unfolding story.  
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Indeed, as Stringer suggests, it is difficult to conceive of the Hollywood blockbuster in purely 
‘American’ terms: 
 the Hollywood blockbuster is very frequently a transnational product… The very 
 production and narrative concerns of Around The World in 80 Days, Bridge on the 
 River Kwai, Khartoum (1966), and others, prioritize issues of cross-cultural contact 
 and understanding. Similarly, the recurring fetishization of “exotic” overseas 
 locations in many contemporary box-office hits, as well as the projection of 
 anthropological themes in action-adventure titles such as Raiders of the Lost Ark 
 (1981) and The Mummy (1999), both suggest that the Hollywood blockbuster 
 continues to enjoy close and ongoing relations with the global culture that spawns 
 and sustains it. (2003, p.10) 
Stringer’s argument here is particularly applicable to Emmerich’s work, which similarly 
draws upon the disciplines of anthropology, archaeology (including Egyptology), climate 
science and astronomy for its plots and themes. With transnational, global or ‘human’ 
concerns centred in their narratives, Emmerich’s films unsurprisingly ‘visit’ and graphically 
signpost diverse range of locations. However, closer inspection reveals that this crude 
universalism is Ameritocratic, with American myths, ideas and heroes at its centre. The 
signposts, whatever their practical expositionary function, point back to America.  
 
Let us take Godzilla as an example. The opening credits form the first part of the film’s 
exposition and provide a representation of the genesis of the eponymous monster; a long 
sequence of shots - a map of the South Pacific ocean, nuclear testing, a lizard with her eggs - 
are overlaid and intercut, all washed in a sepia tint that informs that these events are not 
current, but historic. The sequence is accompanied by a muted version of ‘La Marseillaise’, 
so that along with the geographic and temporal markers, the audience is provided with sonic 
symbolic signposting that informs us that the crisis that is about to ensue is not one that 
America is culpable for. The first scene takes us to Chernobyl (another site of nuclear 
catastrophe in which America bears no responsibility), where the film will collect its hero, a 
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scientist studying the effects of radiation on earthworms. From there the expositionary 
graphics continue apace over the following scenes as the audience tracks Godzilla from the 
South Pacific to New York via Tahiti, Panama, Jamaica, and the Eastern Seaboard of the 
United States. So, before the narrative moves beyond the exposition into the complication or 
crisis section of the film (the monster’s destructive arrival in New York) we have already 
travelled halfway around the world, and the audience is aware of the global scale and scope of 
the narrative.  
 
However, the apparent universality of this geographic signposting symbolically leads us, 
inexorably, to the United States: in the Emmerichian apocalypse blockbuster, all roads lead to 
the New Rome. The introduction to The Day After Tomorrow is a similar case in point, 
centring an American response to a universal crisis. Following a long computer-generated 
shot that carries the viewer in over an Antarctic ice-scape (constituting the opening credits of 
the film), the very first shot of the movie introduces the scene: a text graphic of ‘Larsen B Ice 
Shelf, Antarctica’, overlaid on a fluttering, full-screen stars and stripes. The inference is clear; 
America will be at the heart of the ensuing narrative, even though the plot locations will be 
dispersed throughout the world and the impacts of the coming catastrophe will be universal. 
Moreover, the signified content of the flag (freedom, democracy, etc) is seemingly transposed 
onto the blank Antarctic landscape, a continent whose official territoriality is shared and 
contested by several nations, of which America is not one. The specific national content of 
the flag, however, is elided in favour of a universal context; Antarctica is presented as a vast, 
virginal and universal territory, a terra incognita and tabula rasa onto which America will map 
itself, evoking peculiarly American iterations of new world and frontier mythology. Of the 
fifty-one shots that comprise the rest of the introductory sequence, the flag appears in ten of 
them. So, if The Day After Tomorrow is a deracinated text which does not privilege the US 
domestic market and ‘no longer addresses a national audience’ (Wasser 1995, p.365), or if it 
is a ‘transparent’ text (Olson, 2004), what then is the purpose of the heavy-handed inclusion 
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of the American flag in its introductory sequence if not to assert the universality of American 
identity?18  
 
Other locations are merely plot points, satellites orbiting on the periphery of a global 
America, not nations on a par with America; the threat may well be universal, but the solution 
is ultimately and inevitably always American – a perfect expression of Ameritocracy. 
Independence Day, perhaps the Ameritocratic text par excellence, demonstrates this point 
directly. Following the first devastating wave of alien attacks, a plan is hatched for a 
retaliatory strike; cut to the ‘Iraqi Desert’ where Israeli, Arab, French and British air forces 
have mustered; a Morse code message comes through: ‘It’s from the Americans, they want to 
organise a counter-offensive’ chirps a British officer, ‘It’s about bloody time’, his commander 
replies, ‘what do they plan to do?’. The plan is spread to Russia and the Far East, who are 
equally eager to receive the news of America’s solution: at last, the Americans have a plan to 
save us all. Only American leadership is logical in the face of such a global crisis; only 
American ideas and ingenuity can bring together the previously warring nations of the world 
and offer truly universal answers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 This interpretation is, of course, just that – a singular interpretation of what I perceive to be the 
dominant reading of this scene. However, one could easily argue that the flag here is merely an 
accurate representation of how an American scientific mission in Antarctica would conduct and 
represent itself. Alternatively, one could even make an extreme oppositional reading of this scene and 
suggest that the heavy-handed inclusion of the flag by Emmerich is actually a deeply ironic 
commentary on American jingoism through the hyperbolic deployment of this powerful national 
symbol.  
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Conveying Universality: One World  
Based on the “earthrise” photographs taken by the crew of Apollo VIII, no other single image 
conveys a sense of a unified world more than an image of the earth as seen from space. It 
reveals our planet in all its grandeur and vulnerability, as just a small blue orb in the vast 
blackness of the cosmos and the one world that all humans can call home. Emmerich has used 
this shot in three films - Independence Day, The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 (interestingly, 
and perhaps not coincidentally, these three films are Emmerich’s highest grossing, with each 
featuring global apocalypse) – each time extending the logic of the graphic signposting 
(expositionary and symbolic) of universality, by literalising the idea of one world in a single 
shot. Each usage, however, has a nuanced symbolic meaning and function in its expression of 
Ameritocracy. In Science Fiction films, a genre in which all three films can broadly be 
placed, such a shot is not unusual; indeed, for films whose plot occurs in space, or which 
feature extra-terrestrial beings, such a shot is relatively commonplace and has been used in 
the introductory sequences of many recent sci-fi blockbusters, including Contact (Robert 
Zemeckis: 1997), Armageddon (Michael Bay: 1998), War of The Worlds (Steven Spielberg: 
2005) and Transformers (Michael Bay: 2007).  
 
In Independence Day this ‘earthrise’ shot is used in the film’s introduction and functions as a 
simple visualisation of the fact that the impending alien apocalypse will be global in nature. 
However, the shot comes at the end of a sequence that centres America as the nation that will 
be tasked with leading a planetary (universal) response to the invasion. The sequence begins 
with a shot of the American flag planted by Apollo XI astronauts on the moon, and pans 
down to reveal the plaque set down to accompany it, zooming in on the words as Neil 
Armstrong annunciates what we can read on the screen: ‘Here men from the planet earth first 
set foot upon the moon. We came in peace for all mankind.’ A shadow passes over the 
plaque, and the subsequent shots track the shadow as it moves over the surface of the moon, 
before panning up to reveal planet Earth, small and vulnerable. Immediately, the audience is 
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asked to make a link between the American flag, the voice of America’s most famous 
explorer and the Earth itself. To be American is to be global, bound to lead as representative 
of all humanity, and destined to be the bearer of the light that will cast out the alien shadow.  
To be American is to be already universal – the only nation with the universal aspiration and 
ambition to put a man on the moon, and the only power capable of responding to a universal 
threat. From its very first frames, Independence Day positions Ameritocracy, the union of the 
American and the universal, at the centre of its world. 
 
Emmerich returns to the ‘earthrise’ shot at the end of two other movies, The Day After 
Tomorrow and 2012, using this iconic image to evoke a literal ‘new world’ to replace those 
swept away by environmental apocalypse. As these shots end both films (fade to black), they 
are not expositionary, but rather form the final part of the denouement and, as such, have 
different symbolic relationships to Ameritocracy to that expressed at the beginning of 
Independence Day. In The Day After Tomorrow, the film’s final sequence shows us the rescue 
of survivors from a frozen New York, before cutting to the American astronauts who have 
watched events unfold from the International Space Station. Peering out of a porthole, one 
astronaut asks his colleague ‘have you ever seen the air so clear?’ The camera pans round, 
revealing the earth below and a North America almost entirely covered in ice. The air is clear, 
the earth is cleansed, and a new era awaits humanity. That the United States no longer exists 
as a functioning geo-political entity and that millions of people have died in the rapid onset of 
a new ice age is inconsequential; the ‘earthrise’ shot enables the film to end with a profound, 
and global, sense of hope. ‘America’ survives and endures, even in the absence of the 
geographic nation; again, ‘America’ is not so much a state as a state of mind, enduring, 
immutable, terminal.  
 
The ending of 2012 is extremely similar, but rather than the terminal aspects of Ameritocracy, 
the shot focuses more explicitly on American mythology of the ‘new world’, and its sense of 
hope and possibility. As the arks that contain the remnants of humanity head symbolically 
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towards Africa, the cradle of civilisation, the camera zooms out, slowly revealing a changed 
and new world. The old world, with its decadent civilisation, has been swept away; the 
‘earthview’ shot dramatises the founding myth of America, renewing ‘America’ again on a 
new continent. However, like its usage in The Day After Tomorrow, the use of ‘earthrise’ 
ends the film with a problematic post-nationality. Indeed, the arks themselves (a name with 
biblical origins, thus also conveying Ameritocratic notions of providentiality to the new 
world) evidence the poly- and transnational nature of the film and offer a reasonable, if crude 
reflection of geo-political reality: American and Indian scientists discover the world is 
doomed; the American government leads other nations to plan for the worst and fill the arks; 
but it is the stereotypically industrious and secretive Chinese that manufacture and host them. 
The Chinese make things, America safeguards culture and universal values19.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19 ‘Leave it to the Chinese’, says Carl Anheuser, ‘in the time we had I didn’t think it could be done.’ 
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Conveying Universality through Genre: It’s The End of the World, As We Know It. 
 Emotionally, the end of the world is actually a renewal, a transition to a new 
 beginning and a better life to come. In religious narratives, God smites sinners and 
 resurrects the virtuous. For secularists, the sins of humanity are atoned through a 
 change in our political, economic or ideological system. Environmental 
 prognostications of calamity are usually followed with reproaches and 
 recommendations for how we can save the planet. Marxists projected communism as 
 the liberating climax of a multistage process that requires the collapse of capitalism. 
 Proponents of liberal democracy proclaimed the end of history when the cold war 
 was won by democracy and liberty (Michael Shermer, 2011).  
 
Apocalypse movies have always been attractive to Hollywood; they demand heavy use of 
spectacle to achieve verisimilitude, which whilst a costly endeavour, helps to establish them 
as ‘must-see’ events with universal appeal (such spectacular narratives also naturally inhibit 
dialogue, helping films to ‘translate’ well overseas) and potentially vast commercial rewards. 
Indeed, the appeal of apocalypse may even be genuinely universal (as argued by Shermer) 
hard-wired into our evolutionary psychology. The perennial recurrence of prophecies of 
doom, in both religious and secular contexts, suggests that as humans we fear the worst, but 
hope for the best; a sense of apocalypse, and the rebirth it might bring, is an enduring 
fascination that is not unique to Americans. However, the centrality of renewal inherent to 
ideas of apocalypse, wherein each destruction promises redemption, means that such stories 
have a particular resonance with American identity, which thrives upon rituals of renewal.  
 
Similarly, apocalypse films also make appeals to audiences based on ‘the thought that if none 
shall survive, then, at least, all class, social, and racial boundaries will have been erased. No 
more slavery, no more sweatshops, no more prejudice, and no more inequality’ (Dixon, 2003, 
p.3). This erasure of boundaries has a natural resonance with American myths and ideologies 
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of egalitarianism, feeding into and out of Ameritocratic notions of universality: in the face of 
universal threat, we all become equal. Apocalypse thereby offers resolution to the riddle of E 
Pluribus Unum: as 2012’s fictional American President (Danny Glover) states, ‘Today, none 
of us are strangers. Today we are one family, stepping into the darkness together.’ Moreover, 
apocalypse also enables reference to ideas of America as the terminal society, providentially 
prepared for its universal destiny: at the end of the world it is America that leads the world 
back into the light. Of course, if apocalypse is a recurrent human theme then the end is always 
posited, always nigh; paradoxically, American terminality must therefore always be deferred, 
with each ending functioning as the next beginning. 
 
Many blockbusters, of course, fall into a broad apocalypse genre, which may manifest in a 
superhero or spy story, a biblical or historical epic, or most likely – as here – in science 
fiction: those of Roland Emmerich herald almost exclusively from this genre. Only his first 
theatrical release, Universal Soldier, does not directly relate to apocalypse. Stargate, his first 
major success, has a narrative that mostly occurs off-world, but Earth is threatened with 
destruction by nuclear attack in the film’s climax. Independence Day, The Day after 
Tomorrow and 2012 all visualise the apocalypse, whilst Godzilla sees the catastrophe focused 
only on New York (although there is also the potential for global crisis if the monster’s eggs 
hatch). Even The Patriot and 10,000 BC have themes of civilisational peril; the former, a 
historically inaccurate recreation of the American Revolutionary war, and the latter, a 
picaresque adventure tale of early human society, both see their heroes fighting against 
tyranny so that they may build a new, and more hopeful world. The Patriot is a direct 
representation of one of America’s founding mythologies, whereas 10,000 BC, which is 
ostensibly a narrative deracinated from national identities, merely relocates the same 
mythology to a pre-historic moment. The tale of liberty versus tyranny, and the triumph of 
unity from diversity, so quintessential to American identity, are perceived as perennial and 
applicable to any human era. Indeed, this type of superimposition of the specific experiences 
of American freedom and democracy onto notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ in their 
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broadest, most abstract sense, can be perceived of as an example of the universalisation of 
American values (or perhaps even the Americanisation of universal values – the two 
processes seemingly synonymous) with which the rhetoric of Ameritocracy is concerned.  
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Conveying Universality: New Worlds, New Frontiers 
If apocalypse movies enable the American mythology of the new world, they do so by 
dramatising that other most cherished of American myths, the frontier: 
 ‘What you’ve got in most cases is some kind of monstrous intervention, whether it’s 
 a monster or not, that comes in and sweeps away the supposedly complacent, cosy, 
 corrupt world and forces a re-engagement with this more primal kind of thing, which 
 is again a re-enactment of that kind of frontier dynamic’ (Geoff King, Ameritocracy: 
 2011).  
In analysing films, it is tempting to constrain the frontier to the Western genre and the 
nineteenth century, to moments when a physical frontier was being stretched to the 
boundaries of the American continent. However, as discussed in chapter one, philosophical 
ideas of the frontier are deeply rooted in American identity, prefiguring the founding of the 
United States. Yet, the frontier is also the most elusive of locations, existing to be 
transgressed, a line drawn so that it can be effaced, redrawn and effaced again; indeed, the 
frontier, certainly since the formal closure of the geographical western frontier at the end of 
the nineteenth century, is now not so much a physical location, but a psychological site in 
which to enact ‘the mystery of American renewal’ (a phrase used by President Clinton in his 
1992 Inaugural address), the point at which American universality can be tested, and the 
‘place’ where the ideological ouroborus of Ameritocracy is most at home.  
 
Similarly, the frontier also engages with contradictory notions of American terminality in its 
establishment of a boundary that must be pushed against and extended; in constant pursuit of 
an abstract concept of ‘progress’, the frontier is an end point that can never be reached, but 
rather endlessly renewed. Each renewal, like apocalypse, generates a new world. Nonetheless, 
for all its abstraction and insubstantiality, the frontier still functions as a boundary, the border 
between us (US) and them (everything that is not ‘America’), and thus inevitably therefore 
has a difficult relationship with inclusive notions of American universality. Emmerich 
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engages the mythology of the frontier in a range of nuanced ways: as cultural contact zone, as 
site of renewal, as symbol of masculine adventure, as battleground for heroes who fight both 
external enemies and internal bureaucracy, and as escape from technological civilisation. 
Each iteration, however, seems to reinforce ideas of American hegemony in the unipolar era, 
even as they postulate a universal erasure of national boundaries and the generation of a new 
world. 
 
The idea of the new world (often linked directly to the ‘earthview’ shot), and the new frontier 
it provides, is quite common to science fiction films. In Blade Runner, neon blimps float 
through the skies of a dystopian future Los Angeles, claiming that ‘a new life awaits you in 
the off-world colonies. The chance to begin again in a land of opportunity and adventure’. We 
never see these colonies, with the plot located in the decaying streets of the old world, but we 
do know that the hard work of establishing them is performed through the slave labour of 
‘replicants’. The redeployment of American founding mythology is clear. Similarly, in 
Avatar, Jake Sully is offered ‘a fresh start, on a new world’; an opportunity he seizes, 
eventually joining forces in rebellion with the indigenous population. This idea of ‘going 
native’ is fundamental to the process of renewal that the frontier offers; as Slotkin  argues, 
‘the American must cross the border into ‘Indian country’ and experience a ‘regression’ to a 
more primitive and natural condition of life so that the false values of the ‘metropolis’ can be 
purged and a new, purified social contract enacted’ (1992, p.14). But this is not a radical 
proposition: ‘has there ever been a more banal and obvious manifestation of frontier 
mythology [than Avatar]? The message is a huge grab-bag of clichés from American culture 
and ideology’ (Geoff King, Ameritocracy: 2011).  
 
Emmerich dramatises this border crossing most effectively in Stargate. The Stargate itself, a 
device for travelling between worlds, embodies the threshold to be transgressed; the portal 
takes our frontier adventurers to a literal new world, where they engage with the natives and 
help them overthrow the yoke of their tyrannical alien overlords. The experiences the 
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characters have in the new world will change them irrevocably and positively; the geeky 
archaeologist Daniel Jackson (James Spader), has had his most outlandish theories proved 
correct and is given a chance to stay with the natives (to do research), but it is Colonel Jack 
O’Neil (Kurt Russell) who benefits most from his encounter with the primitive culture. When 
we first meet O’Neil he is contemplating suicide, toying with the same gun his young son had 
accidentally shot himself with. He accepts his assignment to the new world as a suicide 
mission, taking with him a tactical nuclear weapon to destroy any signs of danger. By the end 
of the film he has been born again, regenerated, purged of his melancholy through his 
experience with the primitive world. This is the frontier as a contact zone between primitive 
and civilised cultures, but one in which the Stargate team arrive as liberators, not oppressors 
(the historically more likely turn of events). They bring the people of the alien world writing, 
weaponry and tactics with which they can rebel; most importantly, however, they bring the 
gift of American leadership and example.  
 
Emmerich’s movies are suffused with frontier mythology, in both small details and, as in 
Stargate, in broad brush strokes. In Independence Day, ‘the original westward frontier 
movement [is] echoed in the image of a caravan of motor homes moving across the empty 
expanse of Nevada’ (King, p.19); in 2012 characters flee an earthquake-ravaged Los Angeles 
in an airplane named ‘Western Spirit’. In The Day After Tomorrow, we can observe multiple 
manifestations of frontier mythology. Television announcements tell us that ‘in a dramatic 
reversal of illegal immigration, thousands of people are crossing the Rio Grande into Mexico’ 
as the snow-storm descends on the United States’. Mexico closes its borders until ‘the 
President was able to negotiate a deal to forgive all Latin American debt in exchange for 
opening the border’. Political boundaries are broken down as Western (northern hemisphere) 
civilisation is crushed below the weight on a new ice age. It could be argued that the film 
offers a critique of technological American civilisation, counterposed to a frontier dynamic 
which offers a more finely-nuanced relationship with ‘nature’. However,  
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 ‘The opposition between ‘the frontier’ and ‘civilization’ or the technocratic state is a 
 false one that can be given imaginary reconciliation – and thus the emotional 
 satisfaction derived from creating the impression of taking on problems and resolving 
 them – without addressing the underlying contradictions (of class, race, gender, and 
 so on) that characterize contemporary American society’(King: 10). 
The reconciliation (and renewal) King suggests, is demonstrated by the final words of the 
film, delivered by the new American President (the old President having been symbolically 
sacrificed in the storm): 
 ‘These past few weeks have left us all with a sense of humility in the face of nature’s 
 destructive power. For years, we operated under the belief that we could continue 
 consuming our planet’s natural resources without consequence. We were wrong. I 
 was wrong. The fact that my first address to you comes from a consulate on foreign 
 soil is a testament to our changed reality. Not only Americans, but people all around 
 the globe are guests in the nations we once called the third world. In our time of need 
 they have taken us in and sheltered us and I am deeply grateful for their hospitality.’  
In the new world that has dawned, there is no line between the first and third worlds, all 
nations are now equal in front of nature’s awesome power. However, the unlikely act of an 
American President apologising for America offers an illusory resolution to the narrative; 
America is presented as a new nation, one reduced in geographical size, population, political 
clout and, crucially, hubris, and yet, despite American culpability in the catastrophe – briefly 
explored in the film in a scene featuring an intergovernmental meeting on climate change in 
which the then Vice President of America cites the vast economic costs involved in 
countermeasures – America still retains the agency of hegemony. The third world, even 
though it may no longer be referred to as such, is reduced to a stereotypical hospitality, the 
agency it briefly possessed trumped by a renewed American mythology. Indeed, the humility 
and gratitude of the President’s speech almost make it fit for thanksgiving, the first great 
experience of hospitality in the new world: a frontier experience that, ultimately, did not work 
out well for the hosts. 
 118 
 
The happy, hopeful ending to The Day After Tomorrow also sees a father (Dennis Quaid) 
reunited with his son (Jake Gyllenhall), their relationship now defined on new terms.  More 
commonly, Emmerich uses the reunion of a separated man and woman: whether they are star-
crossed lovers separated by force (10,000 BC), estranged husband and wife (Independence 
Day), ex-lovers (Godzilla) or divorced couple (2012), their re-union is presented with an air 
of inevitability, ‘a return to an essential unity that has only temporarily been blocked’ (King: 
p.26). Superficially, such familial reconciliations can be regarded as universal themes, myths 
to which all audiences can relate. Indeed, what could be more elemental and basic than the 
relationships between father and son, and between husband and wife? However, we can see 
that such structures of familial reconciliation, despite their universality (and in part because of 
it) are tinged with a specifically American mythology; they symbolically represent the 
renewal of the covenant between America and the people, providing an imaginary resolution 
for problems that are not so easily remedied in reality. As Maltby (1995, p.8) argues, movies 
‘have happy endings because part of their cultural function is to affirm and maintain the 
culture of which they are a part’, and the happy ending, the most basic facet of a Hollywood 
narrative (blockbuster or otherwise), thus sustains a quintessentially American conception of 
what the new world promises: a new and happy beginning20. Of course, producers and 
distributors are not necessarily concerned with the ideological imperative of a happy ending, 
but rather the all important commercial aspect: ‘there has been a tendency in Hollywood 
movies over the years to have an upbeat, happy ending, and there’s something to be said for 
that, in that when you leave the cinema, if you leave with a spring in your step, you’re more 
likely to go and tell a friend about it (Hugo Grumbar, Ameritocracy: 2011). Ultimately,                                                         
20 The final renewal of the happy ending thus has implications for internal and external processes of 
Americanisation: ‘Americanisation is the outcome of personal acculturation which involves the willing 
acceptance of a new national identity… Americanisation erases the past and begins things anew. To 
become an American involves regeneration: to become Americanised is to be utterly transformed.’ 
(Melling and Roper, p.6) In some senses then, each Hollywood happy ending enacts a small process of 
Americanisation; active readers can of course resist or reject this happy renewal and seek to transgress 
the norms established. Such a resistance, however, is also likely to circumvent the pleasures derived 
from Hollywood’s traditional mode of narrative resolution; the dominant and hegemonic ideology 
projected by the happy ending is, at least in part, what people pay their money for.  
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Hollywood movies package pleasure, and so it is unsurprising that audiences generally 
respond well to positive, hopeful endings; ‘you might not want to remove yourself from your 
daily life in order to watch a story that does not have some degree of hope at the end of it’ 
(Joe Cardazzo, Ameritocracy: 2011).  
 
The logic of Ameritocracy (which is heavily imbued with the hope of the happy ending) 
eventually reaches its apotheosis in Independence Day’s most jingoistic, and ironically 
universal, scene in which the American President delivers a rousing speech to a gathered 
crowd of nervous pilots: 
 Mankind. That word should have new meaning for all of us today. We can’t be 
 consumed by our petty differences anymore. We will be united in our common 
 interest. Perhaps it is fate that today is the fourth of July, and you will once again be 
 fighting for our freedom… and should we win the day, the fourth of July will no 
 longer be known as an American holiday, but as the day when the world declared in 
 one voice “we will not go quietly into the night, we will not vanish without a fight”, 
 we’re going to live on, we’re going to survive. Today we celebrate our Independence 
 Day!  
If, as Wasser claims, ‘the American film industry no longer addresses a national audience. 
Hollywood’s domination of international trade has altered its relationship with the domestic 
market’, such that ‘deracinated transnational media now dominate all national audiences’ 
(1995, p.364), it is extremely difficult to account for the intense nationalism of this scene.21 
Upon analysis, blockbusters are not as fully deracinated as Wasser would have us believe – 
again, the notions of mythic universality they frequently employ are not decentred from 
national narratives, but are Ameritocratic, speaking (sometimes directly, sometimes 
obliquely) to specifically American concerns. The President’s inspirational words, just like 
the scene set on the moon in the film’s introduction, deliberately conflate the American with                                                         
21 Of course, the hyperbolic jingoism that this speech seemingly expresses can be read in multiple 
ways. A viewer can agree with the post-national, universal sentiment it engenders in varying degrees, 
from a general nodding concurrence to a wholehearted emotional outpouring of cheering and whooping 
like that enacted by the crowd who hear the speech in the film. In contrast, a viewer may view the 
hyperbole of the scene with humour and irony, and see as preposterous its attempts at profundity.  
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the universal (‘Mankind… united in our common interest)’; Ameritocracy, and the profound 
belief that America has a universal and providential purpose and destiny (‘perhaps it is fate 
that today is the 4th of July’), is finally and fully confirmed.  
 
Crucially, this rhetoric is not merely the product of a filmic fantasy, but has a real-life 
analogue. President Reagan confessed to having mooted the notion of an alien threat to 
General Secretary Gorbachev during private discussions held in 1985, stating how easy it 
would be to ‘forget all the little local differences that we have between our countries’ in the 
face of such a universal crisis. He later referenced the same hypothetical idea, in terms that 
are remarkably similar to Bill Pullman’s fictional leader, during an address to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 1987:  
 I occasionally think how quickly our differences worldwide would vanish if we were 
 facing an alien threat from outside this world. And yet, I ask is not an alien force 
 already among us? What could be more alien to the universal aspirations of our 
 peoples than war and the threat of war? 
His Ameritocratic conviction that there could be such a thing as ‘universal aspirations’ that 
are impeded by ‘war and the threat of war’ seems noble, and brims with a ‘one world’ 
rhetoric of peace appropriate for the forum of the United Nations. However, it is unclear as to 
precisely what such aspirations might be and who would define them, although it is probably 
safe to assume that he is speaking of generic notions of peace, freedom and prosperity. After 
all, which people would not want these things? Independence Day takes the same rhetoric, but 
is explicit in outlining who will model such universal aspirations, and even provides a date 
when we might annually celebrate them.  
 
Narrative transparency theory suggests that blockbusters will tend towards simple, mythic 
ideas in their narratives (which speak to ‘universal aspirations’), as producers seek out scripts 
that can provide pleasure to as many people as possible, maximising worldwide profits. The 
very diversity of the American box office, even prior to consideration of the diverse desires of 
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overseas territories, therefore leads producers to naturally tend towards a more generalized 
and homogenized product. Moreover, Emmerich’s blockbusters, and perhaps many more by 
other directors, are also not truly mythotypical (and thus transparent) as Olson (2004) argues; 
global audiences may be able to project their own myths onto the narrative, but only through 
interacting with the peculiarly American ideas and ideologies that are being presented. 
Similarly, the narrative scope and target audience of Emmerich’s blockbusters may be global 
in proportion, but its underpinning structure is specifically American. This returns us to 
Purdy’s ‘parochial universalism’, which is at the core of Ameritocracy, and it is worth re-
stating his contention that Americans have ‘always been inclined to believe that they are the 
world’s universal nation... Americans believe, somewhere below the level of articulation, that 
every human being is born as American, and that their upbringing in different cultures is an 
unfortunate, but reversible accident’ (Purdy 2003, p.105). Hollywood blockbusters therefore 
have a crucial role to play in helping to expound the obviousness of American universality 
and the efficacy of American global hegemony, and in so doing help to ameliorate the 
misfortune of not being born American by helping the world to unite in our common interest, 
and unleash the ‘American’ within us all. 
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Conveying Universality: Deploying the Jeremiad. 
The nearly ubiquitous presence of frontier mythology in Emmerich’s oeuvre is matched by 
the occurrence of the jeremiad, a rhetorical form which the frontier helps engender. Inherited 
from the Puritans, the jeremiad embodies concepts of social renewal and revitalisation, and a 
recommitment to the originary myth of the sacred covenant between the government and the 
people, transposed from the covenant between the Israelites and God22. Emmerich frequently 
utilises the jeremiad in the form of seemingly universal character and narrative archetypes, 
deploying it (as other filmmakers do) as an important constitutive element of the 
blockbuster’s monomythic lexicon. Of course, the origin of the jeremiad in the Old Testament 
establishes its rhetorical structure as a central tenet of Judaeo-Christian theology23, so we can 
in some sense think of it as a universal form of protest.  Indeed, stripped of its theological and 
religious underpinnings, some version of the jeremiad is probably universal: as basic conflict 
between government and people, and as calling attention to the almost inevitable disparity 
between rhetoric (ideals) and action (interests) manifest in political institutions and 
ideologies. However, no other nation centres the jeremiad at the heart of her political life and 
mythic origin story with the same intensity and ubiquity as America; the projection of the 
jeremiad as a ‘universal’ form of protest therefore obscures the fact that in its American 
iteration the jeremiad is implicitly and intimately connected to American exceptionalism. This 
sense of specialness, the idea of America as a chosen nation with special universal values, 
suffuses the American jeremiad and thus feeds directly into notions of America as natural 
global hegemon.  
                                                         
22 It is important to note here that, as Bercovitch explains, the American jeremiad is different from its 
old world predecessors, suffused with a more intense religiosity and sense of providentiality: ‘The 
traditional mode, the European jeremiad, was a lament over the ways of the world. It decried the sins of 
“the people” – a community, a nation, a civilization, mankind in general – and warned of God’s wrath 
to follow… But from the start [the Puritans] sounded a different note. Theirs was a peculiar mission, 
for the they were a ‘peculiar people’, a company of Christians not only called but chosen, and chosen 
not only for heaven but as instruments of a sacred historical design. Their church-state was to be at 
once a model to the world of Reformed Christianity and a prefiguration of New Jerusalem to come.’ 
(1978, pp.7-8)   
23 Jeremiah is considered a prophet in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
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A scene towards the end of 2012 exemplifies Emmerich’s usage of the jeremiad as both a 
universal story trope and archetypal character. As giant tidal waves race towards the 
Himalayan plateau in the film’s climactic scenes, ticket-holders wait to board the arks that 
will lead them to safety. Dr. Adrian Helmsley (Chewitel Ejiofor) discovers that the waves will 
arrive earlier than previously predicted and the decision is taken by Carl Anheuser (Oliver 
Platt, the President’s Chief of Staff who is the acting Commander-in-Chief once the 
incumbent decides to remain in Washington) to close the bow doors, leaving thousands of 
people (including ticket-holders and the Chinese workers who constructed the vessels) 
exposed to certain death outside. Helmsley is appalled by this act and delivers the following 
words to those on the bridge of his ship and, via video, to the heads of state on board the other 
arks: 
 I know we’ve all been forced to make difficult decisions to save our human 
 civilization, but to be human means to care for each other and civilization means to 
 work together to create a better life. If that’s true, then there’s nothing human and 
 nothing civilised about what we’re doing here… Everybody out there has died in vain 
 if we start our future with an act of cruelty. What will you tell your children?’  
Helmsley makes his plea for compassion by way of the jeremiad, a form of protest where 
‘prophets narrate conduct as a decline from origins’ (Shulman 2008, 8), which are defined 
here as the basic, universal standard of ‘human civilisation’. In the conflict of ideals and 
interests that ensues Anheuser argues against Helmsley, ‘Dr. Helmsley’s passion is admirable, 
but I would remind you that we have very limited resources and extremely limited time’. This 
contrary position is typical of an American jeremiad in which the ideals of the nation (‘life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, reduced in this scene to only ‘life’) are opposed by 
government bureaucrats who exchange cherished values for exigency and expedience, thus 
breaking the sacred trust between leaders and their people. 
 
The two other arks respond to Helmsley’s words with a recommitment to the universal ideals 
he has espoused: ‘The people of Russia, along with China and Japan agree to open the gates’, 
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followed by ‘The United Kingdom, Spain, France, Canada, Germany and I believe that I may 
also speak for the Italian Prime Minister, we vote to let these people come in’. The conflict of 
ideals and interests, which lends perennial verisimilitude to blockbuster narratives, is given 
the imaginary resolution of ideals winning through; however, it is Helmsley, the American 
Jeremiah, who puts forth the solution and offers the necessary leadership to guide the other 
nations out of their acquiescent stupor. At this moment of crisis and choice, American 
leadership and alliance with the universal values of all of humanity proves the efficacy of 
American hegemony. Yes, Helmsley has been opposed by forces within his own society, but 
in bemoaning Anheuser’s commitment to interests over ideals, this internal conflict only 
serves to further demonstrate that the American ideal is morally right and just. Suitably 
convinced of the efficacy of American leadership, the other nations agree to let the people in, 
with the Western nations pointedly using the language of democracy (‘we vote’) as they do 
so.  
 
Emmerich deploys Jeremiah figures in many of his films (notably his apocalyptic movies, -
Independence Day, Godzilla, The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 - in which warnings of 
calamity are most apposite), with a character archetype: the morally and environmentally 
responsible scientist, who prophesies and warns against catastrophe, fights against conspiracy 
and bureaucracy, and who keeps alive the ‘universal’ ideals of individualism, freedom and 
democracy. In each case the Jeremiah figure is opposed not just by the external enemy 
(aliens, a mutated monster, and extreme climate change), but also by a bureaucratic and 
secretive governmental figure, so that in each film we can observe, as Geoff King suggests, ‘a 
split between those two things: the ideas of conspiracy, dishonesty and deceit, and the 
unveiling of that by these figures who do have some of this frontier heritage’ (Ameritocracy, 
2011). Helmsley may not be a traditional frontier figure, but his character traits – bravery, 
resourcefulness, soulfulness, intelligence and integrity – and performance of the 
jeremiadplace him squarely in that heroic tradition.  
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Similarly, the character of the prophet-hero or scientist-Jeremiah appears in The Day After 
Tomorrow (Jack Hall – Dennis Quaid), Godzilla (Dr. Niko Tatopoulus - Matthew Broderick) 
Independence Day (David Levinson - Jeff Goldblum) and Stargate (Daniel Jackson – James 
Spader). In each case the scientist discovers the impending apocalypse24 , informs the 
government and is resisted by a bureaucratic figure. Interestingly, as scientists, each is also 
engaged in transnational research (apart from Levinson, who works as a satellite scientist for 
a media network), providing additional credence to their assumed universality. In The Day 
After Tomorrow the conflict between ideals and interests is played out at the UN Conference 
on Global Warming in New Delhi (notably a ‘global’ forum), where Hall explains his ice core 
findings to the assembled international delegates. After fielding concerned enquiries, Hall 
summarises his beliefs with the idealistic statement that ‘if we do nothing it will be our 
children and our children’s children who will have to pay the price’. The United States 
delegate, Vice President Becker (Kenneth Walsh) swiftly retorts, ‘and who’s going to pay the 
price of the Kyoto accord. It would cost the world’s economy hundreds of billions of 
dollars… our economy is every bit as fragile as the environment’, placing national interests 
over post-national ideals. As events unfold it is Hall, our Jeremiah, whose predictions come 
true, leaving Becker contrite and apologetic by the movie’s conclusion.  
 
Godzilla’s jeremiad is more complex, insofar as it is divided between two characters of 
different nationalities, Dr. Niko Tatopoulus, the American scientist-prophet who realises the 
scale of the threat posed by the eponymous monster and its potential progeny, and Phillippe 
Roaché (Jean Reno), a French secret service operative dispatched to clean up the damage 
done by French nuclear testing: ‘I am a patriot, I love my country. You understand that? It is 
my job to protect my country. Sometimes I must even protect it from itself’. Although Roaché 
is in some sense an embodiment of the institutionalised vested interests of his government, 
this statement (and his bravery throughout the film) also renders him as an agent of his                                                         
24 Such prescience is fundamental to the Jeremiah story, and is also fulfilled by Helmsley in 2012: he 
discovers the coming calamity and warns his superiors, becoming the lead scientific advisor to the 
President. 
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nation’s ideals; his actions enable the renewal that his jeremiad implies. Tatopolus meanwhile 
is plagued by a variety of obstructive and self-serving internal forces that will not listen to his 
entreaties: the New York mayor who is concerned about how damage to the city will effect 
his election prospects; the US Army generals who, in aggressively pursuing Godzilla, are 
blind to the exponentially worse problem posed by the creature’s eggs; the manipulative ex-
girlfriend who steals from him in order to forward her media career. In each case, 
Tatopoulus’s predictions come true and his ability to remain right and just is never in doubt. 
Both Tatopoulus and Roaché demonstrate a particularly American aspect of the jeremiad, 
namely the distrust of federal and governmental authority25, but they also embody the mission 
of the American jeremiad, that through the combined power of word and deed an individual 
and national renewal can be enacted. 
 
Emmerich’s use of the jeremiad appears to partly align with the European, exclusively civic 
usage outlined by Bercovitch (1978, pp.7-8), insofar as they seemingly lack the specific 
religiosity fundamental to the American iteration. However, the sense of being ‘chosen’ for a 
‘peculiar mission’ (providentiality), of ‘sacred historical design’ (terminality), and of being ‘a 
model to the world’ (universality) are retained, each expressing an aspect of Ameritocracy26. 
Universal and terminal ideals, expressed by white male scientist-prophet characters, win out 
over short-term interests. Emmerich’s jeremiads thus function to reinforce the idea of 
America as the universally hegemonic nation with global responsibilities: on the eve of the 
final battle in Independence Day David Levinson (Jeff Goldblum) says to his wife, ‘you know 
how I’m always trying to save the world?’, throwing an empty can of Coca-Cola into a 
                                                        
25 The Patriot (2000), concerns part of the founding myth of the American civic jeremiad, and its 
eventual codification in the covenant of the constitution. But even here, the natural distrust of federal 
authority emerges before the War of Independence begins: ‘Why should I’, asks Benjamin Martin (Mel 
Gibson), ‘trade one tyrant three thousand miles away, for three thousand tyrants one mile away?’ 
26 Ellis (1993, p.170) also argues that ‘For Bercovitch, the Puritans provide the key to the “astonishing 
cultural hegemony” of competitive individualist vales – free enterprise, laissez-faire, self-reliance, 
social mobility - in America.  Not only was there an “elective affinity” between Puritanism and 
capitalism, but the Puritans bequeathed a rhetorical form - the jeremiad - that functioned to sustain the 
cultural hegemony of competitive capitalism. It was the Puritan jeremiad, Bercovitch argues, that “gave 
contract the sanctity of covenant, free enterprise the halo of grace, [and] progress the assurance of the 
chiliad.”’ (Ellis, p.170) 
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conveniently placed recycling bin, ‘well, here’s my chance’. The American rhetoric of global 
mission, delivered here as a throwaway line, suffuses Emmerich’s blockbuster texts; his 
deployment of the jeremiad takes all opposition and re-assimilates it into the universal 
consensus of ‘America’, functioning to re-affirm the apparent interchangeability of the terms 
‘American’, ‘global’, ‘universal’ and even ‘human’.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis and accompanying documentary film has demonstrated the centrality of 
Ameritocracy to American identity, thought and action. A sense of the universal example set 
by American government and political economy has been interwoven in the American 
national fabric from the earliest settlers to the present day. Furthermore, the projection of this 
universality has become increasingly important throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-
first century, as America sought to rationalise her position as global hegemon, and establish 
American prime modernity as globally desirable, beneficial and attainable. Consequently, 
Ameritocracy has also served as a rationale for the justification of American primacy, and is 
integrated into the nation’s primary modus operandi and raison d’être: who else should lead 
the world if not the world’s global nation, the nation which best represents the ‘universal’ 
values of freedom, liberty and democracy and thus operates as the last, best hope for 
humanity?  
 
Ameritocracy functions as a useful conceptual prism through which we can analyse 
‘America’ and American cultural products; its application is not unique to Hollywood 
cinema, although the global scale and scope of blockbusters does make them an ideal home 
for universalist ideas. The conception of Ameritocracy has potentially broad applications 
across the field of American studies, with particular relevance to cultural industries such as 
television, or to other cultural media that are exported from the United States. Moreover, the 
ability of Ameritocracy to provide a bridge between culture, history and politics also suggests 
that the concept could be deployed in reference to the various arenas in which universalist 
rhetoric finds a home beyond culture, whether in the explicitly political language of inaugural 
addresses and other presidential pronouncements, or in the more oblique fields of military 
power, economic endeavour or technological progress. Finally, because notions of 
universality are fundamentally inclusive, Ameritocracy offers a means by which the exclusive 
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myth of American exceptionalism, which to a great degree drives the discipline of American 
studies, can be challenged and interrogated. There are, of course, fields and texts that counter 
Ameritocratic thought, and thus there is also much potential scholarship in an analysis of 
films, or other texts, which refute, resist and oppose American universality. Furthermore, it 
has unfortunately not been possible here to engage with notions of a ‘post 9/11’ cinema and it 
particular usage of universalist rhetoric; to do so would have constituted an entire thesis unto 
itself and so, in the interests of clarity, no reference has been made to those calamitous events. 
 
The Hollywood blockbuster, with its industrial power, global reach and universal language, 
has proved to be an ideal vehicle for projecting Ameritocratic thought, providing the perfect 
outlet through which American values can be demonstrated to be universal. The universality 
of Hollywood blockbusters (which functions to both satisfy American commercial interests 
and express American ideals), which obfuscates the boundary between the American and the 
universal, and conflates American iterations of particular ideals with universal values, is also 
beset by a parochial perspective - the profound conviction that America (and the ideals of 
freedom, liberty and democracy) is exceptional, a special and sacred idea that is more than a 
mere nation. Consequently, American universality has always been challenged and 
contradicted by exclusive notions of American uniqueness; the crisis of exceptionalism, of 
how America can be simultaneously unique and universal, is perennial. Ideas of renewal have 
therefore been central to American national narratives, so that universality can be redefined, 
terminality re-deferred, and providentiality re-conferred. Ameritocracy is thus an ideological 
ouroborus, endlessly feeding on itself and beginning again, reconstructing new worlds in 
which the American idea can be reborn, and the American story retold. Where better for this 
story to be told, to American citizens and citizens of the world, than through the myth 
machine of Hollywood? Through Hollywood blockbusters, which are but one conduit for 
Ameritocratic thought, we can engage in an American global culture and share in American 
prime modernity, so that whatever else we might be, we can also be American.  
 
 130 
Not all Hollywood films are as aggressively Ameritocratic as Roland Emmerich’s, and there 
are of course films which attempt to critical engage with America’s primacy, hegemony and 
universal status. However, the importance of maintaining cultural universality is central to 
hegemonic survival and so it is unlikely that mainstream Hollywood cinema (of which the 
blockbuster is the central text) will ever stray too far from the Ameritocratic assumptions of 
American universality, terminality and providentiality that provide the rationale for American 
global dominance and leadership. What is unclear is what happens when American hegemony 
is not just challenged, but supplanted by the primacy of another nation? As the BRIC 
economies continue to grow and develop American primacy and hegemony will, inevitably, 
be threatened, and the unipolar era we currently find ourselves in will most likely be brief. To 
paraphrase Twain, reports of the end of history have been greatly exaggerated.  
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Communications / Dog Eat 
Dog Films / Iconlatry 
Productions Inc. 
 
 
The Corporation 
 
 
2003 
 
Mark Achbar and 
Jennifer Abbott 
 
 
Big Picture Media 
Corporation 
 
Fahrenheit 9/11 
 
2004 
 
 
Michael Moore 
 
 
Fellowship Adventure 
Group / Dog Eat Dog Films 
/ Miramax Films 
 
 
 
 
 
Television 
 
Show Title 
 
Year 
 
Director 
 
 
Producer / Channel 
 
Dallas 
 
 
1978 - 1991 
 
David Jacobs 
(Creator) 
 
 
Lorimar Productions 
/ Lorimar Television 
 
Star Trek: The Next 
Generation.  
 
1993, 26th April 
 
Jonathan Frakes 
 
Paramount 
Television 
 158 
Season 6, Episode 
20, ‘The Chase.’ 
 
 
The Century of the 
Self 
 
 
2002 
 
Adam Curtis 
 
BBC (UK) 
 
The Power of 
Nightmares: The 
Rise of the Politics of 
Fear 
 
 
2004 
 
Adam Curtis 
 
BBC (UK) 
 
The Trap: What 
Happened to Out 
Dream of Freedom 
 
 
2007 
 
Adam Curtis 
 
BBC (UK) 
 
Late Show with 
David Letterman 
 
 
April 9th, 2007 
 
 
 
CBS 
 
Family Guy, “Peter’s 
Progress” 
 
May 17, 2009 
 
Glen Winter 
 
Fox Broadcasting 
Company 
 
 
The Great British 
Film Industry 
 
 
Aug 19, 2009 
 
Michael Buckman 
 
Film24 (UK) 
 
Smallville, “Shield” 
 
Oct 1, 2010 
 
Brian Iles 
 
 
The CW Television 
Network 
 
 
The American 
Dream, “One Nation 
Under God” 
 
 
December 14, 2010 
 
Peter Molloy 
(Producer) 
 
BBC (UK) 
 
 
Video Websites 
www.stockfootageforfree.com 
www.vimeo.com 
www.whitehouse.gov 
www.youtube.com  
